Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ABUDHABI4074
2005-09-26 12:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

MFA U/S ON IRAQ; WELCOMES IRAQ COORDINATOR'S VISIT

Tags:  PREL IZ SA IR SY TC 
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Cable 
Text: 
 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 04074

SIPDIS
CXABU:
 ACTION: POL
 INFO: DAO P/M USLO RSO MEPI ECON AMB DCM

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMBMJ:SISON
DRAFTED: POL:JFMAYBURY
CLEARED: USLO:RSIMM

VZCZCADI156
PP RUEHC RUCNRAQ RHMFISS RUEATRS RUEKJCS RHMFISS
RUEKJCS RHEHNSC
DE RUEHAD #4074/01 2691220
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261220Z SEP 05
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1727
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ1/CCJ2/CCJ3/CCJ5/CCJ5//
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASH DC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP/ISA/NESA//
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 004074 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/I, NEA/ARPI
ALSO FOR S/I AMB JAMES JEFFREY
NSC FOR CHARLES DUNNE
TREASURY FOR LARRY MCDONALD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2015
TAGS: PREL IZ SA IR SY TC
SUBJECT: MFA U/S ON IRAQ; WELCOMES IRAQ COORDINATOR'S VISIT

REF: A. STATE 176666


B. ABU DHABI 4045

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 004074

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/I, NEA/ARPI
ALSO FOR S/I AMB JAMES JEFFREY
NSC FOR CHARLES DUNNE
TREASURY FOR LARRY MCDONALD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2015
TAGS: PREL IZ SA IR SY TC
SUBJECT: MFA U/S ON IRAQ; WELCOMES IRAQ COORDINATOR'S VISIT

REF: A. STATE 176666


B. ABU DHABI 4045

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador met with MFA U/S Abdullah Rashid
Al Noaimi September 24 to preview Iraq Coordinator
Ambassador Jeffrey's October 8 visit to the UAE. She had
earlier previewed the goals of the Jeffrey visit with Abu
Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed and MinState for
Foreign Affairs Hamdan bin Zayed (refs A, B). Al Noaimi said
the UAEG would welcome the interagency consultations. It is
time for Iraqis to hold a conference to achieve "national
consensus" on the future of their country, he said, and
Iraq's neighbors and the international community can be of
help. Al Noaimi had also offered a briefing and insights
about Iraq during a meeting September 20 with a visiting U.S.
delegation; his comments during that meeting are also
incorporated in this message. Al Noaimi advised the U.S.
against withdrawing its troops until the Iraq security forces
have the capacity to guarantee stability on their own, and
indicated that the Iraqis might be willing to allow certain
Arab and non-Arab Muslim forces on their soil. He also
offered his views on the nature of the insurgency. End
Summary.

Previewing Amb. Jeffrey's Visit
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador previewed the October 8 visit of Iraq
Coordinator Jeffrey with MFA U/S Al Noaimi, noting that
Ambassador Jeffrey and an interagency team were going to be
stopping in other capitals in the region as part of a series
of consultations with key Arab partners on Iraq (ref C).
Ambassador highlighted the principal political, economic, and
security themes of the consultations and acknowledged the
UAE's ongoing assistance to Iraq and debt relief pledges.
Ambassador urged accelerated disbursement of aid and
implementation of debt relief commitments. She referred to
her meetings earlier in the week with the Abu Dhabi Crown
Prince and MinState for Foreign Affairs, during which the
Jeffrey visit had been discussed, and noted the September 20
analysis on Iraq Al Noaimi himself had offered (see paras

5-9).

Iraqis Need a Conference on National Consensus
-------------- -


3. (C) Ambassador urged UAE's public support for Iraq's
political process, including posting an Ambassador to
Baghdad. Al Noaimi agreed that Iraq,s stability was
essential to regional stability and in the interests of the
UAE and the U.S. The Iraqis needed help from the
international community, he stressed. "Given their present
situation, they are unable to reinvent their future," Al
Noaimi continued.


4. (C) Al Noaimi shared that he had come to that conclusion
after meeting with Iraq's Ambassador to the UAE recently.
"They cannot do it alone." It was time, he said, for the
Iraqis to hold a conference that would achieve a national
consensus on their future. "Put them in one room and let
them realize the dangers facing them," he suggested. The
Iraqis "need to agree on minimums and stop disagreeing on
details. The details can be worked out later." The unity,
stability, and prosperity of Iraq were in everyone's
interest, Al Noaimi said. Al Noaimi noted Saudi Foreign
Minister Saud Al Faisal's recent remarks about Iraq heading
toward disintegration, raising fears of a wider regional
conflict that will draw the countries of the region into
conflict. He cited Al Faisal's declaration that "We fought a
war together to keep Iran out of Iraq after Iraq was driven
out of Kuwait. Now we are handing the whole country over to
Iran without any reason." Ambassador asked if there had been
GCC consultation on this issue. Al Noaimi said that Al
Faisal's comment had not been made "in a vacuum," but that he
was "exaggerating to have an impact." Ambassador noted the
need for the U.S. and the UAE to confer on strategies to
pressure both Iran and Syria to respect Iraq's sovereignty.

Constitutional Referendum Approaches
--------------


5. (C) In his September 20 discussion with Ambassador and the
visiting U.S. delegation from the Business Executives for
National Security, Al Noaimi said that he expected additional
violence in the run-up to the referendum, but predicted the
Iraqis would approve the Constitution. He said that the
UAE's leadership has tried to allay Iraqi Sunni fears about
federalism by explaining its benefits, using the UAE as an
example of a federal system that has not disintegrated. The
UAE, which has had a provisional Constitution for the past
two decades, has also advised Iraqis that their new
Constitution could be provisional without putting the country
in jeopardy. "The Constitution is a live document that can
be developed," he said. Al Noaimi cautioned against focusing
"too much" on the insurgency. "The insurgency will stay
regardless. ... The more jobs you create, the higher the
living standard, and the greater the security," the less
Iraqis will want to "resist," he said.

Iraq Needs U.S. to Complete Job
--------------


6. (C) Al Noaimi also declared that said a U.S. troop
withdrawal from Iraq at this time "was not an option." The
U.S. should not withdraw until Iraq "possesses the political
and security capacity" to maintain stability on its own. "We
have to be realistic. The minimum goal for the U.S. should
be a stable, unified Iraq. You have to make sure (Iraq's)
neighbors don't cause cracks in Iraq's body." The U.S. also
needs to engage Arabs, NATO, and the UN, he said.

A Role for Other Arab States, Iraq's Neighbors
-------------- -


7. (C) In response to a question from the BENS delegation
about other Arab states' and non-Arab Muslim forces on the
ground in Iraq, Al Noaimi said Iraqis would possibly be
receptive to the idea. Troops from some GCC and North
African states, as well as from Sudan and Egypt, might be
acceptable, he said. He said the Saudi-Iraqi power rivalry
precluded placing Saudi troops in Iraq. (Note: He did
not/not raise the issue of UAE troops, although UAE Special
Operations troops are deployed to Afghanistan in OEF. End
note.)


8. (C) Al Noaimi argued that a stable Iraq would be seen as a
defeat by Iran, Syria, and Turkey, all of which have an
interest in destabilizing all or part of Iraq. He said it
would also mean defeat to Saudi Arabia, although to a lesser
degree. A stable Iraq would be stronger than Saudi Arabia,
he stated. The Saudis want to be the primary player on the
oil market, but if Iraqi oil production capacity increases,
that would increase the Iraqis' strength, he offered. Iraq
would also want to join Saudi Arabia and Iran as regional
powers.

Nature of the Insurgency
--------------


9. (C) Al Noaimi said the insurgency in Iraq was partly
comprised of armed elements loyal to Saddam before he was
ousted from power. The insurgency would continue with or
without the adoption of the new Constitution, as it is "an
organized reaction to disrupt future plans," Al Noaimi said.
He added that prior to the Iraq invasion, no one knew that
Saddam had organized such a force. Asked what should be done
to counter the insurgency, Al Noaimi said the Coalition
should continue building Iraq's military, security, and
economic capacity. He suggested engaging NATO, particularly
on the issue of beefing up border controls.


10. (C) Comment: Al Noaimi, like our other senior UAEG
interlocutors, is convinced that Iran will be the winner in
Iraq. UAEG perceptions of Iran's growing influence and
concerns over Shi'a ascendancy are likely to feature in each
of the conversations Ambassador Jeffrey and team have here
October 8, as is criticism of PM Jaafari's performance and
alleged ties to Tehran. End Comment.


11. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
SISON