UAE DEMARCHE: CUTTING OFF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRADE

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 004049

SIPDIS

STATE FOR T - U/S BOB JOSEPH; T - PATTY MCNERNEY
ALSO FOR NP/RA - CAROLINE RUSSELL
NSC FOR DAVID STEPHENS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2015
TAGS: PARM MNUC KNNP IR CH KN TC
SUBJECT: UAE DEMARCHE: CUTTING OFF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRADE
WITH NORTH KOREA

REF: A. STATE 173768

B. ABU DHABI 3804

C. ABU DHABI 3050

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (U) This message contains an action request at the end of
para 2.


2. (S) Summary: Reminding MFA U/S Abdullah Rashid Al Noaimi
of the UAE's commitment to working with the United States on
shutting down proliferators and targeting their assets (refs
A and B),Ambassador highlighted the need to work together to
ensure that North Korea was not in a position to export
nuclear and nuclear-related technologies on September 24.
She urged that the UAE formally renounce any military trade
with North Korea and noted in particular possible North
Korean use of UAE's ports as transshipment points for vessels
carrying North Korean conventional and missile related
shipments. In the course of the discussion, Abdullah Rashid
shared the UAEG's concerns not only about North Korea and
Iran, but also about China's possible role in facilitating
North Korea's transactions with Iran. Action request: We
would recommend that U/S Joseph be prepared to address the
issue of possible Chinese involvement in such transactions
with his UAEG interlocutors on an "if asked" basis during his
Oct. 1-2 visit to Abu Dhabi and Dubai. End Summary.


3. (S) Ambassador made the points in ref A, noting our
concerns that items originating from North Korea -- both
conventional and missile-related shipments )- could be
transshipped through UAE's ports. She thanked the UAE for
its past nonproliferation cooperation, and noted USG desire
to deepen engagement on all North Korean arms trade. She
also noted USG concerns about the Korean Mining Development
Trading Organization (KOMID),which is identified in the new
U.S. Executive Order as a key entity that is subject to
penalties, including freezing of its assets. The UAE should
refrain from purchasing any dual use items from KOMID and the
UAEG should prohibit KOMID's presence in the country,
Ambassador added. Ambassador had provided Abdullah Rashid
with copies of E.O. 13382 on July 5 and September 4; emboffs
provided copies of E.O. 13382 to the Central Bank, UAE
Federal Customs and Dubai Customs (refs B and C). (Note: The
focus of these previous discussions had been Tanchon
Commercial Bank accounts in the UAE. End note.)


4. (S) Abdullah Rashid replied that the UAE was "well aware"
of the North Korean role in "spreading weapons of mass
destruction materials." He said that the North Koreans had
long expressed an interest in having an "official presence"
in the UAE. He later switched the term to a "cover." The
UAEG, unconvinced about the North Koreans' real intentions,
had "always said no" to such requests. "We don't think they
are a positive player in the international community yet,"
Abdullah Rashid said.


5. (S) Transactions between North Korea and Iran cannot be
fully understood without knowing the role China plays,
Abdullah Rashid argued. "When we want to focus on North
Korea, we need to focus on China as well," he said. The
North Koreans and Iranians conduct "a lot of their meetings"
in China, he added. The UAE intelligence services had "some
information" about what the Iranians and North Koreans were
doing through China. However, "China is a big dragon," he
added, and the UAEG did not have enough manpower "to cover
everything" the Chinese were doing.


6. (C) Ambassador then previewed U/S Joseph's Oct. 1-2 visit
to the UAE, noting that Iran's nuclear program, the need to
develop comprehensive export controls and enforcement
capabilities, the need to address proliferation financing
issues, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and specific
proliferation cases would likely be on the agenda.
SISON