Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ABUDHABI4045
2005-09-25 10:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

MBZ ON IRAQ, EXTREMISM, PALESTINIANS, SAUDIS

Tags:  PREL PTER IZ IR SA SY PK TC 
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Cable 
Text: 
 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 04045

SIPDIS
CXABU:
 ACTION: DAO
 INFO: USLO POL ECON

DISSEMINATION: DAOO
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MJSISON
DRAFTED: POL:JFMAYBURY
CLEARED: USLO:RSIMM

VZCZCADI077
PP RUEHC RUCNRAQ RHMFISS RUEATRS RUEKJCS RHMFISS
RUEKJCS RHEHNSC RHEFDIA RUEASRT RHMFISS RHRMDAB RUEADWD RUEAHQA
RUENAAA RUEAHQA RUENAAA RUEWDAS
DE RUEHAD #4045/01 2681006
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251006Z SEP 05
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1702
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ1/CCJ2/CCJ3/CCJ5/CCJ5//
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASH DC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP/ISA/NESA//
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEASRT/COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA
RHMFISS/COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC
RHRMDAB/COMUSNAVCENT
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHDC
RUEAHQA/OSAF WASHDC//IA//
RUENAAA/NAVY IPO WASHINGTON DC
RUEWDAS/DA WASHDC//DALO-SA//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 004045 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/I, NEA/ARPI
ALSO FOR S/I AMB JAMES JEFFREY
NSC FOR CHARLES DUNNE
TREASURY FOR LARRY MCDONALD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER IZ IR SA SY PK TC
SUBJECT: MBZ ON IRAQ, EXTREMISM, PALESTINIANS, SAUDIS

REF: A. ABU DHABI 4025


B. STATE 175071

C. ABU DHABI 713

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 004045

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/I, NEA/ARPI
ALSO FOR S/I AMB JAMES JEFFREY
NSC FOR CHARLES DUNNE
TREASURY FOR LARRY MCDONALD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER IZ IR SA SY PK TC
SUBJECT: MBZ ON IRAQ, EXTREMISM, PALESTINIANS, SAUDIS

REF: A. ABU DHABI 4025


B. STATE 175071

C. ABU DHABI 713

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin
Zayed (MbZ) told Ambassador and a visiting delegation led by
retired U.S. four-star generals over dinner September 20 that
he expected the Iraqi people would approve a new Constitution
on October 15. MbZ reiterated his support for former Iraqi
PM Iyad Allawi as the person best suited to lead Iraq. He
advised against a premature U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq.
He further indicated that the Iraqis would probably be
receptive to having certain Arab forces on their soil, but he
criticized Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa sharply
for blocking such initiatives in the past. He offered
insights about the threat of Islamic extremism in the UAE and
the region, and identified Hizballah as a greater terrorist
threat than Al Qaida. MbZ also commented on prospects for
Middle East peace, Saudi Arabia's leadership, and Pakistan
President Musharraf's strong stance against terrorism. End
Summary


2. (SBU) On September 20, a delegation from the Business
Executives for National Security (BENS) led by the
organization's president and chief executive officer, General
(Ret.) Charles G. Boyd, met with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince
Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed primarily to discuss the security
and political situation in Iraq. BENS visited the UAE at the
urging of CENTCOM Commander General Abizaid. General Boyd
was accompanied by General (Ret.) Wayne Downing, Chairman,
Combating Terrorism Center; James Kimsey, Founding Chairman
of AOL; Joseph Robert, real estate developer; Eric Flanning,
BENS Strategic Development Senior Vice President; and Lt.
Col. David Dawson, CENTCOM action officer. Also attending
the meeting were Ambassador, USLO Chief, and Pol Chief. MbZ
was accompanied by UAE Commander of Special Forces, General
Juma, and MbZ advisers Yousef Al Otaiba and Jack McGuinness.


Referendum on Iraq's Constitution
--------------


3. (C) The BENS delegation asked MbZ for his views on the
October 15 referendum on the Iraqi Constitution, and on the
likelihood of Sunni support. MbZ said he believed the Iraqis
would adopt a new Constitution. He recommended the U.S. try
to "get the maximum percentage of Sunnis to support it."
Ambassador thanked MbZ for UAEG efforts to engage the Iraqis
on supporting the political process. MbZ then noted his
support for former Iraqi PM Iyad Allawi as "the only" Iraqi
political figure capable of holding the country together.
Iraqi officials needed laws to punish corrupt officials, said
MbZ, citing Ahmed Chalabi specifically. He pointedly
criticized the USG for "bringing in rogue people to run
Iraq."

U.S. Forces in Iraq
--------------


4. (C) Delegation members solicited ideas on how the Bush
Administration could explain to the American public why the
U.S. military should remain in Iraq, particularly now that
the public sees the massive reconstruction effort that is
required in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. MbZ
contended that the situation in Iraq would be "much worse" if
U.S. forces were to withdraw prematurely. From an energy
perspective, "you would need to have the capability to
produce the amount of oil and gas you are pumping from the
(Iraqi) soil." From a security perspective, a premature
withdrawal could cause upheaval in the whole region. "It's a
real danger," MbZ said.Ambassador previewed the upcoming
visit of Ambassador Jeffrey and team to discuss with the UAEG
how we can strengthen mutual efforts in support of Iraq.
(Note: She had previewed the Jeffrey visit September 18 with
MbZ's brother, MinState for Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan )-
ref A. End note.)
Arab Forces in Iraq
--------------


5. (C) The BENS delegation asked what the USG could do to
reach out to the Arab world to persuade Arabs to help in
Iraq. "Your problem in the Arab world is not with the Arab
world; it's with (Arab League Secretary General) Amr Moussa,"
MbZ said, criticizing Moussa for blocking any initiative that
included other Arab states assisting Iraq. He said Moussa
twice lobbied against GCC proposals to deploy a GCC force to
Iraq. Without Moussa at the helm of the Arab League, "you
could find a breakthrough with every Arab nation," MbZ
opined. He said Moroccan, Tunisian, and Yemeni troops might
be acceptable to the Iraqis, but not Egyptians or Syrians.
(Note: Later in the dinner conversation, MbZ suggested having
the Saudis and Egyptians send "a couple of divisions" to
Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. The
UAE has approximately 250 Special Operations troops in
Afghanistan at present.)

Iraq's Insurgency
--------------


6. (C) Ambassador highlighted the need for continued pressure
on Syria to respect Iraqi sovereignty, and asked for UAE
assistance in this regard. The BENS delegation and MbZ both
expressed concern about the potential for the insurgency in
Iraq overflowing into Jordan. MbZ noted the impact Jordan's
collapse would have on Israel. In MbZ's estimation, King
Abdullah is "the only one who could hold Jordan together."
MbZ noted that he heard from his brother Sheikh Hamdan that
Ambassador had urged continued UAE support to Jordan to ease
fuel cost pressures there (ref A). (Note: We believe the
final decision on additional UAE cash assistance to Jordan
now rests with President Khalifa. End note.)

Countering Islamic Extremism in the Region
--------------


7. (C) MbZ devoted much of his reflection to the threat of
Islamic extremism and the UAE's efforts to combat it. He
warned of dangerous repercussions for the region should the
Saudi regime collapse, saying it constituted a greater threat
to the UAE than a nuclear-capable Iran. He dismissed Saudi
claims that they were succeeding in combating extremist
militants. How can you say you are successful when Saudi
security forces have thus far failed to stop the militants'
operations, he asked. In contrast, as soon as the UAEG
learned who was responsible for the September 11 attacks in
the United States, it acted immediately to counter Islamic
radicalization in the UAE.


8. (C) MbZ said he considered Hizballah a more dangerous
organization than Al Qaida, echoing what his brother
Abdullah, the UAE's Information Minister, told S/CT
Coordinator Henry Crumpton in New York September 14 (ref B).
(Comment: During her visit to the UAE on February 7, White
House Homeland Security Adviser Fran Townsend told Director
of UAE State Security Department Sheikh Hazza bin Zayed that
Iran needed to stop sponsoring terrorism and cease supporting
Hizballah, and she requested any UAE cooperation in that
regard ) ref C. Hazza had agreed to ongoing operational
cooperation in the UAE targeting Hizballah and Iranian MOIS.
End comment)


9. (C) MbZ said that he believed in a free press, but was
concerned that people in the Middle East were "not getting" a
free press. In part, this is because terrorists had gotten
the upper hand and used the Internet and television to
promote their agenda, he said. MbZ underscored the
importance of moderate Islamic teachings as a counterweight
to extremist ideology. "If you ground is solid, there is no
problem," he said. MbZ said he also supports the idea of
introducing democratic reforms, such as elections, to the
region, as long as Islamic extremists did not win a majority.
"We will have it in our own time. ... I have no problem with
an elected government. But will it make things worse or
better?" Kimsey praised the UAE for taking a leadership role
in combating extremism and serving as a model for other Arab
states.

Middle East Peace
--------------


10. (C) On Middle East peace, MbZ urged support for
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in his efforts to gain a
stronger grip on Hamas and Islamic Jihad. MbZ also hailed
the Gaza disengagement as a "brave move" on the part of the
Israelis. In response to Ambassador's question about Prime
Minister Sharon's statement at UNGA regarding Arab acceptance
of Israel, MbZ said it was "not a smart move" and asked
rhetorically what Sharon's objective was. MbZ said there
needs to be a "breakthrough" to achieve a two-state solution,
characterizing the current state of the peace process as
being akin to "bargaining in a fish market."

Saudi Leadership
--------------


11. (C) MbZ also took a jab at Saudi Arabia's aging
leadership, saying the Kingdom &needs a retirement system,"
and adding that Prince Bandar was the only one effective
Saudi interlocutor.

Pakistani Leadership
--------------


12. (C) Noting President Musharraf's address at UNGA, MbZ
praised the Pakistani leader for "taking tough positions"
against terrorism in the face of tough neighbors. MbZ
expressed some concern about Musharraf's longevity, but did
not elaborate.


13. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
SISON