Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ABUDHABI3888
2005-09-12 15:05:00
SECRET
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:
COMMENTS ON HUMAN APPEAL INTERNTIONAL NONPAPER
how-tonull Diana T Fritz 08/28/2006 03:58:32 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results Cable Text: S E C R E T ABU DHABI 03888 SIPDIS CXABU: ACTION: ECON INFO: P/M POL AMB DCM DISSEMINATION: ECON CHARGE: PROG APPROVED: AMB:MJSISON DRAFTED: ECON:AECURTIS CLEARED: PM/YD VZCZCADI587 PP RUEHC RUEHMK RHEHNSC RUEATRS DE RUEHAD #3888 2551505 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 121505Z SEP 05 FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1539 INFO RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 1124 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 003888
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/RA FEIERSTEIN; NEA/ARPI MISENHEIMER, WALKER,
THORNE, SMYTH; EB FOR A/S WAYNE, SALOOM, NELSON
TREASURY FOR OFAC WERNER
MANAMA FOR BEAL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2015
TAGS: PTER KTFN EFIN TC
SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON HUMAN APPEAL INTERNTIONAL NONPAPER
REF: A. SECSTATE 166846
B. ABU DHABI 2169
C. 2003 SECSTATE 133205
D. 2003 ABU DHABI 2598
E. 2003 ABU DHABI 2853
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 003888
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/RA FEIERSTEIN; NEA/ARPI MISENHEIMER, WALKER,
THORNE, SMYTH; EB FOR A/S WAYNE, SALOOM, NELSON
TREASURY FOR OFAC WERNER
MANAMA FOR BEAL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2015
TAGS: PTER KTFN EFIN TC
SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON HUMAN APPEAL INTERNTIONAL NONPAPER
REF: A. SECSTATE 166846
B. ABU DHABI 2169
C. 2003 SECSTATE 133205
D. 2003 ABU DHABI 2598
E. 2003 ABU DHABI 2853
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) Summary. Embassy thanks Department for forwarding
Treasury's draft nonpaper on Human Appeal International
(HAI),which is intended for OFAC Director Bob Werner's use
during his 9/16-20 visit to the UAE (ref A). Embassy
strongly recommends against passing the paper as currently
drafted to the UAEG. We support passing a well-sourced,
actionable paper on HAI. However, we believe that the
current draft does not effectively make the case. When we
take a case to the UAEG asking them to take action against
this charity, the case needs to be based on current, credible
intel -- otherwise, we lose credibility with our
interlocutors. End summary.
2. (S) In 2003, Embassy Abu Dhabi raised the USG concern that
the Ajman-based HAI supports terrorist organizations, such as
al-Qa'ida and HAMAS, with UAE Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed. At the time, Sheikh Hamdan
agreed to undertake a thorough investigation of HAI, but
requested an intel package that could be shared with
appropriate UAE intelligence agencies to aid in the
investigation (refs C, D, E). Embassy appreciates that
Treasury is prepared to pass such a package to the UAEG, as
it will aid the UAE in any investigation of HAI.
3. (S) Embassy expects that the UAE Government would raise
the following concerns about the nonpaper as currently
drafted:
-- Most of the information is outdated. There are a few
references to 2004 data, but the majority of the information
is significantly older -- pre-2001.
-- Boudella al Haj is no longer a concern. He was arrested
in 2001 and remains incarcerated in Guantanamo.
-- There is nothing in the paper that indicates that the HAI
leadership is complicit in nefarious activity.
-- The overwhelming majority of the points are related to HAI
activity outside of the UAE.
-- The only datapoint that is within the UAE is inconsistent
with what we know about the charity. There is no Abu Dhabi
HAI branch (see ref B).
4. (S) Embassy continues to believe that taking our HAI
concerns directly to the UAEG -- vice designating -- is the
right approach to take. We believe that the UAEG genuinely
wants to be sure that its charities are all above-board and
is wiling to take action if necessary. However, the UAE
leadership will certainly note that the paper does not
contain current, actionable information.
5. (S) When we take a case to the UAEG asking them to take
action against one of the three largest charities in the UAE,
the case needs to be well-sourced and based on current,
credible intel -- otherwise, we lose credibility and no
action is taken. This case needs to demonstrate that the HAI
headquarters in Ajman is either influencing control over the
international offices and/or is aware that its officials have
connections to extremists. It also needs to demonstrate that
HAI is aware it has received funds from other charities with
extremist connections. Without addressing these issues, the
UAE could just argue that the USG should ask the governments
in Bosnia and Jordan to close those HAI branches.
6. (S) There are indeed many unanswered questions about the
loyalties and motivations of certain HAI employees, and the
natural question is to wonder how far up the chain of the HAI
leadership this goes. Embassy supports passing a
well-sourced and fully vetted intel packet to the UAEG so
that the UAE intelligence services can initiate their own
investigation and take appropriate action. (We note,
however, that the UAE intelligence services only have an
internal presence and will not be able to collect any intel
on HAI's personnel and activities abroad.)
SISON
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/RA FEIERSTEIN; NEA/ARPI MISENHEIMER, WALKER,
THORNE, SMYTH; EB FOR A/S WAYNE, SALOOM, NELSON
TREASURY FOR OFAC WERNER
MANAMA FOR BEAL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2015
TAGS: PTER KTFN EFIN TC
SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON HUMAN APPEAL INTERNTIONAL NONPAPER
REF: A. SECSTATE 166846
B. ABU DHABI 2169
C. 2003 SECSTATE 133205
D. 2003 ABU DHABI 2598
E. 2003 ABU DHABI 2853
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) Summary. Embassy thanks Department for forwarding
Treasury's draft nonpaper on Human Appeal International
(HAI),which is intended for OFAC Director Bob Werner's use
during his 9/16-20 visit to the UAE (ref A). Embassy
strongly recommends against passing the paper as currently
drafted to the UAEG. We support passing a well-sourced,
actionable paper on HAI. However, we believe that the
current draft does not effectively make the case. When we
take a case to the UAEG asking them to take action against
this charity, the case needs to be based on current, credible
intel -- otherwise, we lose credibility with our
interlocutors. End summary.
2. (S) In 2003, Embassy Abu Dhabi raised the USG concern that
the Ajman-based HAI supports terrorist organizations, such as
al-Qa'ida and HAMAS, with UAE Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed. At the time, Sheikh Hamdan
agreed to undertake a thorough investigation of HAI, but
requested an intel package that could be shared with
appropriate UAE intelligence agencies to aid in the
investigation (refs C, D, E). Embassy appreciates that
Treasury is prepared to pass such a package to the UAEG, as
it will aid the UAE in any investigation of HAI.
3. (S) Embassy expects that the UAE Government would raise
the following concerns about the nonpaper as currently
drafted:
-- Most of the information is outdated. There are a few
references to 2004 data, but the majority of the information
is significantly older -- pre-2001.
-- Boudella al Haj is no longer a concern. He was arrested
in 2001 and remains incarcerated in Guantanamo.
-- There is nothing in the paper that indicates that the HAI
leadership is complicit in nefarious activity.
-- The overwhelming majority of the points are related to HAI
activity outside of the UAE.
-- The only datapoint that is within the UAE is inconsistent
with what we know about the charity. There is no Abu Dhabi
HAI branch (see ref B).
4. (S) Embassy continues to believe that taking our HAI
concerns directly to the UAEG -- vice designating -- is the
right approach to take. We believe that the UAEG genuinely
wants to be sure that its charities are all above-board and
is wiling to take action if necessary. However, the UAE
leadership will certainly note that the paper does not
contain current, actionable information.
5. (S) When we take a case to the UAEG asking them to take
action against one of the three largest charities in the UAE,
the case needs to be well-sourced and based on current,
credible intel -- otherwise, we lose credibility and no
action is taken. This case needs to demonstrate that the HAI
headquarters in Ajman is either influencing control over the
international offices and/or is aware that its officials have
connections to extremists. It also needs to demonstrate that
HAI is aware it has received funds from other charities with
extremist connections. Without addressing these issues, the
UAE could just argue that the USG should ask the governments
in Bosnia and Jordan to close those HAI branches.
6. (S) There are indeed many unanswered questions about the
loyalties and motivations of certain HAI employees, and the
natural question is to wonder how far up the chain of the HAI
leadership this goes. Embassy supports passing a
well-sourced and fully vetted intel packet to the UAEG so
that the UAE intelligence services can initiate their own
investigation and take appropriate action. (We note,
however, that the UAE intelligence services only have an
internal presence and will not be able to collect any intel
on HAI's personnel and activities abroad.)
SISON