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2005-07-12 07:19:00
Embassy Abu Dhabi
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						C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 003068 



E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2015

REF: STATE 109232

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison.
Reasons: 1.5 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary: Given the UAE's strategic geographic
location, booming economic activity, and outstanding shipping
facilities, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
identified the UAE as a priority country for outreach. South
Korea, as current MTCR Chair, led a June 7-9 mission to the
UAE with a delegation from the South Korean and French MFAs
and Japanese and Canadian Embassy representatives. In Abu
Dhabi, officials from both MFA and Ministry of Interior were
briefed on MTCR and provided the country's positions on
non-proliferation issues. In Dubai, the meetings focused on
the practical aspects of counter-proliferation, with
briefings, exchange sessions, and a port visit organized at
the General Headquarters of the Dubai Police and at the Dubai
Port Authority (DPA). The mission was informative and
successful in identifying areas of future cooperation. Both
sides expressed a keen interest in information-sharing, and
agreed on the need for enhanced technical assistance,
training, and exchanges at the legal and logistical levels.
A full report will be presented by the Chair to the upcoming
MTCR Plenary, to be hosted this fall in Madrid. However, the
UAE has yet to adopt a specific export control law that
regulates the flow of trade in multilaterally controlled
items. End Summary.

2. (C) In July 2004, the UAE had contacted the MTCR chair to
inquire about the terms and requirements for MTCR membership.
That request, in conjunction with Dubai's heavy
transshipment business, led to the MTCR's outreach visit to
UAE. The MTCR delegation's first meeting on June 7 was
hosted in Abu Dhabi by an MFA panel headed by Assistant Under
Secretary for International Cooperation Abdul Rahim Mohamed

Abduljalil. After expressing the UAE's commitment to a
WMD-free world and a willingness to cooperate with MTCR, he
acknowledged that due to its free market economic policy, the
UAE was vulnerable to people who wanted to exploit its free
trade policies. Abduljalil assured the delegation that all
concerned authorities were aware, able and - so far -
successful in countering that threat. He claimed that the
government had stopped the operations of "many" dubious
companies operating in the country, and had intercepted
material while it was being transshipped through Dubai. He
enumerated the international non-proliferation related
treaties the UAE has signed, and the country's internal legal
framework. Abduljalil cited the national level players: the
National Federal Committee for Control of Radiation Material;
the Federal Customs Authority (which establishes and controls
norms and regulations to control
exports/re-exports/end-users); a National Committee on

Counter-Terrorism; a National Programme that was established
to deal with the "aftermath" of WMDs; Federal Decree 119
(2004) on the Use of Sources of Radiation; and a Law on
Export Control that has been drafted but remains under
review. He also said that a series of seminars, workshops
and training sessions have been organized, mainly in
cooperation with the IAEA, the US and the UK.

3. (SBU) Abduljalil expressed hope that the "efforts and
achievements made until now would be recognized" by MTCR. He
added that effective support and help should be offered to
help the UAE find the right balance between its free market
economy and its potential exploitation for proliferation of
WMD. With Pakistan and Iran as key trading partners and as
main sources of the UAE's expatriate workforce, the potential
for missile and weapons proliferation could not be
underestimated. He requested greater information-sharing,
technical assistance, and training.

4. (SBU) The following session was held at the Ministry of
Interior and consisted of information briefings by the MTCR
delegation to a UAE law enforcement panel. UAE participants
asked about the extent of technical assistance (training and
equipment) that could be offered; the relationship between
members and non-members of MTCR; and the link between MTCR
and the UN, the IAEA and other proliferation-related
treaties, agreements and organizations.

5. (C) On June 8, the delegation traveled to Dubai to meet
with Mohamed Al Dalil, Head of the newly created
Counter-proliferation Team (CPT). The meeting was held at
the Dubai Police GHQ and focused on the practical aspects of
the team's activities more than on the legal framework under
which it operates. The CPT provided detailed information
about interceptions, arrests, and detentions on a number of
cases (including the AQ Khan network related Dubai-based
front companies). According to Al-Dalil, the CP Team's
vision is a region free of WMD trafficking; its official
message is total cooperation with regional and international
partners and improved border control. Its stated objectives
are to improve the international image of the UAE; to prevent
exploitation of legitimate businesses for proliferation
purposes; to review, improve and implement trafficking laws
and regulations; to conduct intensive training through
workshops, seminars, exchange visits; to establish a
licensing mechanisms for import/export and re-exports; and to
provide consultations and advice services to local
interlocutors - private and public - on counter-proliferation

6. (C) The last event was hosted by Sultan Bin Sulayem,
Executive Chairman of the Dubai Port Authority (DPA) followed
by a visit to the Jebel Ali Free Zone. During the
discussion, DPA expressed interest in improving
information-sharing with MTCR. Dubai Port representatives
highlighted the fact that they were one of the 20 ports
worldwide that fully implements the US Department of Homeland
Security's Container Security Initiative (CSI). Port
officials stated that they screen 100% of the manifests,
which are required 48 hours in advance, and x-rayed 420,000
containers last year alone. (Note: Although Port Officials
stated that they used the MTCR and the UN's export control
list as a basis for their operations, it should be noted that
there is no actual and specific export control list issued by
the UN. End Note.) They maintain 24/7 on-site intelligence
team and inspection team which constitutes 65% of all the
DPA's staff. The US, UK and Australia were cited as
countries with which they cooperate on a regular basis.
Finally, DPA underlined that they also complied with norms
set by the Gulf Cooperation Council.

7. (C) Comment: Embassy's assessment is that the UAE's lack
of an export control law has prevented the UAEG from
institutionalizing a regulatory and compliance process that
could be used to detect and interdict shipments and prosecute
violators. The UAE has not yet formally adopted any of the
multilateral control lists as the controlling mechanism.
Nonetheless, excellent law enforcement cooperation on
proliferation cases exists, in part reflecting the fact that
the UAE's anti-terrorism law, enacted in 2004, allows for
criminal prosecution in such cases -- but only for the import
of controlled goods.

8. (C) The USG has been working since early 2002 to encourage
the UAE to enact such a law and a control list. We have held
five cooperative events on legal and operational issues for
export control and the UAE has also sent delegations to a
number of international events on export control and
trans-shipment. We have also provided the UAEG with a
template for an export control law in English and Arabic in
early 2004 and, although the UAEG reported to the UN in
December 2004 that an export control law could be expected in
the very near future, the law has not yet been promulgated.
End comment.