Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ABUDHABI301
2005-01-18 11:17:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER - NSC HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISOR

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PINS EFIN IZ IR TC 
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Diana T Fritz 12/05/2006 11:43:05 AM From DB/Inbox: Search Results

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 00301

SIPDIS
CXABU:
 ACTION: POL
 INFO: DCM AMB P/M USLO ECON DAO

DISSEMINATION: POLM
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MJSISON
DRAFTED: POL:JMAYBURY
CLEARED: A/DCM:OJOHN, P/M SYORK, CG:JDAVIS, ICE:WWALLRAPP, BIS:MO'BRI

VZCZCADI913
OO RHEHNSC RUEHC RUEHDE
DE RUEHAD #0301/01 0181117
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 181117Z JAN 05
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7786
INFO RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 4747
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ABU DHABI 000301 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

NSC FOR HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISOR FRAN TOWNSEND FROM
AMBASSADOR
DEPT FOR EB A/S TONY WAYNE AND NEA/ARPI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINS EFIN IZ IR TC
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER - NSC HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISOR
TOWNSEND'S VISIT TO UAE

(U) Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reason 1.4 (b)
and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ABU DHABI 000301

SIPDIS

NOFORN

NSC FOR HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISOR FRAN TOWNSEND FROM
AMBASSADOR
DEPT FOR EB A/S TONY WAYNE AND NEA/ARPI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINS EFIN IZ IR TC
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER - NSC HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISOR
TOWNSEND'S VISIT TO UAE

(U) Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reason 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) Overview: We look forward to welcoming you to the
United Arab Emirates February 6-7. U.S.-UAE cooperation in
the security and counterterrorism fields is robust and the
UAE leadership is actively seeking ways to enhance the
relationship. Your visit here will be an excellent
opportunity to thank the Emiratis for the outstanding
cooperation they have provided on numerous CT issues. It
will also be an occasion to encourage them to continue CT
cooperation with their neighbors, improve internal
coordination shortcomings, share more leads with us, and sign
an MLAT. In Abu Dhabi, we have requested meetings with Crown
Prince General Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ),State
Security Department Director Sheikh Hazza bin Zayed Al
Nahyan, and Central Bank Governor Sultan Nasser Al Suweidi.
In Dubai, we have requested a meeting with Dubai Crown Prince
Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum (MBR). (We will
suggest that Interior Minister Sheikh Saif sit in on his
brother MBZ,s session, and that SSD Dubai and the Minister
of State for Finance sit in with MBR.)


2. (S) In response to terrorist threats, the UAE is
implementing numerous measures in hopes of preventing attacks
that could cripple its economy and destroy the Emirates,
image as a peaceful, profitable place to do business. UAE
law enforcement agencies )- with U.S. assistance and
training -- are also focusing on how they would respond to a
potential attack, including attacks on critical oil
production, power and water infrastructure, and
ports/airports. The UAE armed forces have made
counterterrorism a leading concern. UAEG funding for
security, including defense, soaked up a whopping 43 percent
of federal budgeted expenditures in 2004.


3. (S/NF) By many accounts, the Emiratis may be better

prepared to prevent, and to cope, with a terrorist assault
than other Gulf neighbors, but the jury is still out on
whether they could capably defend against a sustained
campaign of terrorist violence on their soil. There is
relatively little coordination within and between the
emirates on counter-terrorism strategies. Only in July 2004
did the government pass a new anti-terrorism law that
provides UAE agencies a framework and broad powers for future
operations. There is also still an atmosphere of complacency
that may emanate from the fact that the UAE has, thankfully,
not yet been "hit."


4. (U) We have identified 13 issues for you to explore; they
appear in paragraphs 5 - 17, below.

Suggested Issues
--------------


5. (S/NF) REGIONAL COOPERATION.

Background: The arrest of an Al Qaida-affiliated terrorist
cell in Buraimi in 2004 was an excellent example of CT
cooperation between the UAE and Oman. The UAE State Security
Division and its Omani counterpart developed information and
jointly investigated the case of a terror cell that allegedly
planned to attack oil infrastructure in the Gulf. However,
CT cooperation with other Gulf neighbors has lapsed.

The UAE is focusing significant resources on controlling its
porous land and maritime borders. Your UAE interlocutors are
worried about terrorism in Saudi Arabia and potential
spillover. UAE-Saudi cooperation has been problematic. UAE
officials have told us that when they try to cooperate with
the Saudis by giving them information about suspects in the
Kingdom, the Saudis either reject the offer of cooperation,
saying it is &Saudi business,8 or take so long to act on
the information that it becomes fruitless. Likewise, we have
some evidence that UAE-Kuwaiti CT cooperation is weak.

Points to make: Encourage more regional cooperation; cite
Buraimi cell example.

Expected UAE points: Difficulty getting cooperation from Gulf
neighbors due to political sensitivities.

Suggested interlocutor(s): MBZ, Hazza


6. (S/NF) UAEG INTERNAL CT COORDINATION

Background: There is relatively little coordination between
Abu Dhabi and Dubai on CT strategies. The primary federal
decision-makers on matters related to CT are MBZ, Sheikh
Hazza, and Interior Minister Sheikh Saif. The Central Bank
takes decisions on freezing accounts, while transshipment
issues, which primarily involve Dubai, are handled
autonomously through the Dubai State Security Division. When
the other five emirates have issues related to transshipment
or CT, they refer the matter to federal authorities (Abu
Dhabi) for guidance. (We point to the example of Sharjah
emirate,s handling of Osman Saeed, which landed on Interior
Minister Sheikh Saif,s desk.) The AQ Khan network dossier
has been worked at both the Abu Dhabi and Dubai level.

In August 2004, the UAEG adopted a new anti-terrorism law
that gives UAE officials greater authority to respond to
terrorist-related activity. The legislation defines
terrorism, lists the persons and organizations affected by
this new law, specifically criminalizes terrorist financing,
and sets stiff penalties for violations. The law also
establishes an anti-terrorism committee.

Points to make: Underscore the need for the UAE to improve
interagency and inter-emirate coordination in the CT arena;
equally important that the U.S. continue to explore avenues
of cooperation to assist them.

Expected UAE points: Committee being set up under National
Anti-Terror Law to improve coordination. USG needs to do a
better job of passing on information that is usable for
prosecution purposes. UAEG Central Bank has legal
constraints on asset freezing.

Suggested interlocutor(s): MBZ, Hazza, Al Suweidi, MBR


7. (S/NF) CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE THREAT.

Background: UAE officials have said that they have taken
measures to enhance security at oil installations, but
acknowledge that significant critical infrastructure
vulnerabilities remain and extend beyond oil infrastructure
to power and water grids, ports and airports. Attacks on the
UAE,s power and desalination plants, which produce nearly
all the UAE,s potable water, could have a far greater and
more immediate impact on UAE, senior UAE officials have told
us. Raytheon Corp. is working with the Coast Guard and oil
companies to develop security systems for onshore and
offshore oil installations.

Points to make: Interested in progress on UAE,s assessment
of its critical infrastructure vulnerabilities.

Expected UAE points: Appreciate U.S. cooperation (DHS/ICE ran
a December 2004 Security Threat Assessment Training).

Suggested interlocutor(s): MBZ, Hazza, MBR


8. (S/NF) GREATER UAEG CT ACTIVISM.

Background: While the USG has urged the UAE to provide us
with leads to pursue in CT cases, the UAE has been hesitant
to do so unless they are absolutely certain that the
information is accurate. For example, we believe Sheikh
Hazza wants to be 100 percent certain about the information
he shares with us to avoid being seen in a negative light.

Points to make: Urge UAE intelligence services to be more
proactive and give us leads.

Expected UAE points: Urge the USG to provide it with
actionable information.

Suggested interlocutor(s): Hazza


9. (S/NF) TERRORISM FINANCING.

Background: The UAE is seized with the terrorism financing
issue. Progress on terror finance cases requires information
that is specific, actionable, and releasable to the UAEG.
Salah Al Shamsi remains in UAE detention. In a separate
case, Dubai authorities have moved unilaterally against a
Dubai-based Iraqi insurgent support network. DHS/ICE is also
working a joint investigation with MoI targeting a Dubai
based company allegedly involved in acquiring weapons for the
previous Iraqi regime and financing insurgency operations in
Iraq. If the Ahmed Al Kubaysi or Human Appeal International
cases are to be raised, our side must come armed with
specific, actionable, and releasable information.

Points to make: Appreciate UAE cooperation on Al Shamsi case;
looking forward to further cooperation. What is being done
regarding Iraqi insurgent fundraising connections? Propose
enhanced information exchange, joint terrorist finance
working group or task force. Highlight DOJ training
possibilities on prosecuting terror finance, bringing
prosecutors, judges, and bankers together.

Expected UAE points: U.S. can count on cooperation; ask U.S
for specific actionable information.

Suggested interlocutor(s): MBZ, MBR


10. (C/NF) MIDDLE EAST NORTH AFRICA/FINANCIAL ACTION TASK
FORCE (MENA/FATF).

Background: The Central Bank Governor has stressed that the
UAEG will play a fully supportive role in the MENA/FATF
process, but has stated that the UAEG would like to be
considered for FATF membership in its own right. We assess
that the UAE will participate in MENA/FATF fully and
constructively, despite not being the host of the
organization.

Points to make: The new MENA/FATF will help to address
structural anti-money laundering counter-terrrorist financing
issues in the region. Important to participate fully and
actively.

Expected UAE points: UAEG will be fully supportive of
MENA/FATF. Important that the organization be technical and
not political. May ask about possibility of Iranian and
Syrian participation and UAE interest in FATF membership

Suggested interlocutor(s): Al Suweidi


11. (C/NF) CASH COURIERS.

Background: UAE regulates both the import of cash and
inbound/outbound wire transfers. Individuals are required to
declare cash that they import to the UAE in amounts greater
than the equivalent of $10,800. Legislation specifically
requires cash to be declared when it is brought into the UAE.
The Central Bank recently held a training session on cash
declarations for the emirate level customs services and is
addressing the problem of cash couriers. The UAE is seeing
large sums of cash coming from India and Pakistan.

Points to make: Would welcome UAE taking same leadership role
in cash couriers that it has taken in Hawala (informal funds
transfer networks). Increasingly important way for
terrorists to move funds. Will UAE specifically add a cash
reporting requirement for cash exports?

Expected UAE points: Central Bank is working with UAE
customs, but tracking this is a customs lead. Hosted
training for customs. Would be area for customs training.

Suggested interlocutor(s): Al Suweidi


12. (S/NF) CHARITIES.

Background: The UAE Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
monitors registered charities in the country and requires
them to keep records of donations and beneficiaries. In
2002, the UAEG mandated that all licensed charities transfer
funds abroad via one of three umbrella organizations: the Red
Crescent Authority, the Zayed Charitable Foundation, or the
Mohammed bin Rashid Charitable Trust. The purpose of this
regulation was to make the process of sending charitable
contributions to foreign countries more transparent and to
prevent financing of extremist groups. The Foreign Ministry
has contacted the governments in numerous aid-receiving
countries to compile a list of recognized, acceptable
recipients for UAE charitable assistance.

There are reports of UAE money going to charities linked to
Hamas. (Note: UAE contributions to the Palestinians are to
be funneled through the Red Crescent Society, which is
overseen by MinState for Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan. RCS
funds for assistance go directly to projects and are not
provided in cash.)

Points to make: Important to work together to ensure that
charities are not misused. Give examples of how the Saudis
are working to control charities. Solicit UAE leadership in
the efforts to control charities.

Expected UAE points: Understand the need to control flow of
funds from charities. If USG has information to indicate
problems with UAE charities, please provide it.

Suggested interlocutors: MBZ, MBR, Al Suweidi


13. (S/NF) EXPORT CONTROLS/CSI

Background: The UAE recognizes the need to stop the
proliferation of WMD and related materials and welcomes USG
assistance. Although the UAE is not a source of WMD, its
ports have been used to transship WMD related material to
states with burgeoning WMD programs. On December 13, 2004
Commissioner Bonner from U.S. Customs and Border Protection
signed the Container Security Initiative with the Port of
Dubai. CSI should be operational in February 2005 at Port
Rashid.

The UAE,s draft export control law is still in the UAE
interagency process.

In the past year, the U.S. sponsored:

-- Seaport Interdiction Training Program.

-- A Control List workshop targeted at legal and licensing
experts.

-- A WMD components identification course for federal and
emirate-level customs and law enforcement officials.

-- Legal and regulatory fora for UAE legal and regulatory
experts from the Ministries of Interior, Justice, and Foreign
Affairs, the Federal Customs Authority, and emirate-level
officials.

We are encouraged by the UAE,s continuing cooperation in
individual cases (e.g., their quick action in the Osman Saeed
case involving diversion of controlled missile technology
items through the UAE to Pakistan,s missile program). The
UAE intends to prosecute Saeed under the National
Anti-Terrorism Law, which prohibits the import of WMD-related
components into the UAE.

Points to make: CSI good initiative; export control law and
national control list will help UAE to exercise control over
proliferation-related goods that enter the UAE and take
unilateral action to halt such trade.

Expected UAE points: Nonproliferation is a priority;
appreciate U.S. assistance; draft law in pipeline.

Suggested interlocutors: MBZ, MBR


15. (S/NF) TRAINING.

Background: The UAE has welcomed training opportunities. In
December 2004 DHS/ICE completed Security Threat Assessment
training with the Ministry of Interior on how to assess
security threats, particularly those posed by terrorist
organizations, for critical infrastructure sites and to
employ appropriate countermeasures. Sheikh Saif, Minister of
Interior, was pleased with the training and has created a
dedicated unit comprised of course graduates that will be
handling all future security/threat assessments for the
Ministry. UAE police have participated in Department of
State-sponsored Anti-Terrorism Assistance training courses.

Points to make: Highlight the new DOJ/OPDAT Resident Legal
Advisor position at Embassy Abu Dhabi (RLA arrived 1/05);
seek input on training needs.

Expected UAE points: Desire to explore more training.

Suggested interlocutor(s): MBZ, Hazza, MBR


16. (SBU) MLAT.

Background: U.S. and UAE teams will resume MLAT negotiations
in Washington February 22-24. (We intend to send our DOJ
OPDAT back for the session.) The UAE side will also raise
their concern on extradition issues during the MLAT talks.
An extradition treaty poses problems for the USG because the
UAE Constitution prevents extradition of UAE nationals. USG
policy is not to sign extradition treaties with countries
that do not extradite their own nationals. The U.S. is
concerned with a recent increase in formal refusals to render
fugitives to the U.S. The UAEG has cooperated with the USG
in the past on rendering fugitives, and now it has changed
its policy (probably to gain negotiating leverage in the MLAT
negotiations). Within our legally available means, the USG
has always been helpful to the UAEG in fugitive cases, and
would ask that the UAE show us the same courtesy and return
our fugitives to the U.S.

Points to make: Need for our negotiating teams to sit down
with each other to understand what can, and cannot be
achieved.

Expected UAE points: Link MLAT with extradition treaty.

Suggested interlocutor(s): MBZ, Hazza, Al Suweidi, MBR


17. (S/NF) DHS/ICE, VISAS.

Background: DHS/ICE opened offices at Embassy Abu Dhabi and
ConGen Dubai in 2004. DHS/ICE has focused on transshipment
and money laundering investigations but is also conducting
joint cases with UAE counterparts involving organized crime,
fraud, and child pornography. ICE has developed a close
working relationship with the Ministry of Interior,
particularly on the Saeed investigation where ICE agents were
permitted to accompany MoI personnel during the searches of
several businesses resulting in the recovery of inertial
navigation equipment with missile guidance applications.
Most recently MoI has approved a joint undercover operation
with ICE targeting Hawala dealers operating illegally in the
United States and the UAE. This operation is expected to
commence in February 2005.

On the visa front, our Consular and Public Diplomacy staff
work hard to explain the complexities of our visa regulations
and correct Emiratis, sometimes negative perceptions on U.S.
visa and homeland security policies.

Points to make: Thank MBZ for the close cooperation that ICE
has received from the Abu Dhabi Police Department and the MoI
on joint investigations.

Expected UAE points: Interest in continued training.

Suggested interlocutor(s): MBZ, MBR

SISON
SISON