Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ABUDHABI2781
2005-06-20 10:44:00
SECRET
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR PDAS CHENEY'S VISIT TO THE UAE

Tags:  PREL PGOV KMPI PTER ETRD PHUM MASS IZ AF TC 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ABU DHABI 002781 

SIPDIS

FOR PDAS CHENEY FROM AMBASSADOR SISON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV KMPI PTER ETRD PHUM MASS IZ AF TC
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PDAS CHENEY'S VISIT TO THE UAE

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ABU DHABI 002781

SIPDIS

FOR PDAS CHENEY FROM AMBASSADOR SISON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV KMPI PTER ETRD PHUM MASS IZ AF TC
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PDAS CHENEY'S VISIT TO THE UAE

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: We look forward to welcoming you to Abu Dhabi
and Dubai. The UAE leadership will be very interested in
hearing your perspectives on the latest developments in Iraq
and on the Mideast peace process, as well as listening to
your views on reform in the region. We have requested
meetings with Dubai Crown Prince and UAE Minister of Defense
General Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid (MbR),Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Sheikh
Hamdan bin Zayed (HbZ),and Minister of Education Sheikh
Nahyan bin Mubarak Al Nahyan. You will also have an
opportunity to discuss camel jockey and labor issues with
Labor Minister Ali bin Abdullah Al Kaabi and Interior
Ministry representatives during a visit to a camel jockey
rehabilitation center near Abu Dhabi. (The UAEG appreciates
the fact that you have accepted their invitation to visit the
center.) These meetings will allow us to review our
substantial bilateral agenda, to include excellent
military-to-military and counterterrorism cooperation, slow
but solid progress on a Free Trade Agreement, reform efforts,
and trafficking in persons concerns. We have included some
points that your interlocutors might raise with you in para
12, and some suggested points for you to make with them in
para 13. You will also meet with Emirati educators, civil
society, women, and students during a Zayed University event
in Abu Dhabi and a small dinner in Dubai. End Summary.

BACKGROUND
--------------


2. (SBU) The UAE remains a key partner intent on cooperating
with us to create a stable economic, political, and security
environment in the Middle East. Through our bilateral
cooperation, we have been able to maintain U.S. access to
their military facilities and work closely with them on the

military and law enforcement fronts. We are working to
bolster our bilateral law enforcement and export controls
programs to promote our global counter-terror and
nonproliferation concerns. One of the world's wealthiest
countries, the UAE has adopted progressive economic policies
that will strengthen its position as the region's pre-eminent
hub for trade, transportation, investment and tourism, and
contribute to regional economic stability. We are
negotiating a free trade agreement that will significantly
advance mutual economic interests and ensure that the UAE
remains among the top ten countries with which the U.S. runs
a trade surplus. We are deeply engaged with the UAE
leadership about combating human trafficking. We are also
engaging them about their plans to create a more robust civil
society that could lead to a more open political system.


3. (C) The political transition following the November 2004
death of UAE President Sheikh Zayed has been smooth.
President Khalifa has ensured stability by pursuing the same
domestic, regional, and international policy priorities as
his father. Khalifa and his half-brother, Abu Dhabi Crown
Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ),have shared political
and economic portfolios in what appears to be an even way,
although Khalifa retains ultimate control over Abu Dhabi
emirate's, and by extension, the federal government's, purse
strings. The composition of federal and emirate-level
governing bodies is getting younger and more technocratic.
The federal Cabinet's first woman, Economy and Trade Minister
Sheikha Lubna Al Qassimi, is a model for younger Emirati
women who aspire to play more of a role in the country's
political, economic, and social life. (Lubna regrets that
she will not be able to meet you during your visit, but told
the Ambassador June 20 that she hopes to see you this summer
in Washington.)

MILITARY COOPERATION
--------------


4. (S) The Emirati leadership has tried in earnest to
accommodate every U.S. request for military cooperation and
assistance. This entails some political risk as the
leadership seeks to avoid publicizing our presence on their
military installations. This presence is significant, with
the 380th Air Expeditionary Wing operating KC-10 and KC-135
tankers, U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, and Global Hawk
remotely piloted vehicles conducting non-combat support
operations from Al Dhafra Air Base. There are 1,250
steady-state USAF personnel at Al Dhafra, although the
numbers fluctuate during surges and rotations. The ports of
Jebel Ali and Fujairah are vital to U.S. Navy interdiction
operations, resupply and sustainment, and combat support
efforts across the region, and have hosted in excess of 500
USN port visits for each of the past two years (more than any
other port outside the U.S.). UAE intelligence officers have
deployed to Baghdad and Bagram, participating in coalition
intelligence operations.

5. (S) In May, the UAE received the first installment of 80
F-16 Block 60 combat aircraft, a transaction that will cement
our relationship for years to come. However, there remain
severe training and maintenance challenges for the F-16
program. Citing technology release concerns, the USG has
rejected the UAE's request to allow pilots and technicians
from Turkey to train pilots and technicians from the UAE and
to allow technicians from Turkey to maintain the aircraft.
Despite some setbacks in major foreign military sales offers
(our rejection of their request for an armed Predator and
their rejection of five re-furbished E-2C airborne early
warning aircraft in April 2004),our military-to-military
relationship remains very strong.

COUNTERTERRORISM
--------------


6. (S) The UAE is well aware of its vulnerability to
terrorist attacks and has taken a number of steps to enhance
its border security and critical infrastructure -) including
the use of iris scans at airports -- but there is no overall,
coordinated strategy for these efforts. In July 2004, the
UAE strengthened its legal authority to respond to
terrorist-related activity with the passage of an
anti-terrorism law. The law defines terrorism, specifically
criminalizes terrorist financing, and sets stiff penalties
for violations. The UAE's legal framework to combat
counterterror finance is robust. The Central Bank has
implemented policies to reduce the potential use of the UAE
financial system to finance terror by strictly regulating
financial institutions and freezing suspect accounts. To
further enhance our robust cooperation in the security and
counterterrorism fields, Homeland Security Advisor Fran
Townsend proposed establishing a Joint Terrorist Finance
Coordination Committee (JTFCC) to the Central Bank Governor
during her visit to the UAE in February. This committee will
set terror finance priorities and formalize and coordinate
information exchange. Washington is drafting a proposal to
submit to the UAEG.


7. (S) Dubai also plays a critical role in advancing our
counterterrorism and WMD transshipment priorities. In March
2005, the port of Dubai became the first Middle East seaport
to join the Container Security Initiative aimed at screening
U.S.-bound cargo containers from being exploited by
terrorists. In May 2005, Dubai Ports became the first Middle
East seaport to sign an agreement with the U.S. under the
U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
Administration Megaports Initiative, which will allow the
port to install special equipment to detect hidden shipments
of nuclear and other radioactive materials. In addition, MbR
told us last fall that his State Security Directorate had
uncovered a network of people, one of whom headed a company
in Dubai, that was providing transportation assistance to
fighters headed to Fallujah and safe havens to terrorists
fleeing Fallujah.


8. REGIONAL ISSUES:

IRAQ
--------------

-- (C) We have been able to count on the UAE's strong public
support for the Iraqi political process and significant
humanitarian and military support. The UAE leadership was
disappointed that more Sunnis did not participate in the
January 30 elections and that Shi'a moderate Iyad Allawi,
whom MbZ and HbZ regard as a friend and the best leader for
Iraq, had faired poorly. (Allawi remains a regular visitor
to Abu Dhabi.) The UAEG shares our concerns about Iranian
interference in Iraq,' internal affairs, but it has not
publicly criticized Iran to avoid antagonizing Iran and
jeopardizing the considerable commercial ties that exist
between the UAE and Iran.

-- (SBU) According to the MFA, the UAE provided Iraq with
$216.8 million in assistance from January to December 2003.
During former Secretary Baker's visit in January 2004, the
UAE committed to cancel Iraq's estimated $7 billion bilateral
debt. However, the UAE has not yet officially negotiated
debt-reduction terms with Iraq, although UAEG officials
confirm that they have not asked the Iraqis to repay any of
the debt that is owed them. We continue to remind the UAEG
that a public statement on debt reduction would be useful.

-- (C) The UAE has been working with Germany to provide
police and military training to Iraqis in the UAE, as well as
100 trucks for the Iraqi armed forces. In addition, the UAE
contributed over $8 million toward the transfer of M-113 APCs
from Jordan to Iraq, and it donated four light reconnaissance
aircraft to Iraq (and trained Iraqi pilots to fly the
planes),as well as 45 French-built Panhard APCs, with a
pledge of 80 additional M-113 APCs purchased from
Switzerland. Iraqi Defense Minister Dulaimi visited Abu
Dhabi June 19.

IRAN
--------------

-- (S) The UAE's political relations with Iran are strained
over Iran's nuclear program and the possibility of a
clandestine weapons component, Iran's interference in Iraq's
internal affairs, and Iran's continued military occupation of
three disputed islands. While the UAE has responded to the
perceived threat from Iran by reinforcing its military
capability to protect its borders, it has been careful not to
jeopardize its substantial business interests with Iran by
antagonizing the militarily superior Islamic Republic. The
UAEG has also cooperated with us to clamp down on Dubai-based
Iranian WMD proliferation activities. Nonetheless, Iran
remains one of Dubai's key trading partners.

-- (C) Peace process/aid to Palestinians: The UAE would like
to see tangible progress on the Mideast peace process. It
continues to support the Palestinian people through
substantial project and humanitarian assistance. During a
May 7 visit to Gaza, Information Minister Sheikh Abdullah
inaugurated Zayed City, a new neighborhood comprising 736
apartments built with $61 million in UAE assistance.
Palestinian President Abbas told Sheikh Abdullah that the UAE
was at the forefront in supporting the Palestinians, and that
other countries were beginning to emulate the UAE's work in
the area of housing, health and infrastructure. According to
the MFA, the UAE provided the Palestinians with $389.6
million in assistance from October 2000 to November 2003.

AFGHANISTAN
--------------

-- (S) The UAE has been a strong supporter of President
Karzai. A 215-man UAE Special Operations contingent operates
alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan, where they have
suffered some casualties. The UAE also trained 35 Bahraini
Special Forces who are now deployed at Bagram with their
Special Forces, bringing the contingent up to a total of 250
combined troops. UAE assistance to Afghanistan totaled $41.4
million from September 2001 to December 2003, according to
the MFA.

JORDAN
--------------

-- (C) We understand that the Abu Dhabi leadership is looking
to support the Jordanians and have provided them with project
assistance in a number of areas. We have asked the UAE to
renew its commitment to provide Jordan with oil assistance,
but have not yet received a response.


9. (C) REFORM:

-- POLITICAL: The UAEG's commitment and continued ability to
use its sizeable wealth to satisfy the needs of its small
citizenry constitute the "ruling bargain" and explain the
absence to date of significant popular pressure for change.
However, as the UAE becomes an increasingly developed and
modern society and its population continues to grow rapidly,
traditional consultative mechanisms, such as the open majlis,
are becoming less effective. Our democratic reform strategy
aims to encourage the ruling families to introduce
representative government/elections. We expect there will be
a gradual introduction of representative government, most
likely at the municipal level in individual emirates. It
will be a slow process that the leadership will monitor
closely. We suggest you take up this issue in a quiet
conversation with HbZ.

-- In addition, we are advocating progress toward an open and
independent operating environment for civil society, a free
and independent media, and greater transparency and public
participation in the legislative and regulatory process.
There are no elections, political parties and trade unions
are not authorized, and civil society as a whole is weak.
Advancing reform in the UAE requires a two-fold approach:
quiet -- but frank -- diplomacy with the senior leadership
and a bottom-up strategy of programming and dialogue (to
include targeting of both youth and female groups) to
increase support for reforms among the population at large.
Our efforts to strengthen press freedom provide an example of
how this two-fold approach can work through MEPI. The
bottom-up strategy led MEPI to offer technical assistance to
the UAE Journalists Association as they provide the UAEG
input on needed press law reforms. In addition to political
reforms, the Mission has supported opportunities for economic
reform that simultaneously advance our overall reform agenda.
For example, FTA negotiations provide leverage and a
possible vehicle for expanding labor rights and improving
transparency in the UAE legislative process.

-- MEDIA: The UAEG is in the process of reviewing the
outdated and restrictive press and publications law. The
existing law exposes journalists to criminal charges for
defamation and libel. Information Minister Sheikh Abdullah
and MbR have called on the media to push for greater freedom
and have said they wanted a new law which emphasizes
transparency and openness. The establishment and rapid
development of Dubai Media City (DMC),a media free trade
zone, is attracting journalists from all over the Arab world.
There are currently over 1100 media organizations operating
in DMC, including all international media organizations
operating in the Arab world.

-- EDUCATION/WOMEN: The UAE leadership, under the forward
thinking Minister of Education Sheikh Nahyan, is very open to
interaction with the United States in the education sector.
The Education Minister encourages program linkages between
UAE and U.S. universities and has single-handedly pushed
forward an ambitious U.S. consultant team proposal to
completely revamp K-12 education. With the exception of some
faculties at the UAE University, the language of instruction
in all tertiary institutions is English and the
administration is predominantly American. Education is free
for all nationals. The leadership has encouraged youth to go
to the United States, but many Emirati students are choosing
Canada and Australia, which they perceive as safer and more
welcoming destinations. To facilitate modern, Western-style
education for women, the Ministry of Education created the
all-women Zayed University, which has campuses in both Dubai
and Abu Dhabi. Women comprise approximately 70 percent of
the 17,000 student body of the UAE University, the entire
student body of the two Zayed University campuses, and half
of the students of the Higher Colleges of Technology.
Despite the wealth of the country, resources are unevenly
distributed, leading to unequal access to educational
opportunities found in urban centers. We responded to this
need by conceiving and implementing the ACCESS
Microscholarship Program. We provided 200 hours of English
teaching with American cultural materials, supplemented by
field trips and visits by USG officials, to 100 11th grade
Emirati boys and girls from disadvantaged areas. Their
English levels increased significantly, as did their positive
feelings towards the United States. The success of this
year's program led ECA to fund our 2006 program at the
$300,000 level.


10. (C) TIP/CAMEL JOCKEYS: The UAE leadership reacted calmly
to being downgraded from Tier 2 to Tier 3 in the 2005 TIP
report. The leadership viewed the 60-day action plan as
"doable" and has taken a proactive stance. UNICEF signed a
project agreement with the Ministry of Interior on May 8 to
assist the UAEG in the rehabilitation and repatriation of the
underage jockeys, as well as their reintegration back into
their families and societies. The UAEG has invited you to a
camel jockey rehabilitation shelter where young boys,
primarily from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sudan, are receiving
care from social workers before they are humanely repatriated
to their home countries. While the UAEG has publicized, and
begun to act upon its commitment to address camel jockey
issues, the government has been slower to act on trafficking
in women for sexual exploitation, or abuse of domestic
workers and laborers. G/TIP will send out an officer in
mid-July to determine whether the UAEG's progress on the TIP
action plan should be reassessed as having made "significant
efforts" to bring itself into compliance with the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act's minimum standards.


11. (C) FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: The UAE is the second largest
economy in the Arab world, behind Saudi Arabia, and
(according to preliminary IMF estimates) grew by almost 8
percent in 2004. U.S. non-defense exports to the UAE last
year were $4 billion (about a $3 billion trade surplus),and
there are approximately 500 U.S. companies present in the
UAE. We have held two negotiation rounds on a free trade
agreement in 2005, will hold a video teleconference between
the lead negotiators on June 27, and are aiming for a third
round in September. Progress, so far, has been solid, but
slow. This is due to the decentralized nature of the UAE
federal system, the large complex economy here, and the
relative inexperience of the UAE team in dealing with complex
negotiations like this. We have identified a number of key
issues for both sides including: federal-emirate
jurisdictional issues, national treatment for U.S. investors,
and the UAE labor law. The UAE's population and private
sector workforce are overwhelmingly expatriate, and the UAEG
is concerned about the security implications of allowing
foreigners full union rights. If the UAE remains on the TIP
Tier 3 list, USTR will be unable to bring an FTA to the Hill.
While USTR remains hopeful that we can conclude FTA
negotiations by the fall, the slow pace may delay completion
of negotiations to 2006.


12. (C) The Emiratis are likely to want to raise the
following with you:

-- Iraq,s Political Process: Your interlocutors will be
keen to hear your views on the evolving political process,
and to offer advice on how to generate greater participation
from the Sunni community. They will appreciate the
Washington perspective on political, economic, and security
developments in Iraq.

-- FTA: The UAEG is looking for more exceptional
treatment/USG flexibility in its FTA negotiations with the
USG than USTR is able to provide;

-- Trafficking in Persons: The Emiratis have indicated to us
that they will work diligently on each of the steps suggested
in the TIP action plan by August 2 (the end of the allotted
grace period). You could reiterate our message that
fulfillment of the action plan will demonstrate significant
efforts by the UAEG to eliminate trafficking and elevate the
UAE to Tier Two Watch List status.

-- Status of Iran/EU-3 negotiations: The UAE shares our
concerns about Iran's nuclear program development. Your
interlocutors will be interested in hearing what the USG's
strategy is going to be in the coming months, and how the
results of the Iranian presidential elections might affect
the course of events. President Khalifa met June 7 with
Hassan Rowhani, the SecGen of Iran,s Supreme Council for
National Security. During that meeting, Khalifa stressed the
need for commitment from all countries to eliminate all
banned weapons.

-- Saudi Arabia: The Emiratis closely watch developments in
Saudi Arabia, and will be keen to compare views on security
and political developments in the kingdom. President
Khalifa's first official visit was to Riyadh. Your meetings
with Sheikh Hamdan would be an opportunity to inquire about
the status of negotiations over the Saudi-UAE border, and
about the UAE leadership's views of Saudi political process.
Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud
discussed border issues with President Khalifa and HbZ June
14-15.


13. (C) In your meetings, it would be appropriate for you to:

-- thank the UAEG for its strong and continued support for
the Iraqi political process, as well as political and
humanitarian efforts to support stability in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and in Gaza/West Bank; (all interlocutors)

-- urge the UAE to commit publicly to Iraqi debt relief; (HbZ)

-- thank the UAE for its commitment to Afghan stability and
effective Special Operations deployment to Afghanistan ) the
first Arab country to commit troops; (HbZ, MbR)

-- thank the UAEG for the progress made in combating
terrorism and urge continued efforts, especially in the area
of terrorism financing; (HbZ)

-- inquire whether authorities have yet prosecuted anyone
under the new counterterrorism law; (HbZ, MbR)

-- thank Dubai for being the first Middle East port to join
the Container Security Initiative and Megaports Initiative;
(MbR)

-- reassure the UAE that the US will continue to take a tough
line on Iran's nuclear program; (HbZ, MbR)

-- note that prompt action on the TIP 60-day action plan
could result in the UAE being raised from Tier Three to Tier
Two "Watch List"; salute the political decision to abolish
practice of using underage camel jockeys (HbZ, MbR, Al Kaabi)

-- acknowledge steps taken to identify, care for, and
humanely repatriate the boys; underscore need to take prompt
action on TIP action plan; (Al Kaabi)

-- inquire about the status of the new labor law and the new
law that will allow the creation of trade unions; (Al Kaabi)

-- express appreciation of U.S. business for conducive
business and investment climate (there are over 500 U.S.
companies operating in the UAE). Note progress on FTA
negotiations and importance of this agreement to both
countries; (MbR)

-- note that passing an export control law would give the UAE
greater ability to act against transshipments of controlled
items; (HbZ, MbR)

-- note solid law enforcement cooperation, but that it is
both our interests to restore cooperation on the return of
fugitives and timely exchange of evidence on criminal
proceedings; (HbZ, MbR)

-- commend the Minister of Education for his bold education
reform initiatives. Underscore our readiness to work with
Ministry of Education and Educational Zone officials to
support their reform efforts; (Nahyan)

-- thank the Minister of Education for the Ministry's
cooperation in helping us develop the Microscholarship
Program this past year; program will be expanded in coming
school year. (Nahyan)
SISON