ASD RODMAN MEETS UAE MINDEF MOHAMMED BIN RASHID

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000231

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2015
TAGS: MASS MOPS MARR PREL IR IQ TC
SUBJECT: ASD RODMAN MEETS UAE MINDEF MOHAMMED BIN RASHID


Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison; Reason: 1.4 (B)
and (D).


1. (C) Summary: In a January 11 meeting with Dubai Crown
Prince and UAE Minister of Defense Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid
(MBR),ASD Rodman expressed USG appreciation for UAE's
contributions to our counter-terror and counter-proliferation
efforts. In response to a question on Iraq, ASD Rodman
outlined the U.S. political and military strategy for
achieving stability. MBR doubted that stability could be
achieved as long as Sunnis were "sitting at home depressed";
a way needed to be found to give them hope. US mistakes had
led to Iran playing an increased role in Iraq. MBR said the
Palestinian elections had left him "pleased and hopeful."
End Summary


2. (C) On January 11 Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA),
visiting the UAE for the first annual Joint Military
Commission meetings with the UAE military, called on the UAE
Defense Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktoum (MBR),
the Crown Prince and de facto ruler of Dubai. ASD Rodman
expressed condolences at the recent passing of UAE founder
and President Sheikh Zayid, and congratulated MBR on the
smooth transition. ASD Rodman noted that the JMC sessions
were going well, a reflection of the healthy state of the
UAE-USG relationship. MBR, noting that the UAE had been a
partner "from day one" in the war on terror, said he thought
Dubai and the UAE had probably provided the US with more
information on the whereabouts of terrorists than any other
country. Relations between the intell services of our two
countries were increasing, and exchange of information was
growing.


3. (C) How are things going in Iraq, MBR asked? Noting that
it was a difficult period, ASD Rodman said the US had a
combined military and political strategy. In parallel with
our military efforts against the insurgents, we were
supporting an Iraqi political process, reflected in the
January 30 elections, because an elected government would
have legitimacy. The insurgents feared this and were thus
trying to disrupt the elections. Sunnis faced a painful
dilemma, because whatever happened they would not play the
same dominant role they had played in the past. Nevertheless
they would play an important role in a benign political
system. Polls showed that 85 percent of Iraqis wanted the
elections to take place, including most Sunnis; the
insurgents were using fear to prevent them from
participating. Delaying the elections would not solve
anything -- the Sunnis needed to come to terms with their
situation, and delaying six months wouldn,t change the
reality. And the elections were not the end of the process
-- Sunnis would be included in the new government and
participate in drafting the new Constitution whatever the
results of the elections. The Shia and Kurds were showing
great wisdom in that respect.


4. (C) MBR said the lack of Sunni participation was not
because they were afraid of the terrorists. They were a very
strong group; if they disagreed with the terrorists they
would kill them or drive them out of their midst immediately.
The problem was that the U.S., and the Pentagon in
particular had made mistakes. It had backed "the wrong man,"
Chalabi, and had erred in disbanding the army and forcing
Baathists out. Teachers, doctors, engineers had been made
jobless because they were Baathists. The Baath party was the
backbone of the country, had held the country together.
Anyone who wanted a decent job had needed to join the party.


5. (C) The void created by de-Baathification, MBR declared,
had "given Iran the chance of a lifetime." It was simply not
true that most Sunnis supported the election process; Sunnis,
the backbone of the country, were sitting at home, depressed.
It was essential to "get the right people back in their
jobs; if elections were held now, with the Sunnis sitting at
home depressed, the resistance would expand. The Sunnis knew
they would never go back to having all the power themselves,
but the needed to be given hope. The only way of getting rid
of terrorists would be to get the Sunnis on board -- once
that happened they would get rid of the terrorists
themselves. But they had to be given their jobs back and
given hope -- they would never accept being forced to sit at
home (as former Baathists) while the Shia took all the power,
thereby granting influence to Iran.


6. (C) ASD Rodman said that in our view the Shia of Iraq were
very different from those in Iran. They were more moderate
and secular, and clearly understood the need for unity in
their country. They were showing great openness to Sunnis
and Kurds, working together with them in the current
government. The so-called Shia electoral list included many
Sunnis, and the Shia clearly understood they would need to
form coalitions after the elections. We did not believe the
elections would lead to a radical Shia state. On the issue
of de-Baathification, it was only supposed to have affected
the very top levels of the Baath party, and we had been
working for months to repair the implementation. As for the
Iraqi army, we had not disbanded it; the great tragedy of the
army was that it had disintegrated on its own. ASD Rodman
said he agreed fully that it was our job to get the Sunnis to
help us defeat the extremists. We were training the Iraqi
security forces quickly, and their performance was improving.



7. (C) ASD Rodman told MBR that we shared his perception of
Iran as a strategic threat; it was safe to assume that no
warming of the US-Iran relationship was in the works. We
were worried about Iran's nuclear program, and very skeptical
of the agreement with the Europeans because we believed the
Iranians would cheat. If they cheated, we would need to find
ways of imposing costs on them. ASD Rodman added that we
shared MBR's earlier-stated view that it was a very positive
moment in the Israeli-Palestinian situation. There was new
leadership on the Palestinian side and a new coalition on the
Israeli side. The Israeli government was now willing to
negotiate its withdrawal from Gaza rather than making it
unilateral, and there was a willingness to take the "historic
step" of removing settlements. We would use our influence to
help both sides make this disengagement work. We recognized
that progress on the Palestinian track would make things
easier for our friends in the region.


8. (C) MBR assured ASD Rodman that "we are doing our best to
be partners, and we won't stop...there will always be bad
people." The UAE approach was to "give our people a good
life, to work hard for their benefit," so that there would be
no reason for them to become terrorists. If they turned to
terrorism anyway, then the UAE would not hesitate to "use
arms against them."


9. (U) Meeting participants included:

U.S. - ASD Rodman and staff, Ambassador Sison, USLO Col.
Simm, Dubai CG Davis

UAE - MbR, Mohammed Gergawi (economic advisor),Sultan bin
Sulayam (Director, Dubai Port Authority),Shaikh Ahmed bin
Sayeed al Maktoum (Emirates Group Chairman),and two of
MbR,s sons, Shaikh Rashid and Shaikh Hamdan.


10. (U) ASD Rodman has cleared this message. Congen Dubai
drafted this cable.


11. (U) Baghdad ) minimize considered.
SISON