Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ABUDHABI1712
2005-04-17 11:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR ON U.S. - UAE BILATERAL

Tags:  PGOV EPET PHUM ELAB ETRD SA TC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001712 

SIPDIS

STATE PASS USTR FOR DOUG BELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2015
TAGS: PGOV EPET PHUM ELAB ETRD SA TC
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR ON U.S. - UAE BILATERAL
RELATIONS: SAUDI ARABIA


Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001712

SIPDIS

STATE PASS USTR FOR DOUG BELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2015
TAGS: PGOV EPET PHUM ELAB ETRD SA TC
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR ON U.S. - UAE BILATERAL
RELATIONS: SAUDI ARABIA


Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: On April 16, Ambassador called on long-time
presidential advisor Mohammed Habroush Al-Suwaidi to review
our bilateral agenda (FTA, MLAT, and Camel Jockey
Trafficking). On FTA, Al-Suwaidi opined that there was no
reason the process would not move ahead. The concerns of
some businesspeople about the agency law should not override
the interest of the nation, which was to conclude an FTA as
quickly as possible, he underscored. Al-Suwaidi suggested
that the U.S. explain its reasons for wanting to separate out
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty negotiations from extradition
negotiations in as simple, straightforward a way as possible.
He added that both sides should endeavor to move forward and
not let one issue stymie progress. Al-Suwaidi called the
practice of using children as camel jockeys a violation of
their human rights and said that the practice must be
stopped. Al-Suwaidi told Ambassador that the Saudi crackdown
on extremists was not a complete solution, since it did not
fix the fundamental problems in the Kingdom, including
pervasive corruption. He also said that Saudi relations with
their neighbors were poor and that the Saudis continued to
object to the proposed Qatar-UAE causeway. End Summary.

--------------
FTA - No Need to Prolong Negotiations
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador told Al-Suwaidi that the second round of
FTA negotiations would take place in Washington from May 10
to 12. Al-Suwaidi replied that he did not see that there
were any major issues that would force the negotiations to be
prolonged unduly. He agreed with Ambassador's observation
that much of the "opposition" to the FTA stemmed from
ignorance and that outreach to the UAE business community was
important.


3. (C) Ambassador highlighted a few areas of concern for
Al-Suwaidi, including labor rights and the Agencies' law.
Al-Suwaidi emphasized that the concerns of agents were "not

valid" and short sighted. According to Al-Suwaidi, agents
should work for their money and the practice of getting paid
"for lying in bed and not working could not continue." He
noted that the world was getting smaller through
globalization and that it was far better for the UAE to make
changes now, while it had some control over the changes,
rather than be forced to change in the future. He told
Ambassador that individual interests should not outweigh the
interest of the majority, which was in an FTA with the U.S.
He said that President Khalifa and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) both wanted this FTA to move forward.

--------------
MLAT
--------------


4. (C) Ambassador briefed Al-Suwaidi on the progress of the
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) discussions. She
explained that the USG preferred to keep the discussions on
MLAT and extradition on parallel, but separate tracks,
whereas the UAE Ministry of Justice preferred to negotiate
the two as a package. Al-Suwaidi replied that both sides
needed to look at how to move forward. In his view, the way
to do this was to move forward in stages and not tie issues
together, if this stalled progress. He suggested that the
USG prepare its points in writing for the UAEG to review,
since some objections were likely due to a lack of
understanding on the part of the UAEG. He stressed that "the
simpler" this memo "the better."

--------------
Camel Jockeys
--------------


5. (C) Ambassador noted the steps that the UAEG has taken to
deal with the problem of using children as camel jockeys, but
asked for more action on rehabilitation and rescue. She said
the Minister of Labor had invited her to join him on April 18
for a visit to an Abu Dhabi Emirate rescue center.
Al-Suwaidi emphasized that the use of children as camel
jockeys was a violation of their human rights and was not
consistent with the traditions of the UAE. He noted that, in
the past, the UAE had held camel races on celebratory
occasions, such as Eids or marriages and that the camel
owners or their children had been the jockeys. The use of
foreign boys was a fairly recent development. He stressed
that it was not fair to use an 8-year-old boy as a jockey for
6 years then "throw him away" after he was no longer useful.
The job took away the "best years" of the boy's childhood and
left him with no education or useful skills. He noted that
the lure of large prizes in current races made people lose
perspective, but stressed that the practice needed to be
stopped. Although Al-Suwaidi stated that poor source
countries also shared responsibility for the problem, he
stressed that the UAE must not be instrumental in supporting
this traffic.

--------------
Overall Bilateral Cooperation
--------------


6. (C) Ambassador told Al-Suwaidi that overall cooperation
between the U.S. and the UAEG was excellent in a number of
areas, including military-to military, counter-terror and
counter-terror finance. She expressed appreciation for the
UAEG's efforts to increase security to the U.S. Mission after
the March attack in Doha, Qatar.


7. (C) Ambassador noted the Supreme Petroleum Council's (SPC,
of which Al-Suwaidi is a member) recent decision to negotiate
only with Exxon/Mobil for the 28 percent stake in the Upper
Zakkum field. Al-Suwaidi explained that the SPC had made the
decision after long and careful consideration. He emphasized
that Upper Zakkum is a complicated field, with high reserves,
but a low recovery rate. The UAE, he said, preferred to go
with a company that had the technology to increase the rate
of recovery. He also acknowledged that the UAE preferred to
deal with one of its current shareholders (such as
Exxon/Mobil) rather than a new company, since its
shareholders had "stayed with" the UAE when prices were low..



8. (U) Ambassador also expressed appreciation that UAE
President Khalifa would attend the May 3 F-16 handover
ceremony at Al Dhafra airbase.

-------------- --------------
Saudi Arabia - instability and attitude a problem
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Al-Suwaidi raised his concerns about Saudi Arabia with
Ambassador. He noted that Saudi instability could spill over
to affect its neighbors. He emphasized, however, that he
thought the Saudi solution to the terrorism problem -- i.e.,
a crackdown -- was not the right approach, because it didn't
address the "fundamental problems" in Saudi Arabia. He said
that some changes, such as in the education system, take
time, but that the Saudis were not addressing urgent issues
that could be resolved quickly, such as tackling corruption.


10. (C) Al-Suwaidi also noted that the Saudis were on bad
terms with their neighbors. He cited Saudi objections to the
proposed UAE-Qatar causeway. He said that the Saudis were
"envious" of direct UAE-Qatari contact and that it was
frustrating to the UAE. He explained that if the Saudis had
taken a different attitude to the GCC when it was founded,
political integration would be much further along than it
was. He gave as an example Sheikh Zayed's more nuanced
approach to creating the UAE. He allowed the individual
emirates to retain their authority, even when the
constitution provided that the authority resided with the
federal government. Over time, the individual emirates
realized that they were much better off under a federation
and ceded more of their authority to the federal government.
The Saudis, for their part, had not followed this gentle
approach and the GCC had suffered as a result. He stressed
that the Saudi policy in a number of areas, including
objecting to the Bahrain - U.S. FTA, was short sighted.
SISON