wikileaks ico  Home papers ico  Cables mirror and Afghan War Diary privacy policy  Privacy
IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
05ABUDHABI1091 2005-03-08 12:46:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

UAE: 2005 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT

Tags:   ASEC ELAB KCRM KFRD KWMN PHUM PREF SMIG TC 
pdf how-to read a cable
null
Diana T Fritz  12/06/2006 03:13:05 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
UNCLAS        ABU DHABI 01091

SIPDIS
CXABU:
    ACTION: ECON
    INFO:   PAO P/M AMB DCM POL

DISSEMINATION: ECON
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MJSISON
DRAFTED: POL:SRADDANT
CLEARED: DCM:RALBRIGHT POL:JMAYBURY ECON:OJOHN CG:JDAVIS PA:HOWINDECK

VZCZCADI232
PP RUEHC RUEHZM RUEHTA RUEHAH RUEHKB RUEHBJ
RUEHCH RUEHLM RUEHKA RUEHIL RUEHJA RUEHML RUEHSK RUEHMO
RUEHNE RUEHNT RUEHSI RUEAWJA RUEHC RUEATRS RUEAUSA
DE RUEHAD #1091/01 0671246
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 081246Z MAR 05
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8585
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 0085
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0036
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 0027
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0139
RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU 0009
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0105
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0210
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1347
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 0062
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 0597
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0007
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0371
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1241
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 0184
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 0030
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC
					  UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 19 ABU DHABI 001091 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR G, G/TIP, INL, DRL, PRM, IWI, NEA/RA AND NEA/ARPI

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC ELAB KCRM KFRD KWMN PHUM PREF SMIG TC
SUBJECT: UAE: 2005 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT

REF: 04 STATE 273089



1. Embassy TIP points of contact are PolOff Susan Raddant
and PolChief Joel Maybury, office: 971-2-414-2444, fax:
971-2-414-2639; email: raddantsk@state.gov,
mayburyjf@state.gov.



2. OMB Reporting Requirements: One FS-04 officer spent
approximately 40 hours preparing for and writing the report.
One FS-03 officer spent approximately 6 hours reviewing and
clearing the report. One FS-02 officer spent approximately
one hour reviewing and clearing the report. Three FS-01
officers spent approximately four hours reviewing and
clearing the report. One FEMC officer spent one hour
reviewing and clearing the report.



3. Following is Post's submission of the 2005 Trafficking in
Persons Report for the United Arab Emirates, covering the
reporting period of March 2004 through March 2005. Responses
are keyed to relevant sections of reftel paragraphs 18-22.



--------------------------




4. OVERVIEW OF ACTIVITIES TO ELIMINATE TIP


--------------------------



-- A. The UAE was a destination country for internationally
trafficked persons. There were no reliable numbers or
demographic breakdowns available as to the extent of the
problem. There were widely varying reports, primarily by
NGOs, IGOs, and source countries, that estimate the number of
trafficking victims currently in the UAE from a few thousand
to tens of thousands. Trafficking generally did not occur
within the UAE,s borders, however, foreign victims were
sometimes moved from emirate to emirate once trafficked to
the country. There was no UAE mainland territory outside of
the Government's control. Since 1971, the UAE and Iran have
both claimed three islands in the Arabian Gulf ) Abu Mousa
and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs ) as their own territories.
The islands are currently under Iranian control. Post has
no information on the human trafficking situation on these
islands.

Groups of persons that were at risk of being trafficked to
the UAE were young South Asian and East African boys for use
as camel jockeys, and women and teenage girls, primarily from
East Europe, Russia, other Middle Eastern countries,
particularly Iran, East African countries, and Central,
South, Southeast, and East Asian countries, for the purpose
of sexual exploitation. There were a far smaller number of
men, women and teenage children who were trafficked to the
UAE to work as forced laborers, primarily as domestic
servants and construction workers.

There were no reliable estimates of how many prostitutes
working in the UAE (primarily in Dubai, with somewhat fewer
numbers in Abu Dhabi and significantly fewer numbers in the
Northern Emirates) were trafficking victims as opposed to
those who came voluntarily to perform this work. Many women
currently or formerly engaged in prostitution admitted to
voluntarily traveling to and from the UAE for temporary
stays, during which time they engaged in prostitution and
possibly other activities connected with organized crime.
Many of these women stated that they traveled to the UAE for
this purpose due to extreme economic hardship in their own
countries, and they often used smugglers and false documents
to gain entry into the UAE.

UAE police stated that they typically arrest and deport
between 5,000-6,000 prostitutes annually. The latest figures
available from Dubai police on the number of traffickers and
brothel owners arrested and prosecuted in Dubai cover the
period of January 1, 2002, through December 31, 2003. There
were a total of 14 cases of &management and practice of
prostitution,8 with 40 brothel owners and traffickers
arrested and prosecuted. Of those 40, 22 were deported
without imprisonment or fines.
The Government reported that the number of boys who were
trafficked to the UAE to work as camel jockeys declined over
the reporting year due to improved immigration screening
measures, including DNA testing, medical screening, and fewer
visas issued to potential camel jockeys. From October 2002
to January 2005, UAE immigration officials blocked 26,000
foreigners who attempted to re-enter the country illegally,
using iris recognition biometric technology at airport ports
of entry. Dubai authorities stated that they issued no visas
for camel jockeys over the reporting year. However, a number
of people, including NGO and source country representatives,
journalists, G/TIP visitors, and Mission staff members,
witnessed first-hand on several occasions the continued use
of the underage foreign camel jockeys who were already living
here. Some of these boys appeared to be as young as two or
three years old.

In December 2004, the UAEG opened a camel jockey shelter and
rehabilitation center in Abu Dhabi Emirate to assist rescued
underage camel jockeys. The shelter has housed between two
to three dozen boys since its opening, and at least 16 boys
from the shelter were repatriated to their home countries.
However, several NGOs and one local individual who follows
the issue estimated that between 5,000 and 9,000 children
continued to work in the UAE as camel jockeys.

-- B. See 4A above for the countries of origin.

The great majority of sex trafficking victims were brought to
Dubai, although a significant number were trafficked to Abu
Dhabi City, and others traveled frequently between the two
cities. A smaller number were trafficked to other cities in
all seven emirates. According to Pakistani NGO director
Ansar Burney, approximately 5,000 underage camel jockeys
remain in Abu Dhabi Emirate. He estimates approximately
2-3,000 underage camel jockeys are working in Dubai, and
another 1,000 are working in the remaining five emirates. No
other independent first-hand assessments were available,
however, an Anti-Slavery International representative (please
protect) and a shelter operator who follows the TIP issue
closely gave rough estimates that were similar to these
results. Victims trafficked for the purpose of forced labor
were located throughout the UAE.

There were no reports of people being trafficked from the UAE.

-- C. Since research and verifiable statistics on the issue
of trafficking in persons to the UAE were limited, it was
impossible to reliably report changes in the direction or
extent of trafficking. There were some reports from
Government officials, source country missions and NGOs that
there was a decrease in the number of boys trafficked over
the reporting period to work as camel jockeys.

-- D. Two mid-level Ministry of Interior officials stated
that the UAE did not have the capacity to survey or document
the extent and/or nature of human trafficking to the UAE.
There was no information available from similar reports or
surveys this reporting period that was not available last
year. From October 2002 to January 2005, UAE immigration
officials blocked 26,000 foreigners who attempted to re-enter
the country illegally, using iris recognition biometric
technology. The data base contains approximately four
million iris scan results, including the results of 297,000
illegal immigrants who have been deported. However,
authorities kept no data documenting how many individuals
were real or potential human trafficking victims.

Post and G/TIP visitors repeatedly encouraged the UAEG to
consider working more closely with the International
Organization for Migration (IOM), which has the capacity to
conduct such surveys. UAEG officials and IOM representatives
met on several occasions during the reporting year to discuss
closer relations, and potentially the opening of an IOM
office in Dubai and/or Abu Dhabi. Permission to open an IOM
office in the UAE was not granted by the end of the reporting
period.

-- E. NGO, IGO, source country, and anecdotal reports
indicate that conditions for trafficking victims are varied.

Credible Government, NGO, IGO, and diplomatic source country
sources reported that most trafficked camel jockeys were
South Asian or East African boys aged between 3 and 10 years.
Some boys as young as six months old were reportedly
kidnapped or sold to traffickers and raised to become camel
jockeys. Most camel jockeys were trafficked to the country
by small, organized gangs headed by individuals from the
source countries. The traffickers obtained the youths from
impoverished families by kidnapping, or in some instances by
buying them from their parents outright or taking them under
false pretenses, then smuggling them into the UAE.
Increasingly, parents were paid to bring their children to
the UAE to circumvent the DNA testing mandate, and the
children were turned over to traffickers after the medical
procedures were cleared.

There were multiple NGO, IGO, source country, and media
reports, including an October 2004 HBO &Real Sports8
feature, showing camel jockeys subjected to harsh living and
working conditions. Some boys claimed to be physically and
sexually abused by their traffickers and/or trainers.
Children were frequently beaten for losing races or
disobeying their trainers. Some were injured seriously
during races and training sessions. At least one child was
killed at a camel race during the reporting period, and there
were several allegations by NGOs and one source country
diplomat that other boys were also killed while racing or
training camels, but their deaths went unreported. Boys were
reportedly underfed to make them as light as possible, worked
long hours in extreme weather conditions without water or
rest, were regularly deprived of sleep, and were afforded
inadequate shelter and little or no access to medical care
and educational opportunities. Generally the traffickers,
not the boys or their families, received compensation for
their work. However, sometimes the parents lived in the UAE
and claimed their children,s salaries.

Multiple reports and anecdotal evidence from Government,
NGOs, IGOs, media and diplomatic sources, indicated that many
women trafficked to the UAE for the purpose of sexual
exploitation were lured to the UAE by small gangs originating
in the source country, often under the false pretense of
legitimate employment, but were then forced into prostitution
through physical abuse, including rape, extreme mental abuse,
and other threats against themselves or their families.
Observers believe that trafficking activity was generally
conducted with the complicity of some of the women,s UAE
citizen sponsors and with non-UAE citizen traffickers who
were exploiting the UAE,s sponsorship system to engage in
illicit activity.

Traffickers seized victims, passports, restricted their
movements, and imposed steep (thousands of U.S. dollars)
&debts8 incurred from their travel and other expenses, to
be &paid off8 by working as prostitutes and forfeiting
their earned income. Usually, when the debt was paid, the
trafficker &sold8 the victim to another trafficker, who in
turn forced the victim to pay off yet another debt.
Some trafficked women were imprisoned in private residences
and inexpensive hotels. Others worked in dance clubs, bars,
hotels (from one- to five-star quality), massage parlors, and
other public venues, primarily in Dubai, but also in larger
cities in Abu Dhabi Emirate and, in smaller numbers, cities
in the Northern Emirates. Some trafficking victims,
primarily women and teenage girls, were held in private
residences in all seven emirates for sexual and/or labor
exploitation.

Other forms of labor trafficking existed in the UAE, although
they were not commonplace. Some women and teenage girls were
trafficked to work as domestic servants, and some men were
trafficked to work as laborers, primarily construction
workers, and, less frequently, agricultural workers. Labor
conditions in the UAE can be harsh for all unskilled workers,
and more so for trafficking victims.

There were reports from NGOs, IGOs, source country diplomatic
representatives, and media, that some employers abused
domestic servants, both trafficked and voluntary workers.
Allegations included excessive work hours, nonpayment of
wages, verbal, mental, physical, and sexual abuse, and
restriction of movement. There were some additional local
media (including internet) and anecdotal reports of a few
isolated cases of domestic servants committing suicide or
dying while trying to escape from their employers, homes
after being locked inside for weeks or months at a time. The
Ministries of Interior and Labor have expended considerable
effort to prevent and resolve these problems.

The UAE economy is heavily dependent on foreign labor. An
estimated 85 percent of the total UAE population, and roughly
98 percent of the private workforce, is expatriate. The
majority are workers from poor source countries who are drawn
to the UAE hoping for a better life. While some achieve this
goal, many are left vulnerable to human traffickers, both in
their own countries and after arriving in the UAE.

The media regularly reported on strikes by construction
workers protesting harsh working conditions and unpaid
salaries, and on Labor Ministry efforts to resolve these
disputes. Legally employed construction workers are covered
by the existing UAE labor law. However, legally employed
domestic servants and agricultural workers are not covered by
the labor law, and must appeal to the Ministry of Interior
regarding disputes with their employers.

In 2004, the Ministry of Interior took action against
hundreds of employers who abused or failed to pay their
domestic employees. According to new regulations, ministry
officials can ban an employer from further sponsorship of
domestic employees after receiving four reports of abuse.
Police officials, particularly in Dubai, assisted trafficking
victims once they identified themselves as such. However,
victims were often reluctant to approach police due to their
illegal status and the risk of losing their jobs and being
arrested, charged and deported.

Traffickers normally seized their victims, passports upon
entry into the UAE. This practice, common among employers in
all professions, including public sector jobs, was outlawed
in July 2003. Employers may now only legally hold
employees, passports long enough to take care of
administrative business, after which time the employers are
required to return the passports to their employees.
However, there were numerous reports that the practice
remains commonplace in both the private and public sectors.
The UAEG engaged in a public relations campaign to inform
workers and employers that the practice is illegal. There
were numerous instances, widely reported by the media, in
which police and embassies or consulates intervened to
collect passports from employers and return them to the
employees.

-- F. The UAE is not a TIP country of origin.

-- G. Over the reporting period, senior government
leadership on several occasions voiced its strong political
will to combat trafficking in persons. The highest levels of
leadership have detailed good faith efforts to address human
trafficking. However, there continued to be a significant
presence of child camel jockeys and prostitutes. Throughout
the reporting year, USG officials and NGO representatives, on
several occasions, reported seeing dozens of young boys, some
estimated to be as young as two or three years old, working
publicly as camel jockeys, and dozens of women and teenage
girls, some of them likely trafficking victims, working in
public venues as prostitutes.

There was no evidence that corruption of public officials was
a systemic problem. There were no verifiable reports of
government officials being linked to TIP activity during the
reporting period. In the past, the UAEG investigated and
prosecuted government officials suspected of committing
criminal offenses, such as embezzlement and fraud. This
willingness to take action against government officials
suspected of illegal activity indicated that the UAEG would
likely take action against government officials linked to
trafficking in persons, if identified.

In February 2005, G/TIP and PolOff were refused entry to a
camel race, on the orders of the director of the Camel Racing
Federation, despite the fact that the race was open to the
general public.

The same USG officials were also refused entry to the Dubai
Immigration Detention Center in February 2005 by the deputy
director of the center. The officials planned to talk to
potential sex trafficking victims awaiting deportation. The
ostensible reason for the refusal was a lack of prior
coordination, although the Embassy had made numerous attempts
to coordinate in advance with federal and Dubai officials.

A senior police official confirmed allegations made by an NGO
that some emirates, primarily Abu Dhabi, were moving large
numbers of child camel jockeys deeper into the desert and to
neighboring countries, including Oman, Saudi Arabia, and
Qatar, to &hide8 them until public attention on the issue
died down. One reliable source country official told Poloff
and G/TIP representative that he had 78 trafficking cases
pending with the UAEG; however, each time he asked for
Government law enforcement and repatriation assistance, he
was flatly refused by officials at different ministries.

The UAEG devoted significant time and resources to
sensitizing law enforcement and immigration officials to the
subject of trafficking in persons, as well as practical
training techniques to protect victims and prevent future
trafficking incidents. Abu Dhabi and Dubai police and the
Ministries of Interior, Health, and Justice have all held
anti-TIP training courses throughout the year.

In May 2004, the Abu Dhabi Police College, with guidance from
the IOM, Post, and G/TIP, conducted an anti-TIP training
seminar for approximately 100 law enforcement and ministry
officials. In November 2004, the Abu Dhabi Police College
conducted a human rights symposium for approximately 200 law
enforcement and ministry officials. The police college
requires all students to complete human rights and anti-TIP
courses before graduation.

From May 20 ) June 10, 2004, a representative from the
Ministry of Interior,s Legal Affairs Department participated
in an anti-TIP Multi-Regional Program in the U.S.

The Dubai Immigration and Residency Department regularly
offered training for arrival and departure inspectors in
identifying fraudulent documents, often used by trafficking
victims. The UAEG also supplied ports of entry and source
country embassies and consulates with brochures to try to
warn off potential trafficking victims, as well as to inform
victims where they can go to receive assistance.
The UAEG senior leadership repeatedly asked the USG for
training information and opportunities that would further
their efforts to combat trafficking in persons, and help law
enforcement officials, prosecutors and judges to better
identify, investigate and prosecute trafficking in persons
cases. Embassy is working with LegAtt to arrange training
opportunities for UAE law enforcement in interview techniques
to help elicit information from victims and traffickers to
build stronger cases against human traffickers.

In December 2004, the UAEG opened a shelter and
rehabilitation center for rescued underage camel jockeys,
located on a military compound near Abu Dhabi. The center,
which is run by the Ministry of Defense in coordination with
the Ministry of Interior and Pakistani human rights activist
Ansar Burney, offers the children medical care and basic
education while awaiting repatriation. Approximately 30 boys
on average have lived in the center since its opening. The
center could easily hold 100 children, and could be expanded
to shelter 400 boys. At least 16 children who were sheltered
in the center have been repatriated.

UAEG officials are also working with Government officials and
NGOs in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India to launch UAE-funded
shelters in those countries, intended to house repatriated
children who do not know or are unable to be reunited with
their families.

Before the shelter opened, the UAEG worked with Ansar Burney
and source country missions to repatriate an additional 400
former camel jockeys. Several NGOs and IGOs estimate that
between 5,000 and 9,000 boys remain in the UAE working as
camel jockeys.

The Government provided some assistance to trafficking
victims, once identified as such. Counseling services are
available in public hospitals and jails, and human rights
care departments are present in all Dubai police stations.
There is an anti-TIP unit in the Dubai police central
investigative division, and a Dubai police Human Rights Care
Department that handles human trafficking cases. In 2004,
this department handled 18 TIP complaints, out of over 5,000
arrests and deportations for prostitution and similar
violations.

While UAEG law enforcement generally did a good job of
protecting and assisting TIP victims, once identified, it
generally did not proactively investigate trafficking cases,
nor did it regularly arrest, prosecute, and punish
traffickers, brothel owners, pimps, customers of prostitutes,
and camel owners who used foreign children as camel jockeys.
However, the UAEG regularly deported both traffickers and
prostitutes and banned them from returning to the country.
During a February 2005 visit by G/TIP,s Senior Reports
Officer, a senior officer with the Dubai police stated that
law enforcement officials UAE-wide did not view the September
2002 ban on the use of foreign children as camel jockeys as
legally enforceable, to explain why no cases had been
prosecuted under the ban. Other federal officials agreed
with his assessment, giving this as the principal reason why
the UAEG was pressing ahead with a federal law to criminalize
the use of children as camel jockeys. A number of officials
stated that the law would be passed by Spring/Summer 2005.

-- H. There is no evidence that corruption of public
officials was a systemic problem.

In the past, the UAEG has investigated and prosecuted
government officials suspected of committing criminal
offenses, e.g., embezzlement and fraud. Because of this
willingness to take action against government officials
suspected of illegal activity, we would expect that the UAEG
would take action against government authorities who
facilitated trafficking, condoned trafficking, or were
otherwise complicit in such activities, or that received
bribes from traffickers or otherwise assisted in their
operations.

-- I. As a wealthy country, the UAEG theoretically was not
limited financially in its ability to fight TIP. But as a
young country with a largely inexperienced public work force,
it required continued personnel training to educate and
sensitize officials on the issue. Funding for police
services was generally adequate, although, as a loose
federation, there were sharply different budget levels in the
seven emirates which led to varied ability to fund police
programs and aid victims. Additionally, like many countries,
federal ministry and local department budgets were determined
on an annual basis. Consequently, new programs may be
required to wait until the next budget grant when new monies
can be allocated.

As stated above, overall corruption was generally not a
problem in the UAE. However, certain factors limited the
UAEG's ability to take quick action on all facets of its
trafficking problem.

The UAE gained its independence from the UK in 1971.
Although a young country, it has developed rapidly from an
undeveloped country to a dynamic regional economic power with
an advanced infrastructure and a diverse urbanized population
with residents originating from over 200 countries. Out of a
population of just over four million, approximately 85
percent of all residents are non-citizens. The UAE is an
open country with a vibrant tourism industry, and is the
preeminent transit hub for international travel and trade in
the Gulf. This open atmosphere is especially important in
Dubai, where major efforts have been underway for a number of
years to diversify its economy and reduce its reliance on oil
reserves, which are rapidly dwindling and expected to be
depleted in approximately a decade.

As a result of the country's rapid modernization and growth,
the federal government and the governments of the individual
emirates are increasingly tasked with responding to complex
transnational challenges, many of which involve foreign
organized criminal groups, including terrorism and money
laundering, as well as trafficking in persons, drugs, illegal
arms, and weapons of mass destruction components. These
complex issues stretch the human resources of UAEG law
enforcement, which lacks overall institutional knowledge and
experience due to the country,s young age and small national
population. Ministry and law enforcement officials at all
but the very top levels are often young and lack appropriate
levels of formal training and/or on-the-job experience to
assist them in the performance of their jobs. Therefore, it
is not realistic to expect the majority of UAEG officials to
tackle all facets of a difficult, multi-dimensional global
problem such as trafficking in persons in a short amount of
time.

A loose federation comprised of seven individual emirates,
the UAE is governed by consensus of the seven emirates'
rulers. The federal Government asserts primacy in matters of
foreign and defense policy, some aspects of internal
security, and increasingly in matters of law and the supply
of some government services. However, the loose federal
structure and requirement for consensus prohibits quick
action on matters with any level of controversy, such as TIP.


The federal Ministry of Interior oversees the Police General
Directorates in each of the seven emirates; however, each
emirate maintains its own police force and supervises the
police stations in that emirate. While all emirate police
forces theoretically are branches of the federal Ministry of
Interior, in practice they operate with considerable
autonomy.

The bureaucratic process to pass legislation, accede to
international treaties or create national strategies can
often be lengthy. The Justice Ministry oversees the passage
of new legislation and accession to bilateral or multilateral
treaties. An inter-ministerial technical committee works to
draft agreed language, which is then submitted for approval
to a second inter-ministerial Political Committee that
includes representatives from each emirate. The Political
Committee is charged with achieving consensus on the draft
language from the seven emirates. Once consensus is
achieved, the draft language is presented to the Federal
National Council (FNC) for debate and consideration. After
the FNC concludes its consideration, it recommends draft
language to the Federal Cabinet, which then conducts its own
review and considers the draft language for passage into law
after ratification by the Supreme Council (comprised of the
rulers of all seven emirates).

Consistent enforcement of laws throughout the country is
sometimes affected by the relative independence of security
and police forces in each emirate. While all emirate
internal security organs theoretically are branches of one
federal organization, in practice they operate with
considerable independence. Each emirate maintains its own
independent police force at different budget levels. Civil
courts are generally a part of the federal system, except in
the Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah emirates, and are accountable to
the Federal Supreme Court. Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah do not
refer cases in their courts to the Federal Supreme Court for
judicial review, although they maintained a liaison with the
federal Ministry of Justice, Islamic Affairs and Endowments.

Some cultural characteristics also hamper the Government's
ability to immediately address TIP. For example, camel
racing is a traditional sport. In the past, camel owners or
their sons raced camels. Over the past few decades, young
foreign boys had been increasingly used as camel jockeys as
local interest in the sport waned and prizes for winning the
races increased dramatically. Many foreign boys who worked
as camel jockeys were offered for employment to camel owners
by their impoverished parents, which, in the minds of some,
condones the activity. As a Muslim country, discussion of
sex is culturally taboo, which makes it difficult to talk
about sex trafficking, despite the fact that Dubai is
reported to be the Gulf,s preeminent sex tourism center.
Also, due to a cultural emphasis on privacy regarding matters
of the home, discussion of abuse of trafficked domestic
servants is often avoided publicly.

-- J. The Government generally does not keep and/or publicly
share data and statistics showing the verifiable results of
its anti-TIP efforts.

-- K. Prostitution is illegal in the UAE, punishable by up
to three years of imprisonment followed by deportation. The
activities of prostitutes, brothel owners/operators, clients,
pimps, and enforcers are criminalized.



--------------------------




5. PREVENTION


--------------------------



-- A. The UAEG acknowledges that trafficking in persons is a
problem. The senior leadership has noted a number of times
that this global crime must be addressed for humanitarian as
well as national security reasons. UAEG officials recognize
that a failure to attack any type of organized crime opens
the country to organized crime in other areas, such as drugs
or weapons.

The UAEG repeatedly acknowledged its trafficking problem
during the December 2004 and February 2005 visits by G/TIP
officials. G/TIP met with high-ranking officials from the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice, and Health.
They also met with officers from the Dubai and Abu Dhabi
Police Department, source country embassies and consulates,
and NGOs. Emirati officials acknowledged that trafficking in
persons to the UAE is a problem, sought engagement on the
issue, and requested assistance in training and other areas
in order to combat the problem.

-- B. Both federal ministries and local emirate departments
are involved in anti-trafficking efforts. On the federal
level, the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice,
Health, Labor and Social Affairs, and Information are
involved actively in anti-trafficking efforts. On the local
level, police and immigration departments, public
prosecution, and social services departments are also
involved. Police and other government officials have worked
more closely with members of the media to draw more public
attention to the problem.

In December 2004, the Ministry of Interior took over the TIP
portfolio from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This move
was beneficial, as the new Interior Minister, Sheikh Saif bin
Zayed, who was appointed in November 2004, has taken a strong
interest in addressing trafficking issues. Interior will be
responsible for enforcing the camel jockey law, once passed,
in addition to caring for sex trafficking victims and helping
Ministry of Justice officials prosecute traffickers.

-- C. Despite social sensitivities, there was an increase in
the number of articles in English-language newspapers about
trafficking in persons. There were occasional articles on
these subjects in Arabic-language newspapers.

The local press highlighted cases of child camel jockeys
rescued and repatriated by local authorities, source country
embassies and consulates, and NGOs. The local press also
increased its reporting over the past year on cases of sex
trafficking, despite the taboo nature of the subject. The
media highlighted a number of cases of domestic servants who
were abused by their employers or committed suicide while
trying to escape their employers, homes. Some local
newspapers included regular columns with advice on worker
rights, including articles on the July 2003 law prohibiting
employers from holding their employees, passports. The
media highlighted several incidents of police assistance with
retrieving passports from employers.

-- D. In addition to government ministries and departments,
charitable and other organizations funded by the Government
and individual ruling family members are also involved in
programs that help to prevent trafficking. The Government
maintained its efforts to address humanitarian needs and
concerns in the UAE and worldwide through government-funded
charitable organizations.

Within the UAE,s borders, the government-funded UAE Red
Crescent Authority, an affiliate of the International
Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies,
provided assistance to widows, divorced women, prisoners'
wives, orphans, prisoners and students from poor families.
Internal projects funded by the Red Crescent Authority
included maintaining schools and mosques, digging wells,
building health units, and training people with special
needs.

Outside the UAE, the UAE Red Crescent Authority and other
charitable organizations funded by individual ruling family
members, such as the Zayed Foundation and the Mohammed Bin
Rashid Al-Maktoum Humanitarian and Charity Establishment,
conducted humanitarian relief projects and provided
reconstruction and other types of assistance to a number of
countries worldwide.

Many of the countries that received aid from UAE charitable
organizations were source countries or were at risk of
becoming source countries for human trafficking because of
poor socio-economic conditions. These charitable projects
were anti-trafficking in nature because they help to support
people and communities vulnerable to trafficking.

The UAEG cooperated with the office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees. The UAEG also
cooperated with Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without
Borders), which maintained offices in the UAE. UAEG
officials regularly met with visiting NGO representatives,
such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Over
the reporting year, the UAEG worked with the IOM to conduct
Iraqi out-of-country voting, and met with IOM officials on
several occasions to discuss the possible opening of an IOM
branch in Abu Dhabi and/or Dubai. Additionally, after the
October 2004 HBO expose on the continued use of child camel
jockeys in the UAE, senior level Government officials from
the Ministries of Defense, Interior and Labor forged close
relations with Ansar Burney, the head of the self-named NGO
that was prominently featured in the program. The Government
gave Burney a residency permit, housing, transportation, and
permission to facilitate the rescue work he previously
undertook clandestinely. The Government also offered to
assist Burney in any way he required within the bounds of the
law, and offered him the lead management position at the Abu
Dhabi Emirate-based camel jockey shelter and rehabilitation
center, which opened in December 2004. To date, 16 boys from
the shelter have been humanely repatriated. The Government
is also working with Governments and NGOs in Pakistan, India
and Bangladesh to establish UAE-funded shelters to receive
former UAE-based camel jockeys after their repatriation.
-- E. The government is able to and does support prevention
programs both in the UAE and in source countries. See
paragraphs 4C and 4D above.

-- F. The UAEG works with foreign embassies, consulates and
ministries, and source country NGOs, to provide shelter and
assistance to victims and facilitate their repatriation, as
well as to stop the flow of trafficking victims at the
source. The UAEG has a good working relationship with the
local branch of the UNDP. The Dubai Human Rights Care
Department has worked with a number of source country and
U.S.-based NGOs. The Abu Dhabi Police College has worked
with the IOM, Amnesty International, and Interpol to develop
its anti-TIP training program.

-- G. The UAEG monitors its borders against illegal
migration and smuggling. The Armed Forces are responsible
for guarding and monitoring the UAE's coast and land borders.
Border guards have the legal authority to stop and inspect
individuals at the border or points of entry, especially if
there is suspicion of illegal activity. The UAE is erecting
a fence barrier that will run for roughly 525 miles along its
land borders with Oman and Saudi Arabia, in an effort to curb
land-based smugglers and illegal immigration.

The federal and emirate-level immigration authorities are
responsible for controlling the influx of people at the
country's international airports. Immigration authorities
regularly conducted training to detect fraudulent documents,
often used by trafficked persons, for arrival and departure
inspectors.

The authorities have long since recognized that illegal
immigration and the violation of residency laws is a problem
in the UAE, where only about 15% of its residents are
citizens. To that end, the Ministry of Interior's Department
of Naturalization and Residency created a central operations
room in 2000, including an integrated federal data center to
track the arrival and departure of individuals in the
Federation's seven emirates. In 2003, the UAEG instituted
the use of iris recognition scans to add biometrics
identification information to its databases, to better
monitor migration and combat document fraud by visitors and
illegal immigrants, some of whom are trafficking victims.
UAE immigration authorities have stopped 26,000 potential
illegal immigrants, some of whom were likely trafficking
victims, using iris scan technology, from October 2002 to
January 2005. The data base contains approximately four
million iris scan results, including the results of 297,000
illegal immigrants who have been deported.

During the reporting period, the media regularly reported on
crackdowns on illegal residents. In February, Abu Dhabi and
Dubai emirates began campaigns to arrest and deport thousands
of individuals overstaying their visas and absconders from
their employers, encouraging citizens and legal immigrants to
turn in their illegal neighbors. A Dubai police official
stated to the media that, from February 1 to 15 alone, 2,855
illegal men and women were caught. There was no mention of
whether police were making efforts to identify trafficking
victims from this crowd, and provide them with care and
assistance, in order to identify their traffickers and
dismantle international trafficking rings.

-- H. The UAEG does not have a public corruption task force.
Beginning in December 2004, the Ministry of Interior took
the lead in combating the daunting UAE human trafficking
problem, and immediately developed a national strategy to
address the problem. It also created and activated a
designated anti-child trafficking unit within the Ministry of
Interior, and established a shelter for rescued camel
jockeys. Over the reporting year, the Ministry of Justice
drafted an anti-trafficking law specifically addressing the
use of child camel jockeys. The draft is expected to become
law by April 2005. Representatives from the Ministries of
Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice, Labor, and the Dubai
Police meet when required.

-- I. Throughout the reporting year, police and Ministry of
Interior officials continued to develop channels with source
country governments to exchange information on organized
crime, including trafficking in persons.

UAEG authorities worked closely with authorities and NGOs in
Pakistan and Bangladesh to prevent and control trafficking in
boys to the UAE by stemming the seizure and recruitment of
these children at the source. Law enforcement officials
coordinated with foreign NGOs and source country governments
on trafficking in women cases.

Immigration authorities also worked with source country NGOs,
embassies and consulates, to repatriate trafficking victims,
including 400 former camel jockeys to Pakistan, Bangladesh
and Sudan.

-- J. The UAEG developed an inter-ministry group, including
representatives from Interior, Justice, Labor, Foreign
Affairs, and Dubai police, in late 2004, to coordinate and
communicate on trafficking in persons issues and develop a
national strategy to address the problem.

-- K. Beginning in December 2004, the Ministry of Interior
took responsibility to coordinate all anti-TIP programs.



--------------------------




6. INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF TRAFFICKERS


--------------------------



-- A. The UAE does not have one law specifically
criminalizing trafficking in persons. However, traffickers
can be prosecuted under a number of laws that, taken
together, may be adequate to cover the full scope of
trafficking in persons. Those laws criminalize child
smuggling, prostitution, and forced and compulsory labor.

UAE Penal Law Article 346 states: "Whoever brings into or out
of the country any person intending to possess or dispose of
and whoever possesses or purchases or sells or offers for
sale or transacts in any manner of any person as a slave
shall be punished with provisional imprisonment."
Provisional imprisonment is a sentence of 3 years minimum and
15 years maximum.

Justice Ministry officials indicate that traffickers can also
be prosecuted under other penal laws, including: kidnapping;
rape; sodomy; sexual abuse; sexual exploitation; immoral
acts; exploitation of someone for immoral acts; physical
abuse; false imprisonment; juvenile endangerment; forced
labor; child labor; forced prostitution; indecency;
enticement, inducement or deceiving someone to commit immoral
acts or prostitution; aiding or facilitating the commission
of immoral acts or prostitution; keeping or operating a
place for immoral acts or prostitution; and money
laundering.

Ministry of Labor officials also report that the UAE Labor
Law contains penalties for labor law violations. UAE Labor
Law Art. 181 provides for a fine from 3,000 dirhams (about
$820) to 10,000 dirhams (about $2700) and/or imprisonment up
to six months per labor law violation or for obstructing,
preventing or threatening labor inspectors.

UAE law appears to adequately cover the full scope of
trafficking in persons in a piecemeal fashion, if properly
applied. However, Ministry of Justice officials are
currently reviewing U.S. trafficking in persons model
legislation and evaluating current UAE laws to determine
whether there are gaps in existing legislation. If so,
Justice Ministry officials will determine whether
supplemental legislation will be adequate or if comprehensive
trafficking in persons legislation will be necessary. Also,
several UAEG officials have informed USG officials that a
draft anti-child camel jockey law, based on the tenets of the
2002 presidential decree banning the practice, will be passed
into law by April 2005.

-- B. There is no single law specifically criminalizing
trafficking. The punishment for child smuggling is
imprisonment plus a 1,000 dirham (USD 270) fine. For child
smuggling that results in child abuse, the fine is increased
to 10,000 dirhams (USD 2700). UAE Penal Law Art. 346 (see
paragraph 6A above), which comes closest to the USG
definition of trafficking in persons, provides for
imprisonment from 3 years minimum to 15 years maximum.

-- C. Sentencing for rape ranges from 15 years plus lashings
to capital punishment. The penalty for rape that leads to
the death of the victim or for rape with extenuating
circumstances is capital punishment.

-- D. The UAE does not keep and share data on how many
trafficking cases the Government has arrested and prosecuted.
The Dubai Police Human Rights Care Department reported 18
TIP-based complaints in 2004. Dubai police also reported
that, from January 1, 2002, to December 31, 2003, it arrested
40 suspects on charges of &management and practice of
prostitution.8 Of those 40, nine received imprisonment and
fines, followed by deportation. Twenty-two others received
administrative deportation only.

-- E. IGO, NGO, and media reports, as well as UAEG and
source country officials, indicate that small, organized
crime syndicates, almost all of them originating from source
countries, were behind the great majority of human
trafficking cases to the UAE. Employment and travel agencies
had been used as fronts for traffickers, although in many
cases these organizations handled legitimate business as well
as participated in trafficking. These observers believe that
trafficking activity was generally conducted with the
complicity of some of the victims, citizen sponsors and with
noncitizen traffickers who were exploiting the sponsorship
system to engage in illicit activity. There were no verified
reports that government officials were involved, although
there have been anecdotal reports that some lower-level
officials may have turned a blind eye to the problem, and
some observers questioned the sincerity of UAEG officials,
political will to combat human trafficking in light of the
long-term lack of appreciable progress on the issue. There
were no reports of where the profits are being channeled.

-- F. Law enforcement officials reported that they
investigated cases of trafficking in persons and assisted
trafficking victims, once cases were brought to their
attention. However, there is no indication that police
regularly used proactive law enforcement methods, such as
sting operations of places known to harbor potential
trafficking victims, or internationally accepted interview
techniques to differentiate trafficking victims from those
who choose to work in illegal activities, to ferret out sex
trafficking cases. Also, although the Camel Racing
Federation mandated the use of DNA testing to prove familial
ties and the ID card system at racetracks to prevent the use
of trafficked children as camel jockeys, lack of adequate
enforcement allowed the problem to continue. However,
several victims, source country officials, and NGOs stated
that police provided excellent care and assistance once a
victim or other interested party lodged a complaint. Police
officials repeatedly stated that investigating trafficking
cases was extremely challenging when trafficking was
suspected but victims refused to cooperate.

Electronic surveillance and undercover operations are
permitted under UAE laws. Police officials often recommend
sentence mitigation for cooperating suspects and are not
prohibited from engaging in covert operations. However, due
to restraints on properly trained and experienced law
enforcement staff, police take more of a reactive role in
investigating trafficking cases.
-- G. The UAEG has devoted a significant amount of time and
resources to sensitizing law enforcement and immigration
officials on the subject of trafficking in persons, as well
as practical training techniques to protect victims and
prevent future trafficking incidents. Abu Dhabi and Dubai
police and the Ministries of Interior, Health, and Justice
have all held anti-TIP training courses throughout the year.

In May 2004, the Abu Dhabi Police College, with guidance from
the IOM, Post, and G/TIP, conducted an anti-TIP training
seminar for approximately 100 law enforcement and ministry
officials. In November 2004, the Abu Dhabi Police College
conducted a human rights symposium for approximately 200 law
enforcement and ministry officials. The police college
requires all students to complete human rights and anti-TIP
courses before graduation.

From May 20 ) June 10, 2004, a representative from the
Ministry of Interior,s Legal Affairs Department participated
in an anti-TIP MRP program in Washington, D.C., and other
locations in the U.S.

The Dubai Immigration and Residency Department regularly
offered training for arrival and departure inspectors in
identifying fraudulent documents, often used by trafficking
victims. The UAEG also supplied ports of entry and source
country embassies and consulates with brochures to try to
warn off potential trafficking victims, as well as to inform
victims where they can go to receive assistance.

The Ministry of Justice Institute of Judicial Training and
Studies conducts mandatory classes for prosecutors and judges
on proper victim care and assistance. The Institute also
conducts mandatory specialized classes on the following
topics: human rights (14 hours); sexual offenses (20 hours);
offenses against life (20 hours); immigration offenses (20
hours); juvenile protection and delinquency (30 hours); labor
violations and offenses (12 hours).

The UAEG senior leadership repeatedly asked the USG for
training information and opportunities that would further
their efforts to combat trafficking in persons, and help law
enforcement officials, prosecutors and judges to better
identify, investigate and prosecute trafficking in persons
cases. Embassy is working with LegAtt to arrange training
opportunities for UAE law enforcement in interview techniques
to help elicit information from victims and traffickers to
build stronger cases against human traffickers.

-- H. UAEG officials stated, and several source country
embassies and consulates confirmed, that they cooperated to
investigate, care for, and repatriate trafficking victims,
and prevent future trafficking incidents. Officials,
primarily in law enforcement, reported that they also worked
with NGOs and IGOs on trafficking issues when cases were
brought to their attention.

Ministry of Interior officials have indicated that they
continue to work on developing new channels with source
country governments to exchange information on organized
crime, including trafficking in persons.

The UAEG generally does not keep and share trafficking
statistics, therefore, Post can not relay the number of
cooperative international investigations on trafficking.

-- I. The UAEG has extradition treaties with India, Sri
Lanka, Armenia, Canada (for drugs and money-laundering
charges), China, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco,
Syria, Somalia, Jordan and Egypt. Post does not have
statistics covering extraditions over the reporting year. In
the past, the UAE has agreed to extradite cases to and from
countries with which the UAEG does not have extradition
treaties. UAEG authorities have discussed the UAE,s
interest in pursuing an extradition treaty with the U.S.,
most recently in February 2005.

The UAEG also has mutual legal assistance treaties (MLAT) in
criminal matters with a number of countries. In some cases,
mutual legal assistance was exchanged with countries with
which the UAEG did not have an MLAT. MLAT negotiations
between the USG and UAEG are currently underway.

To Post,s knowledge, the UAEG has not requested or granted
extradition in a human trafficking case. Based on the UAEG's
record on extradition and mutual legal assistance in criminal
matters, it would be fair to expect that the UAEG would
request or grant extradition and mutual legal assistance in
human trafficking cases.

UAEG extradition of a UAE citizen to another country is
highly unlikely absent extreme extenuating circumstances.
For example, there was reportedly a clause in the UAE-India
extradition treaty, included at the UAEG's request, wherein
both nations agreed not to extradite their own nationals to
the other country.

-- J. There is no firm evidence of government involvement in
or tolerance of trafficking, whether on a local or
institutional level. Some NGO, IGO, source country and
internet sources alleged that some lower-level officials may
look the other way as traffickers bring their victims into
the country. Some also alleged that some police may &tip
off8 certain clubs, bars or hotels before a sting. Post
cannot corroborate these allegations.

-- K. There have been no credible cases reported of
government officials involved in trafficking. Based on
previous cases of investigation and prosecution of government
officials for criminal offenses, it is expected that the UAEG
would investigate and prosecute government officials
suspected of trafficking or trafficking-related corruption.


-- L. Although there have been a number of media, source
country, NGO and IGO reports that some teenage girls, almost
all of whom are trafficking victims, work as prostitutes in
the UAE, there have been no reliable reports of the UAE being
a child sex tourism destination. There have been no reports
of foreign pedophiles being prosecuted, deported or
extradited to their countries of origin.

-- M. Following is a rundown of the UAE,s position on
relevant international instruments:



A. ILO Convention 182 Concerning the Prohibition and
Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of
Child Labor: The UAEG ratified ILO Convention 182 Concerning
Worst Forms of Child Labor on 28 June 2001.



B. ILO Conventions 29 and 105 on Forced or Compulsory Labor:
The UAEG ratified ILO Convention 29 Concerning Forced Labor
on 27 May 1982, and the UAEG ratified ILO Convention 105
Concerning Abolition of Forced Labor on 24 February 1997.


C. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child
Pornography: The UAEG ratified the UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child on 3 January 1997, but has not ratified
its supplemental Option Protocol on the Sale of Children,
Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography.



D. The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking
in Persons, especially Women and Children, Supplementing the
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime: The UAE
acceded to the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime in December 2002. Justice Ministry officials report
that the UAE is reviewing and will likely sign the following
supplemental protocols soon: (1) the Supplemental Protocol
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children; and (2) the Supplemental
Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and
Air.



E. Other Instruments:

The UAEG has also ratified or acceded to the following
international instruments that help directly or indirectly
guard against trafficking in persons.

--UN International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination (acceded 20 June 1974).

--Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (ratified October 2004)

--Convention Against Slavery (ratification date unknown).

--ILO Convention 1 Concerning Hours of Work for Industry
(ratified 27 May 1982).

--ILO Convention 81 Concerning Labor Inspection (ratified 27
May 1982).

--ILO Revised Convention 89 Concerning Night Work for Women
(ratified 27 May 1982).

--ILO Convention 100 Concerning Equal Remuneration (ratified
24 February 1997).

--ILO Convention 111 Concerning Discrimination in Employment
and Occupation (ratified 28 June 2001).

--ILO Convention 138 Concerning Minimum Age for Employment
(ratified 2 October 1998).



--------------------------




7. PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE TO VICTIMS


--------------------------



-- A. The Government provides assistance and protection to
victims, including victims of trafficking in persons.
Counseling services are available in public hospitals. While
the UAE has no &safehouses,8 authorities have worked with
embassies and NGOs to provide shelter facilities for victims,
either in hotels or in embassies and consulates. Police
departments also claim to provide shelter facilities for
victims separate from the general prison population. Those
sheltered in police facilities receive free medical care.
Police provide victims who agree to testify against their
traffickers with housing, employment opportunities,
counseling, medical care, and any other necessary support.


UAE Code of Criminal Procedures Arts. 14 and 22 provide for
legal assistance for victims.

Each Dubai police station is staffed with a human rights care
officer and a social worker/counselor from Dubai Police's
Human Rights Care Department.

In 2002, the Dubai Police Human Rights Care Department
developed a Crime Victims' Assistance Program, which includes
the creation of Victim Assistance Coordinators and police
training in victim protection and assistance. In March 2003,
Victim Assistance Coordinators were assigned to police
stations. Victim Assistance Coordinators' responsibilities
include advising victims about the criminal justice system
and criminal procedure; encouraging witness testimony,
especially in cases like sexual abuse and trafficking in
persons where victims are reluctant to speak out; advising
victims of their rights; providing counseling and medical
care; placement in a hotel or shelter; and follow-up with
victims as the case proceeds to trial.

The Dubai Tourist Security Department operates a 24-hour
toll-free hotline telephone number to assist visitors with
inquiries or problems. The Department publishes information
on the hotline and precautionary measures for visitors in a
brochure that is distributed at all ports of entry and other
locations, including source country missions.

The Women's Da'waa Administration in the Dubai Department of
Awqaf and Islamic Affairs also operates a hotline especially
geared toward women and children. Operating since July 2002,
the hotline is open to all nationalities living in all
emirates. The hotline is open from 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m.,
Saturday to Wednesday, but will take emergency calls on
Thursday and Friday (the UAE weekend).

Post does not have statistics showing how many victims used
any of the above services over the reporting year.

-- B. The Government provides funding for most or all local
NGOs, and works with foreign NGOs to provide assistance to
trafficking victims.

-- C. Authorities regularly work with source country NGOs to
assist in the humane repatriation of victims to their home
countries. Beginning in November 2004, UAEG authorities
worked closely with Pakistani human rights activist and
self-named NGO director Ansar Burney to help rescue, care
for, and repatriate child camel jockeys.

Police state that they do follow screening and referral
processes to determine if individuals suspected of or
arrested for crimes may be trafficking victims or
perpetrators. However, in practice, police admit that they
do not often identify human trafficking victims or
perpetrators through interviewing techniques alone. Often
victims must identify themselves as such, after which time
police provide necessary assistance. While law enforcement
regularly transferred trafficking victims to the protective
care of NGOs outside the UAE, there were no reports in 2004
of police officials transferring custody to officially
sanctioned local NGOs. Dubai police worked with one local
victim assistance organization, although that organization
has not received official government recognition.

-- D. Rights of victims are generally respected, once
identified as victims. There were NGO, IGO, and source
country reports, however, of cases where victims were never
identified as such, and were treated as criminals.
Individuals identified as victims receive assistance,
including medical care and counseling, and those who agree to
testify against their traffickers are afforded housing,
employment opportunities, and any other care required.
However, police reported that in most cases, victims choose
to be immediately repatriated to their home countries rather
than stand up to their traffickers.

-- E. Law enforcement officials report that they advise
victims of their rights and encourage witness testimony,
especially in cases like sexual abuse and trafficking in
persons, where victims may be reluctant to speak out. Police
will assist victims who choose to stay in the UAE during
court proceedings with locating appropriate housing and
temporary employment opportunities.

Before or during a criminal trial, a victim may claim
financial compensation, or "diya," which can be granted as
part of a defendant's sentence. Victims may also file civil
suits for damages.

Foreign diplomats indicate that victims have been permitted
to give sworn testimony and leave the country before judgment
was rendered.

-- F. The government is able to provide protections for
victims and witnesses, and does provide these protections in
practice.

UAE Code of Criminal Procedures Arts. 14 and 22 provide for
legal assistance for victims.

Authorities have worked with NGOs and source country
embassies and consulates to provide shelter for trafficking
victims. Police departments claim to provide shelter
facilities for victims separate and apart from jail
facilities, and have also arranged for shelter in hotels.
The UAEG does not operate a safe house system. Post is not
aware of how much money the UAEG spent on sheltering victims
over the reporting year.

-- G. The UAEG has devoted a significant amount of time and
resources to sensitizing law enforcement and immigration
officials on the subject of trafficking in persons, as well
as practical training techniques to protect victims and
prevent future trafficking incidents. Abu Dhabi and Dubai
police and the Ministries of Interior, Health, and Justice
have all held anti-TIP training courses throughout the year.

In May 2004, the Abu Dhabi Police College, with guidance from
the IOM, Post, and G/TIP, conducted an anti-TIP training
seminar for approximately 100 law enforcement and ministry
officials. In November 2004, the Abu Dhabi Police College
conducted a human rights symposium for approximately 200 law
enforcement and ministry officials. The police college
requires all students to complete human rights and anti-TIP
courses before graduation.
From May 20 ) June 10, 2004, a representative from the
Ministry of Interior,s Legal Affairs Department participated
in an anti-TIP MRP program in Washington, D.C., and other
locations in the U.S.
The Dubai Immigration and Residency Department regularly
offered training for arrival and departure inspectors in
identifying fraudulent documents, often used by trafficking
victims. The UAEG also supplied ports of entry and source
country embassies and consulates with brochures to try to
warn off potential trafficking victims, as well as to inform
victims where they can go to receive assistance. UAE
Missions in source countries closely screen visa applications
and deny visas to potential trafficking victims and
prostitutes.

The Ministry of Justice Institute of Judicial Training and
Studies conducts mandatory classes for prosecutors and judges
on proper victim care and assistance. The Institute also
conducts mandatory specialized classes on the following
topics: human rights (14 hours); sexual offenses (20 hours);
offenses against life (20 hours); immigration offenses (20
hours); juvenile protection and delinquency (30 hours); labor
violations and offenses (12 hours).

The UAEG senior leadership repeatedly asked the USG for
training information and opportunities that would further
their efforts to combat trafficking in persons, and help law
enforcement officials, prosecutors and judges to better
identify, investigate and prosecute trafficking in persons
cases. Embassy is working with LegAtt to arrange training
opportunities for UAE law enforcement in interview techniques
to help elicit information from victims and traffickers to
build stronger cases against human traffickers.

Post is unaware of any specific UAEG-provided training on
protection and assistance for staff members located in source
countries.

-- H. There were no reports of UAE nationals being
trafficked outside of or within the UAE. Considering the
UAEG's record of numerous services provided to citizens at
little to no cost, it is expected that the UAEG would provide
generous assistance to repatriated UAE nationals who were
victims of trafficking, if such a situation were to occur.

-- I. The Government cooperates and coordinates with NGOs
and IGOs in providing assistance to trafficking victims, as
cases come to their attention. Some examples are the United
Nations, Pakistan-based Ansar Burney International Welfare
Trust, the Bangladesh National Women,s Lawyers Association,
the IOM, The Protection Project, and any other NGOs,
including small source country NGOs, that request UAEG
assistance with cases or request meetings during
familiarization missions.
SISON