Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ZAGREB71
2004-01-14 11:35:00
SECRET
Embassy Zagreb
Cable title:  

CROATIAN PRESIDENT MESIC: OK ON IRAQ TROOP

Tags:  PREL MARR KAWC ETTC IZ SY HR NATO 
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S E C R E T ZAGREB 000071 

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE:KABUMOTO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2014
TAGS: PREL MARR KAWC ETTC IZ SY HR NATO
SUBJECT: CROATIAN PRESIDENT MESIC: OK ON IRAQ TROOP
CONTRIBUTIONS, WAIT ON ARTICLE 98, LIBYAN SHIP REFIT, TRIP
TO SYRIA


Classified By: Ambassador Ralph Frank, reasons 1.5 (b) & (d)

SUMMARY
-------

S E C R E T ZAGREB 000071

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE:KABUMOTO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2014
TAGS: PREL MARR KAWC ETTC IZ SY HR NATO
SUBJECT: CROATIAN PRESIDENT MESIC: OK ON IRAQ TROOP
CONTRIBUTIONS, WAIT ON ARTICLE 98, LIBYAN SHIP REFIT, TRIP
TO SYRIA


Classified By: Ambassador Ralph Frank, reasons 1.5 (b) & (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) In the Ambassador's January 13 call on President Mesic
to seek movement on key bilateral issues, Mesic offered to go
slow for the time being on any contract to refit a Libyan
naval vessel while restating his desire to develop commercial
relations with Libya. Mesic committed not to get in the way

VBI0878 SECURITY ERROR
of moves by the new government to send Croatian troops to
Iraq, but he remained concerned about the increased risk of
terrorist attacks on Croatian tourist installations. Mesic
continued to balk at signing an Article 98 agreement until
the ICTY has issued all indictments against Croatian
citizens. Mesic plans to visit Syria before the summer and
asked for U.S. views on a possible meeting with Syrian
President Asad (see comment paragraph 9). Intelligence
cooperation discussions will be reported septel. End SUMMARY.

Go Slow on Libya Ship Refit
--------------


2. (S) The Ambassador called on President Stipe Mesic on
January 13 to review core bilateral issues and set the tone
for what we hope will be regular consultations. Also
attending the meeting were Presidential Foreign Policy
Advisor Ambassador Mastruko, Assistant to the Foreign Policy
Advisor Tomislav Car, and Poloff Justin Friedman (notetaker).
Ambassador Frank led the meeting by noting recent moves by
Libya to come clean on its WMD programs and resolve the
Lockerbie case. However, the restoration of normal relations
would need to wait until implementation of the agreement on
WMD was verified and U.S. sanctions were lifted. In the
interim, the Ambassador urged that Croatia continue to hold
off on any contract to refit the Libyan naval vessel
Al-Munijed.


3. (S) President Mesic responded that Libya was testing
Croatia with this ship refit contract, and that $150 million
in commercial contracts were contingent on this deal.

However, Croatia understood U.S. concerns and would wait on
consummating any refit deal by stalling the Libyans "in the
Arab way." Mesic repeated Croatia's offer to allow U.S.
intelligence access to the ship when it arrives in Croatian
waters and offered that prospective Croatian contractors in
Libya could also be exploited for intelligence purposes. He
said that he had good personal relations with Libyan leader
Qadhafi, based in part on Qadhafi's deep admiration for
deceased Yugoslav dictator Tito, as well as on Mesic's
significant personal experience working in Libya. Mesic said
he had worked for many years in Libya during his days as
chief of an engineering firm, including work on three
separate 1000-person settlements along the Libya-Chad border,
and had visited Libya officially previously when he held the
rotating Yugoslav presidency. Mesic noted that he had
invited Qadhafi to visit Croatia, although no dates have been
discussed.

Won't Block Troops to Iraq
--------------


4. (C) Ambassador Frank turned the conversation to Iraq,
commenting that a Croatian troop contribution to the
coalition would be a significant gesture toward improving
bilateral relations. The Ambassador noted that UNSCR 1511
specifically authorized the international military force in
Iraq and urged member states to contribute to the military
effort. As recently as two weeks ago, Mesic had publicly
commented that Croatia needed a further UN resolution
authorizing military force before it could contribute troops.
Mesic further commented in the press that troop
contributions would increase the risk of terrorist attacks in
Croatia.


5. (C) Mesic said that he agreed on our assessment of UNSCR
1511, but countered that the coalition action "was not a UN
action." However, Mesic agreed that Croatia should assist
international efforts in Iraq to speed up Croatia's pace on
the road to Euro-Atlantic integration. Mesic said that he

would not push for a troop contribution, but would not make
any effort to block such a contribution if it received
support in the Sabor. He preferred that the contribution
have a non-military profile, such as engineers, medical
personnel, or even military police. Mesic offered, however,
that he would be in contact with the government and would not
do anything to make Sabor approval more difficult. (Comment:
The required two-thirds majority in the Sabor for a
deployment is problematic and a significant challenge for the
HDZ-led government. Nonetheless, Mesic's commitment is a
positive development. The Croatian armed forces have been
training a small special forces unit for potential deployment
to Iraq.)


6. (C) President Mesic appeared surprised when the Ambassador
noted that there had been no terrorist attacks on countries
contributing troops to the Iraq coalition since the start of
operations. However, Mesic said he remained deeply concerned
about the risk to Croatia's critical tourism industry of an
attack on a hotel on the Adriatic coast.

Wait on Article 98
--------------


7. (C) Ambassador Frank urged President Mesic to support
moves by the new government to seek an Article 98 agreement
with the U.S. He noted the importance of helping the
Croatian public distinguish between the UN mandated ICTY and
the ICC, which sought to assert jurisdiction over
non-signatories like the U.S. The Ambassador noted that 80
countries, including other prospective EU members, had signed
Article 98 agreements with the U.S.


8. (C) President Mesic said he understood the U.S. position
and reasons for seeking Article 98 agreements. He agreed
that the ICTY and ICC carried differently mandated
obligations, but stressed the difficulties of conveying this
distinction to the Croatian people who were victims of
external aggression. Mesic said that the ICTY performed a
necessary role in Croatia of individualizing the guilt for
war crimes committed by all sides. He asked that the U.S.
press the ICTY to issue all remaining indictments for
Croatian citizens. Once that was done, it would be easier
for him to explain to the public the reasons for signing an
Article 98 agreement with the U.S. He added that once all
Croatian indictees were in The Hague, Croatia could more
easily sign an Article 98 agreement.

Syria Visit
--------------


9. (C) Mesic asked what U.S. views would be if he were to
meet with Syrian President Bashar al Asad. He said that he
was looking to visit the Middle East some time before the
summer, and stops would include Syria, Qatar, Oman, and
Jordan. Mesic noted that the petroleum exploration Croatian
firm Crosco (a subsidiary of INA) had taken over leases from
U.S. firms of some gas and oil fields in Syria, and these
were turning into major finds. Several hundred Croatian
citizens were now working in Syria, and Mesic felt it
important that he visit them. (Comment: We will seek
guidance from Washington closer to the date of the trip on
specific points that Mesic could use with Al-Asad if
appropriate.)
FRANK


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