A NOT-SO-HOT SPRING? WHAT IF WE'RE WRONG...

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000844

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM AM
SUBJECT: A NOT-SO-HOT SPRING? WHAT IF WE'RE WRONG...

REF: YEREVAN 809

Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway for reasons 1.5(b) and (d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) We continue to believe that the current round of
opposition protests across Armenia is unlikely to develop
into a revolution, rose, velvet or otherwise (reftel). The
Ambassador has urged restraint in the strongest possible
terms during meetings this week with both senior government
officials and key opposition leaders, and we remain convinced
that the leadership on both sides wants to avoid violence.
As both the opposition and government raise the rhetorical
stakes, however, and skirmishes around the opposition rallies
make headlines, we want to explore potential alternative
Armenian scenarios: what happens if we're wrong? End
Summary.

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AMBASSADOR URGES RESTRAINT
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2. (C) The Ambassador has strongly urged restraint during
meetings this week with the most prominent opposition
leaders, Stepan Demirchian and Artashes Geghamian, as well as
with Foreign Minister Oskanian. The Ambassador warned
Oskanian that the government had a special responsibility to
avoid violent outbreaks at the upcoming demonstrations, and
noted our concern that the police stood by and did not
intervene during the incident March 5 when members of private
security forces (as identified by Oskanian) destroyed
journalists' cameras and equipment. The Ambassador noted
that if there were significant violence at upcoming rallies
the government would be held accountable in international
public opinion, and that any serious disturbances would harm
Armenia's economy.

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VIOLENCE COULD UP THE ANTE CONSIDERABLY...
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3. (SBU) The authorities have been concentrating their
efforts on reducing the number of possible demonstrators.
They are reportedly using the police in provincial towns and
villages to pressure people to stay out of Yerevan on April
9, and will undoubtedly undertake measures to impede traffic
into the city that day. These actions, along with arrests of
opposition activists, opening a criminal investigation of the
opposition Justice Alliance, and calling in selected
opposition MPs for questioning by the procuracy, are
increasing an already tense situation. Some prominent
opposition leaders (but not Geghamian or Demirchian) are much
more inclined to confrontation, even violent confrontation.
Both senior government and opposition leaders continue to
emphasize their commitment to keeping the situation peaceful.
During similar election-related demonstrations in 2003, both
sides acted with considerable restraint. That outcome seems
somewhat less likely this time as the mood has turned harsher
across the board. If security officials on the street become
involved in further violent altercations and if anyone were
seriously injured or killed we expect that public emotions
could well lead to large-scale demonstrations (with 50,000 or
more people on the streets) which would open the door to even
more opportunities for violence.


4. (C) There is at least one intriguing sign that even
senior government officials are concerned about the outcome.
One source in a sensitive position claimed that President
Kocharian and Defense Minister Sargsian have hedged their
bets and sent their families to Moscow, while Prime Minister
Margarian has sent his family to France. (However, at a
dinner on April 4 the Ambassador spent several hours with
Mrs. Bella Kocharian. In the course of an extended
conversation, she showed no concern about the current
political situation, although she did mention that she had
just returned from several days in Moscow.)

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...BUT THEN WHAT?
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5. (C) Even if we assume that sufficiently large, widespread,
prolonged demonstrations would lead Kocharian to resign we
are still faced with the question of what would happen then.
Constitutionally the next person in line is the Speaker of
the National Assembly Artur Baghdasarian. While he is not a
Kocharian "crony" he is certainly not part of the opposition,
and would not be likely to make things easy for the
opposition. There is no clear opposition figure who could
replace Kocharian, and there is little that various factions
in the opposition agree on except for their desire to remove
Kocharian.

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BAGHDASARIAN A POSSIBLE WINNER
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6. (C) Baghdasarian has been developing a stronger public
profile over the past ten months, and his recent statements
urging government restraint and calling on the government to
stop using detentions to intimidate opposition politicians
are notable in their moderation. It is not inconceivable
that, were Kocharian to resign, a disgruntled Armenian
electorate would turn to him rather than to any of the
opposition politicians. As part of the current governing
coalition, he might also be acceptable to current members of
the Kocharian government.

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"PEACEMAKER" ROLE COULD WIN BIG FOR DASHNAKS
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7. (C) The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF -
"Dashnaksutyun") Party attempted to fill the widening
political divide in late March by offering a "consultative
role" for the opposition. Prominent ARF Party leader and
National Assembly Deputy Speaker Vahan Hovanessian even went
so far as to urge the governing coalition to find better ways
to consider opposition policy concerns. The role of
potential peacemaker is relatively new for the ARF, whose
polarizing rhetoric (on topics such as Turkey and N-K) is
periodically the source of contention among the governing
coalition or a target for opposition criticism. Even though
the opposition categorically rejected the offer, the ARF's
political olive branch was the only such offer and gives the
party a serious, policy-focused appearance in the midst of
emotional political rhetoric. If Kocharian were to resign,
the ARF would likely maintain its seat at the table given the
constructive face it has put forward thus far this Spring.

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FINAL COMMENT
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8. (C) As we noted initially, we still believe that the
current round of protests will lose steam after several
demonstrations. The potential for violence exists, however,
and if peaceful protesters were to be killed or seriously
injured we would expect to see a significant backlash that
could well provide momentum for much larger rallies with
greater risks of violence. The opposition simply does not
have the resources to force Kocharian out of office if he
doesn't choose to resign -- and we see no sign that he is
about to leave office voluntarily.
ORDWAY