Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04YEREVAN2517
2004-11-22 13:15:00
SECRET
Embassy Yerevan
Cable title:  

ARMENIAN DEFMIN SOLID ON IRAQ CONTINGENT

Tags:  AM IZ MARR MOPS PREL 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 002517 

SIPDIS

STATE/EUR FOR DAS LAURA KENNEDY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2014
TAGS: AM IZ MARR MOPS PREL
SUBJECT: ARMENIAN DEFMIN SOLID ON IRAQ CONTINGENT

REF: YEREVAN 2494

Classified By: Amb. John Evans, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 002517

SIPDIS

STATE/EUR FOR DAS LAURA KENNEDY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2014
TAGS: AM IZ MARR MOPS PREL
SUBJECT: ARMENIAN DEFMIN SOLID ON IRAQ CONTINGENT

REF: YEREVAN 2494

Classified By: Amb. John Evans, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1.(S) Summary. In a two-hour one-on-one with the
Ambassador November 18, Armenian Defense Minister Serge
Sargsian confirmed that he was rock solid in his commitment
to fielding the Armenian non-combat contingent to Iraq.
He volunteered that the issue was with the Constitutional
Court and would soon move to the National Assembly, where
he would personally present it for approval. Other issues
he touched on included domestic politics, Nagorno-Karabakh,
concerns about Georgia and Turkey, and relations with
Russia. End Summary.

2.(S) Sargsian said Armenia simply had to
participate in the International Coalition in Iraq for
reasons of its own state interests. Armenia opposed
terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism and with Georgia and
Azerbaijan participating, how could Armenia stand aloof?
Sargsian said he would like to contribute a much larger
contingent, but there were some very real constraints.
First of all, there were not enough trained personnel.
Second, Armenia was already on a "war footing"
because of Karabagh. And third, premium pay for the
volunteers going to Iraq was five times what Armenian
servicemen on the borders of their own country were
receiving. Sargsian noted that he had just returned from a
National Assembly meeting at which he had argued for an
increase in the defense budget occasioned by higher than
expected fuel costs. This was a particular problem in
view of the new aircraft e confirmed that he meant the
Slovak SU-25s rmenia was in the process of obtaining.

3.(S) Prompted by the Ambassador, Sargsian launched into
a tour of the domestic political landscape. Predictably,
he had little positive to say about opposition leaders
Demirchian and Geghamian and others. He eased up in his
overall disdain for the political class by according mild
approbation to Artur Baghdasarian, the Parliamentary
Speaker and leader of Orinats Yerkir, and Raffi Hovhanissian,
the former U.S. citizen who was Amrenia first foreign
minister.

4.(S) On Nagorno-Karabagh, Sargsian said a settlement had

to favor neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan; eventually,
fifteen or twenty years down the road, things might
look differently. He claimed that, given a choice,
seventy percent of Armenians would rather live with the
Azeris than with the Georgians; on a personal level,
they had a record of getting along. Sargsian said the
OSCE Minsk Process needed to be preserved at all costs.
This was why the Azeri move in the UNGA nd the Council
of Europe Parliamentary Assembly critical reports ere so
dangerous.


5. (S) The Ambassador expressed concern about the situation
on the line of contact and asked about rules of engagement;
press reports continue to describe sporadic incidents
resulting from the close contact of Armenian and Azeri troops.
Sargsian said a lieutenant (vzvod commander) was authorized
to return fire, but then had immediately to report to his
headquarters. Of course not a meter of territory could be
taken without express authorization. Sargsian dismissed
Azeri talk of war, saying that even if Azerbaijan built its
forces up to twice what Armenia could field, it would not
suffice; Baku would need a three- or four-fold advantage to
have any confidence
of victory.

6.(S) On Georgia, Sargsian said he worried about
the impulsiveness of the young leaders who had come to
power a year ago. He said he had advised them not to bait
the Russian bear. He thought they had been unwise to try
to duplicate their early success in Ajara in South Ossetia,
but might now have learned their lesson.

7.(S) Asked about relations with Turkey, Sargsian was wary.
He also admitted that there were some reasons to tolerate
the current blockade of the border with Turkey. While EU
membership would be an undoubted plus for the region, one
had to recall that Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 despite
membership in NATO. Sargsian said it would indeed be a
shame if the Kars-Gyumri-Tbilisi rail link were replaced
with an expensive new line that bypassed Armenian
territory.

8.(S) As for relations with Russia, Sargsian said
Russia was indeed Armenia traditional ally, but lamented
that e have not solved all our own security problems
yet. His own view, he said, was that when
Russian-American relations were good, this was good for
Armenia.

9.(S) Biographic note: Sargsian told the
Ambassador that he was acquainted with Vladimir Putin from
the days when he was in charge of Armenia National
Security Service and Putin was heading the FSB in Moscow.
There had been at least two group meetings of the
intelligence chiefs in those years, and Sargsian said that
at the one in St. Petersburg, Putin had been especially
warm, giving him a big hug. Putin had also offered to
help investigate the 1999 parliamentary shootings, Sargisan
said, although the Armenian side had declined the offer.

EVANS