Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04YEREVAN2071
2004-09-20 12:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Yerevan
Cable title:  

IMF TEAM LEAVES ARMENIA UNIMPRESSED WITH PROGRESS

Tags:  ECON EAID ETRD KCOR AM 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 002071 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN, EUR/ACE, USTR FOR KKUHLMAN, TREASURY
FOR JEFFREY BAKER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2014
TAGS: ECON EAID ETRD KCOR AM
SUBJECT: IMF TEAM LEAVES ARMENIA UNIMPRESSED WITH PROGRESS

REF: A) YEREVAN 1453 B) YEREVAN 1899

Classified By: DCM A.F. Godfrey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

-------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 002071

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN, EUR/ACE, USTR FOR KKUHLMAN, TREASURY
FOR JEFFREY BAKER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2014
TAGS: ECON EAID ETRD KCOR AM
SUBJECT: IMF TEAM LEAVES ARMENIA UNIMPRESSED WITH PROGRESS

REF: A) YEREVAN 1453 B) YEREVAN 1899

Classified By: DCM A.F. Godfrey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (SBU) The IMF team conducting the Sixth review of
Armenia's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)
program has left Armenia concerned about Armenia's progress
in key areas of reform. The Resident Representative, James
McHugh, told us that he anticipated problems completing the
sixth review and disbursing the program's final tranche to
the GOAM. While the government has successfully completed
many of the easy reforms, it has been loath to or incapable
of addressing those reforms that touch most heavily on
corruption in the economy -- namely, reform of the tax and
customs services. According to McHugh, Armenia has reached a
critical juncture: it must decide if it has the political
will to reform in the way that will fundamentally change the
nature of its crony capitalist economy. "Put bluntly," said
McHugh, "We have to see if they are willing to tax rich
people." End Summary.

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UNMET CONDITIONS
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2. (SBU) During the donor out-brief the visiting IMF review
team described their concerns about Armenia's unmet
obligations in guarded language. While the GOAM has
expressly asked for a waiver of one energy sector measure
(ref A),it seeks to address what the GOAM itself has called
"severe deficiencies" in meeting its fiscal measures with "a
two-year action plan to deal with pending tax and customs
reforms." The action plan would establish a timeline that
presumably would be part of a conditionality under any
follow-on program. The proposed reforms would purportedly
aim to reorganize the structures of the tax and customs
services in order to control the enforcement and audit
functions, which currently harass medium-sized businessmen
into overpaying in order to make up for lost revenues that
large businesses do not pay. The government claims to have
met technical tax and customs conditionalities (concerning
VAT administration and customs valuation) that the IMF sees

as indicative of larger administrative problems and as a
burden on medium-sized business and foreign investment. The
IMF team is skeptical of the government's claims and has gone
back to the government requesting more information: the team
doubts reports that the customs service has used transaction
or invoice prices to value 50 percent of imports; the tax
service's claimed progress in accruing only a negligible
amount of VAT refund arrears belies the stories of
medium-sized businesses, who uniformly claim that the
government's arrears to them are increasing.

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TAXING THE MIDDLE CLASS ONLY
--------------


3. (SBU) In less formal meetings, including two meetings with
the Ambassador, the IMF representatives spoke more candidly
about Armenia's progress, and talked less about the specific
conditionalities than the overall status of corruption.
Although the suspect conditionalities are technical, they all
reflect the reluctance of the tax and customs services to tax
big businesses and the concomitant need to extract extra
revenues from medium-size businesses to compensate. The
customs conditionality requires the Customs Service to use
the actual invoice price to value goods for purposes of
tariffs and value added tax: customs currently uses flexible
valuation methods with the dual goals of increasing revenues
from medium sized importers and soliciting bribes. According
to the IMF, discriminatory valuation by customs keeps
Armenia's oligarchs in control of the lion's share of
Armenia's basic food imports because well-connected importers
are bribing customs officials in exchange for not paying
taxes on the import of basic goods (ref B). Similarly, large
enterprises pay almost no taxes, while medium-sized firms
complain of harassing audits, demands for prepayment, and the
inability to get their refunds due from overpayment of value
added tax. At the time of the last IMF review, the
government's arrears of non-refunded VAT equaled nearly 1.5
percent of GDP, owed mostly to small and medium firms. While
the government has claimed, per agreement, not to have
increased the total stock of arrears during 2004, American
firms have uniformly reported to us that the arrears owed to
their respective companies was growing.

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COMMENT: SQUEEZING A BALLOON?
--------------


4. (C) The IMF conditionalities all aim to make corrupt
behavior more difficult. Because these are also the areas
that currently affect the interests of U.S. investors, VAT
refunds and customs valuation also appear on our bilateral
agenda in the U.S.-Armenia Task Force on Economic Development
(USATF). But the larger battle concerns not these technical
procedures but whether the government is willing to raise
significant revenue from the well-connected oligarchs who
control much of the economy, or whether the tax and customs
service will continue to extract revenue only from the middle
classes by semi-legal or harassing means. In order to
realize progress in the area of VAT refunds or customs
valuation without substituting another evil, there must be
true change in the nature of taxation and its relationship to
Armenia's oligarchs. Notably, offices in the administration
of tax and customs must cease to be seats of rent-seeking
activity. Unless the government can reorganize the tax and
customs services in a way that truly brings them under the
control of officials who are genuinely interested in reform,
the tax burden will continue to fall disproportionately on
medium-size businesses and foreign investors, who lack the
necessary contacts and influence to make favorable
arrangements with corrupt officials.
EVANS