Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04YEREVAN2062
2004-09-17 13:51:00
SECRET
Embassy Yerevan
Cable title:  

ARMENIA: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND PROLIFERATION

Tags:  PINR ECON PTER TBIO PARM AM KPRP 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 002062 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN; INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2014
TAGS: PINR ECON PTER TBIO PARM AM KPRP
SUBJECT: ARMENIA: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND PROLIFERATION

REF: STATE 80982

Classified By: DCM A.F. Godfrey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

-------
SUMMARY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 002062

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN; INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2014
TAGS: PINR ECON PTER TBIO PARM AM KPRP
SUBJECT: ARMENIA: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND PROLIFERATION

REF: STATE 80982

Classified By: DCM A.F. Godfrey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S/NF) Armenia does not have an active biological warfare
program nor does it have an interest, desire or capability to
start one (reftel). The Armenian government has denied ever
having a biological warfare program and currently Armenian
biological institutes and private companies are struggling
with low salaries and lack of new equipment. This
significantly hampers their ability to find international and
domestic clients to purchase their vaccines, medicines and
technological know-how. The Armenian government has
instituted strict export laws concerning the export, import
and transit of dual-use items. The Armenian emergency
management administration stated that protection against
biological attack was a lower government priority than
preparing for other potential disasters, such as earthquakes,
chemical or nuclear accidents. End Summary.

-------------- --------------
ACQUISITION OF BW-RELATED ITEMS AND EXPERTISE WMDB
-------------- --------------


2. (S/NF) The MFA's Armen Isralian and Aram Tanyan, Deputy
Head of the Armenian Emergency Management Administration
(AEMA),both stated in no uncertain terms that the Armenian
government (GOAM) did not conduct any biological warfare
research during the Soviet period, that no research is
currently underway and that they strongly believed that there
was no interest or capability to start a program now. Both
explained that it was against Soviet doctrine to have any
sensitive defense research located in a Soviet republic which
bordered a NATO country. Both also explained that soon after
independence, with the terrible economic conditions and lack
of electricity, it would have been nearly impossible to start
and/or maintain any type of biological weapons program in
Armenia. Jean Akopian of the Institute of Microbiology (IM)
told us that none of Armenia's chemical or biological

institutes were secret closed institutes during the Soviet
period, which was a prerequisite to conduct sensitive defense
research. Post has no evidence that the GOAM is working with
any other country in order to acquire WMDB.

-------------- --------------
BW-ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT AND ARMENIAN EXPORT CONTROL POLICIES
-------------- --------------


3. (S/NF) Israelian told us that in 2003 the GOAM had
established an export law modeled on the Australian group
principles. This law gives the Armenian export commission
multiple tools to turn down any export that has dual-use
properties. The commission consists of nine deputy ministers
who have the ability to call in scientific experts if needed.
The export control law carries penalties of up to eight
years in prison and the commission has the legal right to
question scientists that were working on biological programs
overseas. Isrealian told us that to his knowledge, the GOAM
has never exported any biological agents. Isrealian stated
that a GOAM concern was that Armenia could become a transit
corridor for illegal dual use items for Iran, and therefore,
the GOAM purposefully made their export laws as strict as
possible. Israelian told us that after the fall of the
Soviet Union, hundreds, if not thousands of qualified
Armenian scientists and specialists either emigrated to
Europe, America and Russia or simply took up other
professions. Israelian, as well as others in the scientific
community, also stated that he had no first hand knowledge of
any Armenian scientists who have worked or were currently
working on Iranian or other rogue nation biological or other
weapons programs. Scientists have told us that oppressive
Islamic environments, low pay, perceived low level of science
and concerns about working with pariah states have
discouraged most if not all Armenian scientists from working
in Iran or other rogue nations. The scientists and directors
of scientific institutes told us that that western grants
have helped Armenian scientists stay in Armenia, but more
consistent funding from the GOAM will be needed in order to
stop good Armenian scientists from emigrating or leaving the
field of science altogether.

-------------- -
BW DETECTION, DECONTAMINATION AND MEDICAL CARE
-------------- -


4. (S/NF) After discussions with senior officials at the MOD,
the defense attache reported his impression that the MOD has
limited chemical, and biological defense capabilities and are
placing biological defense at a low priority due to the lack
of resources and low perceived threat. The MOD does have one
specialized unit, the 21st independent nuclear biological
chemical defense battalion, which has approximately 92
soldiers. In order to deploy soldiers to Iraq as part of the
coalition, the MOD had formally requested vaccinations
against anthrax, typhoid, meningitis and smallpox.

5. (S/NF) AEMA's Tanayan told us that his organization was
working with international donors on various disaster relief
projects to prepare for possible earthquakes and/or chemical
accidents. Tanyan told us that the AEMA does have a nuclear,
biological, chemical laboratory where they can test for
various chemical, radioactive and biological agents. He also
reported that the equipment is from the Soviet era, not up to
international standards and does not allow the AEMA to
conduct tests quickly. Tanyan stated that AEMA has good
specialists in biological, chemical and nuclear disciplines
but they do not have the training, language skills and
equipment to do international level work. AEMA has a plan to
open an local AEMA office in every region of Armenia in order
to coordinate with all GOA agencies in the event of a
disaster. Tananyan admitted it would be very difficult to
outfit all of the offices with modern equipment in order to
do any accurate testing. He stated that AEMA was working
with local scientific institutes and various government
agencies to compile a complete list of biological entities
and where and how they were stored in Armenia.


6. (S/NF) Tanyan explained that the AEMA SOP for any
outbreaks of biological hazards among crops was to isolate
and quarantine the infected area and then burn the crops.
AEMA has the same SOP for infected farm animals. Tananyan
told us that Armenia has had some outbreaks of dysentery and
cholera in the regions outside Yerevan but they were able to
contain them quickly. AEMA stated that they currently do not
have any biological detection devices and they believed that
the GOAM and the MOD were also probably lacking such
equipment. AEMA complained that they have very few vaccines
on hand and do not even have the minimum stockpiles for
ordinary problems such as snakebites and insects.

-------------- --------------
IMPACT OF BIOTECHNOLOGY AND SECURITY OF RESEARCH PATHOGENS
-------------- --------------


7. (S/NF) Dr. Harachya Hovhannisyan, a senior biologist at
Armenicum, told us that the lack of modern equipment
seriously limited the international-level work was being
conducted in the field of biotechnology in Armenia.
Armenicum, an Armenian biotechnology company currently being
funded by Armenian businessmen (allegedly including Minister
of Defense Serzh Sargsian) was one of the exceptions.
Hovhannisyan told us that Armenicum was working on AIDS
vaccines and had sold some medications to Indian clients.
Dr. Hovhannisyan stated that Armenicum was guarded by
Armenian soldiers, and he felt that this measure had been
taken to safeguard the expensive American machinery as well
as Sargsian's personal investment. Dr. Akopian of IM
explained that IM was currently specializing in sugar
substitutes, nitrogen, natural zeolites, and agricultural
nitrogen techniques. Akopian told us that they have garnered
some interest from the Chinese company Northstar. The
Armenian Lysine Plant, Lizin, who had been sanctioned by the
Department of State in May of 2002 for two years for the
attempted sale of fermenters to Iran, told us that after
their sanction expired, they planned to market and sell
livestock feed, lysine, vitamins, medicines and sugar
substitutes to local domestic companies as well as any
interested international clients.
EVANS