Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04YEREVAN1453
2004-06-29 10:18:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Yerevan
Cable title:  

ARMENIA RELUCTANT TO DISSOLVE ARMENERGO: RIGHTFULLY

Tags:  ECON ENRG AM 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 001453 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR EUR/CACEN FOR SIDEREAS, EUR/ACE FOR LONGI, EB/ESC,
PASS TO USAID EGAT FOR WALTER HALL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON ENRG AM
SUBJECT: ARMENIA RELUCTANT TO DISSOLVE ARMENERGO: RIGHTFULLY
SO?


SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY

-------
SUMMARY
-------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 001453

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR EUR/CACEN FOR SIDEREAS, EUR/ACE FOR LONGI, EB/ESC,
PASS TO USAID EGAT FOR WALTER HALL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON ENRG AM
SUBJECT: ARMENIA RELUCTANT TO DISSOLVE ARMENERGO: RIGHTFULLY
SO?


SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (SBU) An IMF conditionality and commitments to other
donors, including the United States (as part of the USATF
action plan),oblige the Government of Armenia to eliminate
by July 31 ArmEnergo, a state-owned enterprise that is the
single buyer of midstream electricity. Once ArmEnergo is
eliminated, the electricity distribution company,
Electricity Networks of Armenia (ElNetArm),must negotiate
contracts with all of Armenia's generating enterprises, as
well as the calculating center, national traffic management
and high-voltage power networks. Because the Public
Services Regulatory Commission has not yet established
market rules for the energy sector or adopted an energy
adjustment clause, premature dissolution of ArmEnergo would
put private energy companies in an untenable situation.
Sources close to the Ministry of Energy say that, despite
press reports to the contrary, ArmEnergo will necessarily
exist until there is a viable alternative in place, almost
certainly past the July 31 deadline. End Summary.

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ARMENERGO: GUARANTOR OF THE ARMENIAN ENERGY SECTOR
-------------- --------------


2. (SBU) Since privatization of its electrical distribution
function, ArmEnergo has acted as a single-buyer single-
seller mediator of electricity, in effect making the
Government of Armenia the guarantor of the Armenian energy
sector. The Ministry of Energy has used adjustments in the
profits of ArmEnergo to keep end-use prices stable when
generation costs have fluctuated. Due to lack of
transparency in its operations, it has also been subject to
political interference and funds diversion. The Government
of Armenia committed to the IMF to dissolve ArmEnergo by
July 2004. The commitment also appears in the May 2004 U.S.
Armenia Task Force Draft Action Plan.

--------------
THE BUCK STOPS WHERE?
--------------


3. (SBU) It remains unclear what system will replace
ArmEnergo. Armenia has committed to a system whereby the
privately owned electricity distributor, Electricity
Networks of Armenia (ElNetArm) independently negotiates
contracts with Armenia's generating enterprises as well as

the national traffic management. This does not eliminate a
single-buyer from the system but rather transfers that
unenviable role to ElNetArm, who currently must provide
electricity at a tariff comprising a weighted average of
supply costs based on a mix of hydro, nuclear and thermal
generation. The Public Service Regulatory Commission (PSRC)
has been reluctant to adopt an energy adjustment clause,
which would give the distributor the right to raise
electricity prices for end-users when the average costs from
generation rise. Without adjusting its tariff to account
for a change in the composition of generation, ElNetArm
loses USD 4 million each month that the Armenia Nuclear
Power Plant does not operate. (Note: The ANPP shuts down
annually for maintenance and refueling. Longer closures due
to lack of fuel have also occurred in the past. End note.)
ArmEnergo is also vulnerable to significant drops in cheap
hydroelectric production during an unusually dry year.
Without an adjustment clause and without rules that control
ElNetArm's energy costs, ElNetArm would operate in the red
and quickly use its cash reserves in the (not unlikely)
event that generation costs exceed the tariff. In the worst-
case scenario, ElNetArm would buy and distribute only that
electricity it could purchase for less than the tariff, an
understandable but undesirable outcome that would lead
immediately to power outages and would be potentially very
damaging to the government. (Note: Armenian consumers can
currently count on reliable power supplies throughout the
country. Almost all power interruptions are brief and
caused by short-term technical problems. End note.)

-------------- --------------
PSRC RESISTING THE ADOPTION OF MARKET-BASED REGULATION
-------------- --------------


4. (SBU) The PSRC has argued to preserve ArmEnergo for now
and has resisted the adoption of rules governing tariff
adjustment. The PRSC has also resisted putting market rules
governing these transactions into a regulatory framework,
instead preferring to include rules in independent licenses
and contracts. Dispatch, import and export rules, which
govern the seasonal swap with Iran and export to Georgia
among other things, would affect ElNetArm's bottom line
following the dissolution of ArmEnergo, and would affect end-
user electricity costs if ElNetArm had an adjustment clause.
Comment: Hiding such rules in a web of contracts and
licenses creates a weak base on which a private network of
generators, distributors, and customers cannot reasonably
rely. End Comment.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


5. (SBU) The PSRC's actions indicate a desire to leave the
government as the guarantor of both steady supply and steady
prices in the energy sector. The government seemingly finds
the continued existence of ArmEnergo to be the most
convenient way to do so, as it allows the government to
absorb energy sector profits as well as losses (although
there is justified suspicion that profits are diverted
before reaching the government's coffers--another possible
factor in the reluctance to eliminate ArmEnergo). Until the
government is committed to establishing market relations
between the private players in the energy sector that may
result in price rises, the elimination of ArmEnergo alone
could cause more harm than good. The establishment of rules
by contract and license rather than law will lend itself to
abuse, non-transparency, and distorted incentives. In the
absence of ArmEnergo, the lack of rules and of an adjustment
clause would put private energy firms, especially ElNetArm,
in an untenable situation, and could give private companies
an incentive to produce, buy or distribute too little
electricity.
ORDWAY