Armenian-Azeri border clash

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 001345

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/16/14
TAGS: PREL PBTS MOPS AM AJ
SUBJECT: Armenian-Azeri border clash

Ref: State 130470

Classified by Ambassador John Ordway. Reasons: 1.5 (B,
D).


1. (C) Following receipt of reftel, DAO assistant spoke
with the CHOD, Gen-Lt. Haratunyan, and Ambassador spoke to
Ambassador Kasprzyk and Acting Foreign Minister Shugarian.
The CHOD claimed that the Azeri side had initiated the
outbreak of hostile action a week ago, and then on the
night of June 14/15 began shelling an Armenian village.
The Armenian side "shot back." At 02:00 Ambassador
Kasprzyk called the CHOD while monitoring on the Azeri
side. The CHOD said he had told Kasprzyk that if the
Azeris continued the shelling, Armenia would take the hill
that apparently was the original Azeri position before they
moved forward a week ago. Haratunyan said that the
Armenian MOD had been unable to establish any contact with
the Azeri side, and was using Ambassador Kasprzyk to pass
messages to Baku. He did not provide any timeline (or
deadline) for the threatened Armenian forward movement.


2. (C) Ambassador spoke to Kasprzyk by phone shortly
after he had completed his June 14/15 monitoring mission.
Kasprzyk, en route to Tbilisi, said that it had not been
quiet the previous night. The monitoring that had just
been completed had established that one Armenian officer
had been killed, while on the Azeri side a woman and a
child had been injured. In addition, livestock on the
Azeri side had been killed. Kasprzyk said that he could
not determine which side had started the firing the night
before. He theorized that the Armenians had subjected the
Azeri village of Mazamly to a barrage as a means of
psychological pressure, and that the casualties were the
result of rounds that had actually landed in the village.
The attack clearly had frightened and enraged the
villagers. 8-10 of them came to the monitoring site (2 km
from the village). Aggravated by "untactful" remarks by
the Azeri military escorts, the villagers were
extraordinarily hostile. The Azeri military decided to
leave the scene before the villagers engaged in violent
action against them.


3. (C) The Armenian side requested, through the field
monitors, a face-to-face meeting with the Azeri local
commander. The Azeris refused, and requested a discussion
with the Armenian local commander via the OSCE radio
connection. The Armenian side refused. The Azeri side
then indicated that they would be willing to have a face-
to-face meeting. This, however, requires the approval of
the Minister of Defense. Although Kasprzyk told the
Ambassador he was very doubtful the Minister would agree,
he planned to pursue this option with the Minister on June

16. (The Minister is out of the country, and is returning
the morning of June 16.)


4. (C) Kasprzyk said that the situation was tense and
very dangerous. There is considerable and constant
military movement, and both sides appear to be reinforcing
their positions -- which are very close to each other.
Each side, he believes, feels it is in a corner and neither
side wants to retreat.


5. (C) The Armenians recently realigned the main road
between Noyembrian and Idjevan. The new route takes inter-
city traffic out of range of Azeri positions. (The road
had come under Azeri fire periodically over the past year.)
Kasprzyk theorized that the Azeri side believed its
leverage had been reduced by the road realignment, and
decided to regain its leverage by moving closer to the
Armenian pumping station. (Note: Kasprzyk did not know
whether the station was in Armenia or Azerbaijan, but said
that it is located between the lines that had been
maintained by the two armies.) The workers manning the
pumping station had fled when the Azeris moved closer, and
the Armenians were unwilling to lose the water supply for
five villages.


6. (C) Ambassador spoke to Deputy Foreign Minister
Shugarian, and passed on the points provided reftel. He
emphasized that the situation was tense and fraught with
danger of escalation. The U.S. expected that both sides
would refrain from taking any actions that would exacerbate
the situation, and especially refrain from any further
firing. Shugarian said he would get in touch with the MOD
and President's Office to pass on the message.


7. (C) French Ambassador Cuny telephoned the Ambassador
to say that Paris was also very worried about the
situation, and offered to join in a co-chairs demarche to
the Armenian side.

ORDWAY