HOLY SEE CLARIFIES POSITION ON NAJAF MEDIATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L VATICAN 003197

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR EUR, NEA, AND EUR/WE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2014
TAGS: PREL KIRF PHUM IZ VT
SUBJECT: HOLY SEE CLARIFIES POSITION ON NAJAF MEDIATION

REF: LEVIN-HARDT 8/17 E-MAIL

Classified By: Charge d'affaires, D. Brent Hardt. Reasons: 1.5 (b) an
d (d).


1. (C) Summary: The Holy See's Acting Foreign Minister
Pietro Parolin told Charge August 18 that the Holy See would
be willing to help mediate the standoff in Najaf if all
parties to the conflict requested it, but had indicated this
willingness only in response to a public request made by an
al-Sadr "spokesman." Charge outlined the U.S. view (reftel)
that al-Sadr's proposal was merely a delaying tactic, and did
not reflect a good faith desire to resolve the impasse.
Charge also emphasized that resolution of the conflict was
the responsibility of the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG),
which was best placed to determine the way forward. Parolin
noted that the Holy See had come under intense pressure from
the media late August 15 to respond to the al-Sadr "proposal"
and had issued their standard statement of Holy See
willingness to provide good offices when all parties to a
conflict request such support. End Summary.


2. (C) During an August 18 call on Acting FM-equivalent
Monsignor Pietro Parolin, Charge solicited clarification of
recent press reports of Vatican willingness to help mediate a
resolution to the current standoff in Najaf. Parolin
responded that the Holy See was eager to hear what the U.S.
thought of the idea, which had first been floated August 15
by al-Sadr "spokesman" Ahmad al-Shaybani. Drawing from
reftel, Charge said the proposal did not appear genuine.
Al-Sadr was playing for time and playing to the media, but
did not appear to be seriously interested in resolving the
standoff. Moreover, his broader agenda -- to disrupt
progress toward democracy and move towards a theocratic state
infused with a radical Shi'a outlook -- was contrary to U.S.
and Holy See goals for Iraq.


3. (C) Parolin expressed appreciation for the U.S.
perspective, noting that since this issue first came to their
attention, the Holy See had not had any input on the
coalition attitude toward such mediation. He said that
Cardinal Sodano had told him that the media was "persecuting"
him for a response on the plane back from the Pope's trip to
Lourdes, which had prompted the Secretary of State to issue
his first statement on the matter to the effect that "if
requested, the Pope will allow this mediation." He
elaborated further, noting that the "whole endeavor of the
Pope and the Holy See is an endeavor of mediation," and that
he could envisage a "good offices" mediation aimed at
encouraging concerned parties to talk. Sodano had also
condemned ongoing killings in Najaf as "a dishonor for Islam"
and appealed for respect for the sacred character of the city.


4. (C) Following continued media speculation, Parolin said
the Vatican press office issued a further clarification
August 17 in which it stressed the general nature of the
Vatican offer, since the Vatican had never actually received
any formal request for mediation. The Vatican spokesman
explained that "the Holy See is always ready to help the
parties so they can talk and dialogue, on the condition that
there really is a will to undertake peaceful ways for the
solution of conflicts." CDA noted that the recent statements
from the al-Sadr spokesman, which attempted to portray the
mediation as a Papal initiative -- and not something Al-Sadr
had first raised -- offered further confirmation that the
proposal was not intended to be taken seriously.


5. (C) Parolin indicated that should there ever be interest
in Vatican mediation, their Nuncio in Baghdad, Fernando
Filoni, would likely undertake such an effort. At the same
time, the Holy See would be willing to send a special envoy
if the occasion should ever arise. He said the Nuncio
personally had no further details on the alleged al-Sadr
proposal. The Nuncio had observed publicly that it would be
"useless to make predictions until (al-Sadr) clarifies his
real intentions." Parolin said he understood that the
disarmament of al-Sadr's forces remained the sticking point
in any durable political solution to the standoff.


6. (C) Parolin did express the Holy See's mounting concern
about the flight of Christians from Iraq in the wake of the
recent bombings of Christian churches. The Vatican has heard
that 40,000 Christians had fled since the attacks, primarily
to Syria and Jordan, compounding an exodus that had begun in
the wake of the war. Despite the Chaldean community's deep
historic roots in Iraq, Christians were becoming identified
with the West and with the military presence.


7. (C) Parolin queried whether the U.S. had concerns about
Iran's role in the Najaf uprising, and said the Holy See
would be interested in hearing if there were firm indications

of Iranian involvement. Parolin also asked about the UN's
role, and when it would step forward to play a greater role.
Charge conveyed a copy of USAID's recent summary of progress
in Iraq, "A Year in Iraq," noting that despite problems there
were positive developments. Parolin welcomed this
information, but concluded that until the security situation
improved significantly, the outlook for further progress
would be bleak.

HARDT


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2004VATICA03197 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL