DAS SATTERFIELD REVIEWS MIDDLE EAST AND IRAQ WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L VATICAN 002058

SIPDIS


DEPT. FOR NEA DAS SATTERFIELD, EUR/WE-LEVIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2014
TAGS: PREL IS VT IZ
SUBJECT: DAS SATTERFIELD REVIEWS MIDDLE EAST AND IRAQ WITH
HOLY SEE DFM


Classified By: Ambassador Jim Nicholson. Reasons: 1.5 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary David Satterfield
reviewed U.S. policy in regard to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, Iraq, Middle East reform and Syria in a May 17
meeting with Holy See Deputy FM equivalent Monsignor Pietro
Parolin. Satterfield described the Israeli-Palestinian
dispute as "an extremely painful and difficult situation"
that has to change. He outlined how PM Sharon's Gaza
withdrawal plan fit in with the Road Map and offered a
possibility to break the cycle of violence and hopelessness.
On Iraq, Satterfield emphasized that the June 30 transfer of
sovereignty to Iraq would mark a clean break with the
occupation, and that no later than January 2005 there would
be a fully empowered Iraqi government in place. Satterfield
emphasized the importance of reform in the Middle East,
noting that the U.S. was encouraged by the tenor of
discussions at the Arab League Summit in Tunisia in favor of
a robust, indigenously developed reform program. On Syria,
Satterfield made clear that the U.S. believes the time has
come for Syria to withdraw from Lebanon and allow the
Lebanese people to choose their own government. End Summary.

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MEPP: Repairing the Breakdown of Partnership
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2. (C) NEA DAS David Satterfield told Holy See DFM Parolin
May 17 that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had become an
extremely painful, difficult situation in which both sides,
the region as a whole, and the international community had
been repeatedly frustrated. The greatest casualty, he said,
has been a "breakdown in a sense of partnership" between the
sides and a sense of their ability to live together. The
consequence of Israeli actions to address their security
situation has been that economic activity had ground to a
halt, communities have become isolated, and it has become
difficult for Palestinians to live normal lives. This "has
to change," Satterfield stated. Parolin said the Holy See
shared these concerns, observing that the Vatican believed
the situation in the territories had been made even more
difficult by the exchange of letters between President Bush
and PM Sharon on Gaza.


3. (C) Satterfield said the President's vision of two states
sought to offer an end goal for the parties to aspire to, but
for the past three and a half years there has been a visible
breakdown between them. Clearly something was needed to
break this cycle of political passivity combined with
violence. The U.S. believed that PM Sharon's unilateral Gaza
withdrawal plan -- though developed for his own reasons --
offered a means to overcome the breakdown. Noting that the
plan was popular within Israel, but not in Sharon's Likud
Party, he explained that Sharon had appealed to the President
to support the withdrawal in order to sway his own party
members. The President agreed to do so, but had been careful
to make clear that all end-state issues, including refugees
and borders, had to be worked out between the parties. The
U.S. was determined to continue playing an honest broker
role, and would not cross lines that would jeopardize this
role. In a situation in which nothing has moved for three
and a half years, Satterfield observed, the U.S. believes
that the Gaza withdrawal -- if executed in a multilateral
framework and in line with the Road Map -- could change the
negative dynamic in the region.


4. (C) On this latter point, Parolin pressed for more detail
on how the Gaza withdrawal fit with the Road Map.
Satterfield pointed out that the Road Map calls for
progressive Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territory
linked to Palestinian performance on security. In this case,
the Palestinians have yet to meet security goals, but the
expectation is that Israel's withdrawal will compel the
Palestinians to perform. In other words, the Road Map would
be triggered by the withdrawal. Whatever its origins,
Satterfield added, the Gaza withdrawal was consistent with
the Road Map and a two state outcome, and could in fact
become a model for other areas.


5. (C) Parolin expressed the Holy See's concern that Gaza
would become "an open air prison" in light of Israel's
refusal to allow the construction of a port or airport and
the constant surveillance of the Israeli army. Parolin added
that the Holy See also had concerns about ongoing
construction of a security trench. Satterfield agreed that
Gaza could not be shut off from a flow of workers, supplies,
and economic activity. He noted Israel has offered us


assurances on this point. Nevertheless, there would probably
be an Israeli army presence between Gaza and Egypt at the
outset. Satterfield praised Egypt's active role along the
border, and also indicated that there could in time be a role
for the MFO (Multinational Force Observers) along the border.
Pressed again about consistency with the Road Map,
Satterfield indicated that the Gaza withdrawal could not be
"Gaza first and last," but had to be the first step that
could bring the two sides together in a constructive
framework. The decision, though unilateral, had to be
implemented multilaterally and would therefore offer an
opportunity to restart dialogue.


6. (C) Parolin expressed hope that the Gaza withdrawal could
provide the needed impetus, but said he doubted whether the
steps taken thus far are the right ones to build trust. On
the contrary, he suggested, the Holy See had the impression
the gap was widening. The Holy See believes greater pressure
needs to be applied to both sides. In the past, he noted,
impetus for peace had come from outside, and it would have to
be the same now. The parties cannot work out peace on their
own. Satterfield acknowledged this point, but noted that the
process had to start somewhere and Gaza could be that point
of departure. Parolin said it was critical to recognize that
not only the Palestinians, but also the Israelis had to meet
agreed goals if the Road Map was to move forward.
Satterfield agreed, noting that the U.S. has been blunt and
direct to both sides.

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Holy Sites and Visa Problems
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7. (C) Satterfield said the U.S. fully appreciates the Holy
See's concerns for the implications of the wall's
construction for Holy sites and convents in Jerusalem and
elsewhere in the West Bank, and has spoken with the wall's
principal designer regarding potential adjustments.
Satterfield noted that this was a serious issue not only for
the Church, but for the Palestinians as well. While the U.S.
was not opposed to the wall in principle, we were opposed
where it would negatively affect Palestinian lives and the
peace process. Israel has been responsive to some U.S.
concerns, he noted, but not all. On the Holy See's concerns
about visas for Catholic religious workers in Palestinian
territories, Satterfield stressed that the U.S. was working
with Israel, and that we understood that a resolution was
being prepared by the Israeli government. The Holy See's
concerns, he noted, were shared by other NGO's working in the
territories. The U.S. wants to see full access, and will
continue to be an interlocutor with the Israelis to this end.

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Iraq's Challenge
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8. (C) Turing to Iraq, Satterfield acknowledged that reaching
our goal of a unified, prosperous, peaceful and democratic
Iraq was proving a difficult challenge, but the U.S. was
moving forward on target for the June 30 transfer of
sovereignty. The departure of Ambassador Bremer June 30 and
arrival of Ambassador Negroponte would signal a fundamental
break with the occupation. By January, Iraqi authorities
would have full power and ability to govern the country. UN
Special Representative Brahimi's role was critical,
Satterfield noted, and he has succeeded in reaching out to
all groups. Our goal was to ensure the new interim
government was seen by Iraqis as genuinely Iraqi. The U.S.
would retain forces on the ground, and was working to achieve
agreement on a UN resolution that would provide the basis for
their continued presence.


9. (C) On Abu Ghraib, Monsignor Parolin asked Satterfield how
this could have happened. Satterfield expressed U.S.
revulsion at these actions and our determination to ensure
justice is done. He called Parolin's attention to Secretary
Powell's speech in Jordan where he spoke as a soldier of his
horror and disappointment at the actions of those soldiers
involved. Satterfield acknowledged that this abuse was "a
blow to America's image" in the Arab world, and assured
Parolin that we would find out how this happened and take
steps to ensure it never happens again. Parolin described
the scandal as "very unfortunate", noting that it had damaged
broader relations between the West and the Muslim world and
provided ammunition for extremists.

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Middle East Reform
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10. (C) Satterfield said the U.S. had been encouraged by the


tenor of deliberations at the Arab League Summit in Tunisia,
where it appeared the region would develop robust proposals
that will address issues such as women's rights and
education. The U.S. was determined to encourage and support
an indigenous reform agenda. The U.S. was sensitive to the
need to support but not dictate the path of reform, and we
have been pleased with the positive signs we have seen coming
form the region. Satterfield noted that this would be a
central issue at the upcoming G-8 Summit, and was also on the
agenda of NATO and the OSCE.

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Syria and Lebanon
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11. (C) Turning to recent U.S. policy statements regarding
Syria, Satterfield said the U.S. believes the time has come
for Syria to withdraw from Lebanon and to allow the Lebanese
people to be able to follow their own national will.
Upcoming presidential elections, he added, should not be
dictated from outside. Syria remained resistant, however,
and the situation in Lebanon would continue to require
careful tending.

Nicholson


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2004VATICA02058 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL