U/S BOLTON PREVIEWS SEA ISLAND NON-PROLIFERATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L VATICAN 001968

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR T U/S BOLTON AND EUR/WE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2014
TAGS: PARM PREL IR LY IN PK IS VT
SUBJECT: U/S BOLTON PREVIEWS SEA ISLAND NON-PROLIFERATION
INITIATIVES FOR HOLY SEE FM


Classified By: Ambassador James Nicholson. Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) Under Secretary Bolton previewed Sea Island G-8
Summit non-proliferation initiatives for Holy See Foreign
Minister Giovanni Lajolo May 17, emphasizing the
President's desire to ensure that efforts to address WMD
threats were a priority for G-8 nations. Bolton
highlighted progress in implementing the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI),including its success in
interdicting nuclear equipment destined for Libya. He
reviewed the status of the Global Partnership initiative to
address the legacy of the Soviet-era WMD programs, and
outlined the U.S. desire to close loopholes in the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that created the potential
for easy transfer from civilian to military applications.
FM Lajolo asked about the status of Libyan disarmament, as
well as North Korean, Indian, Pakistani, and Israeli
nuclear programs. Lajolo also reviewed his recent meeting
with
the Iranian vice-Foreign Minister, who promised the Vatican
that Iran would completely meet its IAEA commitments by the
time of the next meeting in Vienna. End Summary.

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WMD Proliferation in Focus for G-8
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2. (C) Continuing a regular dialogue with the Holy See on
international non-proliferation and arms control efforts,
U/S John Bolton told the Holy See's Foreign Minister
equivalent, Archbishop Giovanni Lajolo, that the United
States believes the proliferation of biological, chemical
and nuclear weapons continues to pose a serious threat to
global security despite some recent successes. Given U.S.
concerns, President Bush had asked that WMD be a primary
focus of the June 8 Sea Island G-8 Summit. Bolton outlined
the G-8 non-proliferation agenda, which would include a
review of the PSI, an effort to expand the Global
Partnership (GP),and an initiative to close loopholes in
the NPT that allow states to pursue fissile material and
develop expertise for nuclear weapons under peaceful cover.

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Proliferation Security Initiative
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3. (C) In its first year, Bolton told Lajolo, the PSI had
resulted in expanded international cooperation to interdict
shipments of WMD materials and prevent them from moving
from states of concern to other states or non-state
actors. The initiative had scored a major success last
October when the U.S., working with Germany, Italy, and the
UK stopped and seized a shipment of centrifuge equipment
destined for Libya that could have facilitated uranium
enrichment. This interdiction, Bolton suggested, may have
played a role in Libya's decision to abandon its nuclear
weapons programs.

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The Global Partnership
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4. (C) A second objective of the Sea Island Summit, Bolton
said, would be to expand the Global Partnership against the
spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction, which
had been launched at the Kananaskis G-8 Summit in June
2002, and which had contributed to the destruction of
missile silos and chemical weapons, as well as to the
conversion of reactors from highly to low enriched
uranium. The U.S. has committed 10 billion dollars to the
Partnership over ten years, and was looking to its G-8 and
other partners to come up with an additional 10 billion
dollars to reach the 20 billion target established at
Kananaskis. While preventing dangerous materials from
falling into the wrong hands, the program would also help
bring Russia in line with its START and other treaty
commitments, while allowing for the expansion of programs
to ensure legitimate employment for weapons scientists.
Lajolo welcomed this initiative and expressed hope it could
be expanded to address this threat.

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Closing NPT Loopholes
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5. (C) A third priority for the U.S. at Sea Island, Bolton
explained, would be to build support for an initiative to
close loopholes in the Non-Proliferation Treaty that allow
countries to be in full compliance with the NPT while
acquiring the skills and materials to bring them very close
to nuclear weapons capability. The U.S. has tabled a
number of reforms that we believe would prevent the spread
of uranium enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. The
Under Secretary observed that this has been a controversial
initiative, and has required the U.S. to explore ways to
ensure that low enriched fuel can be made available at low
cost as highly enriched plants are converted. If the G-8
can agree on this, it would set an international standard
that would form a useful foundation for future
international discussions on closing loopholes.

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Iranian Compliance with IAEA Commitments
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6. (C) FM Lajolo told the Under Secretary that he had
recently received the Iranian Vice Foreign Minister, who
assured him that Iran would be in full compliance with IAEA
requirements by the time of the next commission review
meeting in Vienna. Lajolo also noted that the Iranian
Minister had complained about what he considered the double
standards vis-a-vis Iran's treatment compared to that of
Israel and India. Bolton responded that it is true that
Iran wants to get off the IAEA's agenda and close its file,
but that they have too much work to do to disclose recently
uncovered programs to meet this timeline. He pointed out
that Iran had agreed with Germany, the UK, and France to
suspend all uranium enrichment activities in exchange for
expanded energy cooperation. Unfortunately, Iran had not
stopped production of centrifuge components or design work
for an advanced centrifuge. Iran is hoping to get off the
IAEA's agenda, and then resume its enrichment work, Bolton
explained, but he saw no prospect that the file would be
closed anytime soon given the number of unanswered
questions about Iranian programs. Bolton stressed that the
U.S. was working closely with EU countries on this issue,
and would continue to work to make all of the Middle East
free of nuclear weapons.


7. (C) Lajolo also raised the Iranian Minister's claim that
Iran needed the nuclear facility for economic purposes and
long term energy security. Bolton pointed out that Iran
allows four times the amount of energy that would be
produced at the Bushehr reactor to escape into the
atmosphere. Simply by scaling back this waste and loss, it
would recoup far more than it would gain from nuclear
power. Bolton said that revelations of I.Q. Khan's nuclear
dealings left no doubt that Iran is intent on building a
nuclear weapons program, and will remain a serious
proliferation problem for some time to come.

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Libya
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8. (C) In contrast to Iran and North Korea, Bolton told
Lajolo, Libya had recently demonstrated how a country can
give up its nuclear programs and reap benefits from greater
international cooperation. Libya had come to realize that
its nuclear ambitions were not making it safer, but were
increasing its risks from international sanction and
potential military action. Lajolo asked about the status
of Libya's disarmament process and prospects for a
resumption of full diplomatic relations with Libya. Bolton
indicated that Qadafi had been cooperating fully, allowing
the U.S. and UK to move all of his nuclear equipment to Oak
Ridge, Tennessee. The U.S. and the international community
had lifted major sanctions and, after resolving some
remaining issues, it was likely that our relations could be
upgraded by the end of the year.

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North Korea
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9. (C) Lajolo said it appeared to the Holy See that North
Korea was trying to use its nuclear capability to leverage
assistance from the West. Bolton, commenting that this is
also called blackmail, said it was hard to understand
exactly what North Korea was after. Even the Chinese were
mystified, he noted. To us, it appears the North Koreans
want to keep their capability and get western assistance --
something the U.S. would not accept. The U.S. was
committed to resolving the North Korea threat


diplomatically, and we were prepared to meet again in
Beijing in June if this would be helpful.

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India, Pakistan, and Israel
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10. (C) Touching briefly on other nuclear countries,
Lajolo asked what the U.S. was doing in regard to nuclear
capabilities in India, Pakistan and Israel. On India and
Pakistan, the Under Secretary pointed out that the U.S. had
been engaged intensively and successfully over the past two
years to prevent the dispute over the Kashmir from spilling
over to a nuclear showdown. Pakistan remained a source of
great concern in the face of continued assassination
attempts on President Musharaf and the potential for a
radical takeover. On Israel, Bolton observed that the
Israeli nuclear program offered an ultimate protection
against being driven into the Mediterranean. The U.S. did
not regard the Israeli program as a threat to the region,
as Israel would never use it unless attacked. He noted
that Libya had often cited Israel as an excuse for their
nuclear program, but now insists that they know Israel
would not attack unprovoked. The U.S. goal remained to rid
the Middle East of all nuclear weapons, but this had to be
done one state at a time.

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Comment
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11. (C) FM Lajolo expressed appreciation for Bolton's
briefing on U.S. non-proliferation priorities and
activities, and affirmed his interest in continuing such
discussions in light of the Holy See's interest in arms
control worldwide. U/S Bolton noted that the Holy See had
always been active in the NPT and an important voice on
arms control, and he looked forward to staying in contact.


12. (U) This cable has been cleared by Under Secretary
Bolton.

Nicholson


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2004VATICA01968 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL