DUTCH TO CONTINUE POLICE TRAINING IN SOUTHERN IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000867

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2014
TAGS: KCRM KJUS MOPS PREL NL
SUBJECT: DUTCH TO CONTINUE POLICE TRAINING IN SOUTHERN IRAQ

REF: A. SECSTATE 58021

B. 03 THE HAGUE 2476

Classified By: PolCouns Mary E. Daly Reasons 1.5 (b)


1. (C) Summary: The Dutch government is not/not able to
contribute any trainers for CPA Iraqi police development
programs in Iraq and Jordan (ref a). However, the Dutch
remain actively involved in training Iraqi police in the
province of Al-Muthanna. The Dutch have also seconded a
military police (Marechaussee) officer to work as Advisor and
Mentor to the provincial Chief of Police (Iraqi Police
Service) at the request of the British government. Following
ref a demarche, the GoNL has instructed its Marechaussee
officers to be in closer coordination with CPA officials in
Baghdad. End Summary.


2. (C) The Dutch government is currently not/not able to
contribute either civil or military (Marechaussee) police
trainers to aid in Iraqi police development in either Jordan
or Iraq. PolOff delivered ref A demarche to MFA Security
Policy Advisor Hester Jonkman in March. Following
interagency consultations, Jonkman advised post on April 1
that the GoNL would unfortunately not be able to assist in
the call for international trainers. Dutch military police
trainers are already executing police training programs via
CIMIC (civilian-military cooperation) programs in the
Al-Muthanna province, where Dutch troops are deployed. The
GoNL is unable to spare any additional Marechaussee police
training officers for the Jordan or Baghdad training sites.
(Note: Further information on the police training program in
Al-Munthanna will be provided septel. End note.)
Additionally, due to strict security considerations and
regulations, civilian police are not able to be sent to Iraq.
Jonkman noted that the approval process for sending civilian
police officers to Jordan is so time-consuming and
complicated that the GoNL preferred not to begin the process,
as approval would not be certain, and even a best-case
scenario would be sending a mere one or two officers.
Jonkman added that if the security situation in Baghdad
significantly improves and stabilizes, the GoNL might
reconsider this request in the future.


3. (SBU) The GoNL, upon request from the British
government, recently seconded a Marechaussee officer to act
as advisor and mentor to the Chief of Police for the
Al-Muthanna. The Dutch were pleased to be able to assist in
this request. According the Political Counselor at the
British Embassy in The Hague, this individual has the
following responsibilities:

a) Working with the Iraqis and international civilian and
military staff to build capacity within the new Iraqi Police
Service
b) Mentoring the provincial Chief of Police. Providing
professional guidance to ensure s/he develops the necessary
skills and abilities commensurate with the role. Ensuring
the Chief of Police carries out his/her duties in line with
regional and national policies as determined by the Ministry
of Interior.
c) Developing sufficient capacity within the provincial
Governate to introduce effective local accountability within
the IPS
d) Providing coordination, guidance and advice to the Field
Training Coordinators and Officers who will be monitoring and
mentoring IPS in the province
e) Assisting in the development of the provincial police
committee in accordance with CPA Baghdad and Ministry of
Interior policy.



4. (C) Further to reftel request, the GoNL has instructed
its Marechaussee officers conducting police training in Iraq
to ensure adequate contact and coordination with CPA police
trainers in Baghdad.
SOBEL