Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04THEHAGUE813
2004-03-30 10:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

ICTY: OTP PAPER SAYS BELGRADE FAILING TO COOPERATE

Tags:  BK HR KAWC NL PHUM PREL SR ICTY 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000813 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI - PROSPER/RICHARD, EUR/SCE -
STEPHENS/GREGORIAN/MITCHELL, L/EUR - LAHNE, L/AF - GTAFT.
INR/WCAD - SEIDENSTRICKER/MORIN; USUN FOR ROSTOW/WILLSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6 FIVE YEARS AFTER CLOSURE ICTY
TAGS: BK HR KAWC NL PHUM PREL SR ICTY
SUBJECT: ICTY: OTP PAPER SAYS BELGRADE FAILING TO COOPERATE
ACROSS THE BOARD


Classified By: Legal Counselor Clifton M. Johnson per 1.5(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000813

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI - PROSPER/RICHARD, EUR/SCE -
STEPHENS/GREGORIAN/MITCHELL, L/EUR - LAHNE, L/AF - GTAFT.
INR/WCAD - SEIDENSTRICKER/MORIN; USUN FOR ROSTOW/WILLSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6 FIVE YEARS AFTER CLOSURE ICTY
TAGS: BK HR KAWC NL PHUM PREL SR ICTY
SUBJECT: ICTY: OTP PAPER SAYS BELGRADE FAILING TO COOPERATE
ACROSS THE BOARD


Classified By: Legal Counselor Clifton M. Johnson per 1.5(d).


1. (SBU) Summary: In a paper circulated among key diplomatic
representatives in The Hague and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) late on March 26, the Office of the
Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) asserts that Belgrade's
cooperation with OTP was "insufficient and difficult"
throughout the past year and, since December 2003, has been
"frozen in all main areas (arrests, receiving documents,
waivers for witnesses to testify)." The paper expresses
concern about the impact such noncooperation could have on
the Completion Strategy and foresees no change in the pattern
of noncooperation. End summary.


2. (SBU) In a three-and-a-half page nonpaper circulated by
Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte's senior political adviser
on March 26 the OTP paints a bleak picture of Belgrade's
cooperation on fugitive apprehensions, investigative
document/archival requests and witness testimony waivers.
The paper was drafted by one of Del Ponte's political
advisers, Anton Nikiforov, coordinated among key
investigators and prosecutors, cleared by Del Ponte and her
senior staff, and circulated among key governments and
friendly NGOs (such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty
International, the Coalition for International Justice and
the Soros Foundation). The paper acknowledges "some positive
developments" in Serbia and Montenegro (SaM),such as the
amendment of the Law on Cooperation, but suggests that the
assassination of Zoran Djindjic in 2003 "severely affected"
SaM-ICTY cooperation in a number of respects. Even though
the post-Djindjic government spoke favorably about
cooperation, OTP argues that minimal steps were taken. OTP
believes that the new government has indicated not only that
it will not make cooperation a priority but that "(n)ew

obstacles and bureacuratic barriers have been created in
areas where a reasonable communication, for instance at
operational level, had been established." The paper also
takes umbrage at a "sometime difamatory (sic) media campaign
against the Prosecutor".


3. (SBU) Fugitive Apprehensions: OTP's paper asserts that
only three arrests should be attributed to SaM authorities in
2003: Franko Simatovic and Jovica Stanisic, who were
originally arrested on non-ICTY charges; and Veselin
Sljivancanin, arrested prior to last June's USG
certification. No credit is due Belgrade, OTP argues, for
the three transfers of fugitives to The Hague following
certification, since those either arose out of direct ICTY
efforts (Meakic and Rasevic) or, in the case of Kovacevic,
murky circumstances where the "arrest" may have been "staged
to score undue credit." In addition, OTP believes that 15 of
the 21 current fugitives from ICTY warrants "either reside
permanently in or travel frequently to Serbia and
Montenegro," including Karadzic and Mladic. The paper says
that OTP shared information with Belgrade to facilitate
arrests but that no "concrete results" or feedback from the
government followed. Recent senior-level military and police
indictees, OTP alleges, "continue to this day to move freely
in Belgrade."


4. (C) OTP also alleges that this month's violence in KOSOVO
was "used to justify the refusal to arrest a high-level
fugitive that the OTP had located in Serbia," a decision said
to be taken "at the political level" in Belgrade. In a
conversation with Del Ponte's political adviser, Jean-Daniel
Ruch, emboffs were told that this was a reference to Ljubisa
Beara, an indictee charged with involvement in Srebrenica.
According to Ruch, the OTP's Tracking and Intelligence Unit
"found" Beara at his apartment in Belgrade and passed along
the discovery to the Ministry of Interior and USG. The
Ministry, however, refused to act on the information, and
Ruch said the OTP believes senior Ministry officials (and
possibly Kostunica himself) were involved in a political
decision not to apprehend Beara, especially during the
ongoing KOSOVO crisis. OTP also believes that government
officials warned Beara that he was being surveilled and that
he should leave Belgrade for a few weeks.


5. (SBU) Investigation and Trial Cooperation: OTP
acknowledges improvement in Belgrade's assistance in locating
"witnesses or suspects, providing such waivers for witness
testimony and delivering Prosecutor's summonses and Court
subpoenas." Yet OTP also identifies three specific problems:
First, it says that testimony waivers for high-level
government witnesses are difficult to obtain, in contrast to
those for lower-level witnesses, and that Belgrade has
imposed "cumbersome procedures" unique among the states of
the former Yugoslavia. Second, Belgrade has been reluctant
to provide access to relevant documents in investigations and
trials, providing them "only" under court order. It focuses
on difficulties with respect to "documents that show the
extent of influence and control of Slobodan Milosevic in the
decision-making process regarding the wars in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Croatia." Third, Belgrade has not provided
OTP with access to "actual archive premises" for the purpose
of assessing holdings, making specific requests difficult.
On documents generally, the paper argues that, while
"Belgrade has produced several thousands documents to the
ICTY, this has always been under pressure, and mainly as a
result of binding orders." More troubling to OTP is that the
numbers conceal that "(m)any highly relevant documents ...
have not been produced and many were provided after
unacceptable delays, thereby hampering on-going proceedings."
It notes that "over 120 requests for documents (are)
outstanding, which represents over 20% of all requests
forwarded since 2001."


6. (SBU) Conclusion: The paper concludes that
"- The cooperation of (Belgrade) with ICTY has been and
continues to be partial and to come as a result of
international pressure.
- In the past year, the cooperation has been minimal. Since
December 2003, it is at a standstill.
- In the meantime, Serbia and Montenegro has become a safe
haven for ICTY indicted fugitives.
- It appears unreasonable at this stage to expect
improvements on the basis of statements or actions by
(Belgrade) high officials."


7. (C) Comment: While the OTP paper consistently adopts the
most pessimistic interpretation of the underlying facts, the
factual descriptions themselves are largely accurate and
track what we have been hearing over the past year.
Throughout the year, cooperation was difficult and often
handled by litigation in the Milosevic trial chamber, which
was seized which numerous efforts to order Belgrade to
provide specific information or archival access. While there
were some favorable steps toward cooperation on indictee
apprehension, the minimal transfers since last spring
frustrate OTP greatly, particularly as the Tribunal as a
whole implements its completion strategy. Del Ponte's tin
ear to the political dynamics in the region, irresponsible
public statements, and penchant for grandstanding have
certainly not helped OTP establish or maintain a cooperative
relationship with SAM. That said, the obligation to
cooperate fully with the Tribunal belongs to SAM and, as the
paper points out, many of the deficiencies in this respect
are rightly attributed to it. End comment.


8. (U) The full text of the paper has been e-mailed to
S/WCI, EUR/SCE, INR/GGI/WCAD, and L/EUR.
SOBEL