Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04THEHAGUE774
2004-03-25 06:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): - U.S./U.K.

Tags:  PARM PREL CWC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 000774 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AC, AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR CHUPA
WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2014
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): - U.S./U.K.
CONSULTATIONS ON LIBYA WITH OPCW AND WESTERN GROUP
DELEGATIONS

Classified By: Amb. to the OPCW Eric M. Javits for reasons 1.5 (b) and
(d).

This is CWC-41-04.

-------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 000774

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AC, AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR CHUPA
WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2014
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): - U.S./U.K.
CONSULTATIONS ON LIBYA WITH OPCW AND WESTERN GROUP
DELEGATIONS

Classified By: Amb. to the OPCW Eric M. Javits for reasons 1.5 (b) and
(d).

This is CWC-41-04.

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) AC DAS Don Mahley and Patrick Lamb, Deputy head of
the Counterproliferation Department of the U.K.'s FCO, met
with senior OPCW officials and delegations from the Western
Group on March 19 to discuss Libya. There was substantial
interest in what procedure the U.S./U.K. supported to address
Libya's request for conversion of the Rabta facility. Mahley
and Lamb confirmed the issue is still under consideration.
On the question of extending the deadlines for Libya to
destroy 1%, 20% and 45% of its CW stocks, there was little
controversy. However, Libya still needs to decide which
destruction method it wishes to use, and may be aided in that
process at an upcoming conference at Porton Down in the U.K.
Mahley and Lamb noted that Libyan cooperation has been
outstanding, and officials of the OPCW Technical Secretariat
(TS) confirmed that they had also found the Libyans to be
forthcoming and transparent. End Summary.

--------------
LIBYAN COOPERATION
--------------


2. (C) Mahley emphasized to Acting Director General Brian
Hawtin that Libya is a success story. It appears Libya has
provided full and correct chemical weapons information to the
U.S./U.K. The only exception had been unfilled bombs, where
the Libyans kept increasing the number of such munitions on
hand, but the issue was now resolved. Lamb voiced full
agreement with the points made by Mahley, adding that the
initial indication is that the Libyan declaration to the OPCW
appears to be essentially complete. He emphasized that
U.S./U.K. coordination with the OPCW on Libya has been
excellent, and as the U.S./U.K. continue to work with the
Libyans, Washington and London will remain transparent with
the OPCW.


3. (C) Hawtin expressed appreciation for the visit by
Mahley and Lamb and concurred that Libyan cooperation has

been excellent so far. He said the OPCW hoped the Libyan
decision would have an impact on universality and convince
other non-member states to join the Chemical Weapons
Convention. The TS is still studying the Libyan declaration,
noted Hawtin, but it was important to stress that Tripoli had
said it would provide a supplemental filing on unfilled bombs
or any other matter of concern. Hawtin stated that there
had been good cooperation with Libyan officials in Tripoli
and with the Libyan Ambassador in the Hague. He informed
Mahley and Lamb about upcoming visits by Libyan officials,
including one who would visit the OPCW lab to discuss
destruction methodologies.


4. (C) Acting Inspectorate division chief Renato Carvalho
said Libya has not expressed any concern about funding for
destruction of its CW stocks, and echoed the point of
excellent cooperation with Libya. They appear eager to
resolve any disputes and answer any questions arising from
their declaration, preferably in Tripoli, rather than in the
Hague. As a result of such cooperation, noted Carvalho,
there will be no surprises for the TS when, for example, the
Libyans submit their list of equipment to be utilized as part
of the inspection process.

5. (C) In the WEOG discussion, delegations raised a number
of points on Libyan cooperation. Spain asked about
statements from Qadhafi's son that the U.S,/U.K. had made
promises of compensation to Tripoli for abandoning its WMD
programs. Mahley noted that Libya had indeed provided a long
"wish list," but flatly told delegations that there are "no
blank checks" to the Libyans. The FRG inquired about the
fact that the Libyans had not declared any riot control
agents in its declaration. Lamb replied that Libya did
indeed claim not to possess any such agents, and Mahley added
that they assert that they have two chemicals that are used
for training, but not in actual riot control.


6. (C) Australia asked more generally about the
completeness of the Libyan declaration, and Lamb replied that
the U.S./U.K. are satisfied with the document. He emphasized
that the U.S./U.K. are not yet ready to "swear it is
accurate," but stressed that the document does confirm what
the U.S./U.K. have seen. Mahley added that if there is a
problem with the declaration due to errors or lower-level
officials not having fully implemented instructions from
Tripoli, the Libyans have indicated they will amend their
declaration.

--------------
CONVERSION OF RABTA FACILITY
--------------


7. (C) With TS officials and the WEOG, Mahley noted that
there are two key issues, one of which is the Libyan desire
to convert the Rabta facility for peaceful pharmaceutical
production. Mahley informed Hawtin and the TS officials that
the U.S./U.K. are comfortable with the Rabta engineering data
concerning projected production uses. Lamb said that Italy
has played an important role concerning Rabta, and feels a
degree of "possession" on this issue, although it has
admitted that it has little experience on facility
conversion. Hawtin noted that DG Pfirter has worked hard to
keep the Italians informed on Libyan developments. However,
Verification Division chief Horst Reeps flatly told Mahley
and Lamb that the Italians have not been forthcoming with the
TS on their discussions with the Libyans.

SIPDIS


8. (C) During the WEOG discussion, as anticipated, Italy
made a strong pitch on the need to find a pragmatic and
flexible solution regarding Rabta conversion. Lamb told the
delegations that the U.S./U.K. recognize the importance of
the issue, and the precedent that it would set. And while
one of the points made by Libya is that the converted
facility would be producing beneficial medicines, Lamb noted
that the CWC does not provide "humanitarian" exemptions or
caveats. Mahley added that there is no question Libya is
being transparent on the issue and has good intentions.
However, it is important to avoid setting a bad precedent.
The option of a "technical amendment" to allow Rabta
conversion might be best, but, emphasized Mahley, the U.S.
has not decided yet on the course it wishes to take.


9. (C) Switzerland asked about the impact the justification
authorizing conversion would have on other late signatories
to the Convention. Mahley replied that the U.S./U.K. were
aware of such concerns, and commented that an additional
protocol (suggested by one WEOG member as a possible action
path),for example, would raise a lot of other legal and
procedural complications. In the U.S., it would require
Senate approval. And it was possible that the deliberation
process on an additional protocol would not be limited to
Rabta, but other unexpected issues could be thrown in as
well. Lamb added that an additional protocol would be a
lengthy process.

--------------
DESTRUCTION DEADLINES AND METHODOLOGY
--------------


10. (C) Mahley told the TS officials and the WEOG that the
second issue that needs to be addressed is extension of the
deadlines for Libya to destroy 1%, 20% and 45% of its CW
stocks, as required under the Convention. He noted that it
is not clear yet there will be a problem with Libya meeting
the 100% destruction deadline by 2007. Mahley told Hawtin
and the TS officials that the upcoming conference at Porton
Down would give the Libyans information on destruction
options, and the U.S./U.K. hope Libya makes a decision soon
on destruction technology. Mahley stressed that Libya can
pay for the destruction of its CW stocks itself, and the U.S.
does not plan to compete with or impinge on OPCW
responsibilities regarding inspection and monitoring.


11. (C) On destruction technology, Reeps commented that he
did not have a clear recommendation for the Libyans. There
was no/no consideration of the offer from a Polish company to
destroy the Libyan stocks in Poland, or any other option to
ship CW out of Libya. One possibility was using on-site
holding containers to ship the mustard to a cement kiln in
Libya for destruction. This appeared at the moment to be the
fastest way to dispose of stocks, commented Reeps. Building
an incinerator may not be cost-effective, and will certainly
take time. Reeps added that elimination of precursors is
another question that needs to be addressed. The salts to be
eliminated could simply be made into cubes.


12. (C) But the bottom-line, emphasized Reeps, is that the
TS wants U.S./U.K. views on destruction so the Libyans get

SIPDIS
one message. Mahley and Lamb voiced strong support for that
goal, and Lamb invited the OPCW to send participants to the
Porton Down conference. Mahley emphasized that Libya "does
not have a deep bench" and there are only a few Libyan
experts on the CW program. That small group needs to get a
clear message from the U.S./U.K. and the TS. He then added
that the key for the U.S. is verification of the destruction
of the material. Carvalho added that Libyan officials had
said that if possible, they would like to initiate
destruction of stocks in December 2004-January 2005.

--------------
LIBYAN STOCKS
--------------


13. (C) Mahley noted to the TS that he had phoned DG
Pfirter and informed him that TS personnel had to be sure to
protect themselves from the possibility of leakage from
stored Libyan CW. Protective gear would be critical, and the
prospect of out-gassing in the summer was particularly great.
Chief of Staff Rafael Grossi noted that the OPCW had acted
expeditiously to destroy the Libyan unfilled bombs, with the
DG taking action and then notifying the Executive Council of
the destruction. Such a step could theoretically be
questioned by member states as an unauthorized action by the
DG.


14. (C) Lamb expressed the view that the most difficult
part of the process may have been completed with the removal
of as much WMD material from Libya as possible. While the
U.S./U.K. were aware of IAEA and OPCW concerns about process,
the goal was to get the sensitive material out of Libya.
Lamb said the U.K. would be talking with the Indian and other
delegations to ensure they do not feel snubbed by being
informed after-the-fact about actions that were taken. The
U.K. message will be that Libya is an excellent example which
non-member states should be encouraged to emulate.


15. (C) In the WEOG discussion, the Australian delegation
asked about possible Libyan stocks of biological weapons.
Mahley replied that Libya informed the U.S./U.K. it had
"thought briefly" about a BW program, but claims to have not
proceeded down that path. Mahley stressed that Libya has
been "less forthcoming" on the BW side, but there have been
no pathogens found yet in Libya. And there is no sign yet of
any BW-related infrastructure or current capability. In
addition, commented Mahley, it appears Libyan claims to send
medical diagnostic requests to Tunisia have been borne out.
And it seems Libya does import all its vaccines and has no
indigenous production. So for the moment, there is no
indication of a BW program.

--------------
PUBLICITY SHY
--------------


16. (C) Lamb told Hawtin and the TS that the Libyans have
emphasized that there would be 1) no publicity, and 2) no
message that Libyan WMD materials went to the U.S./U.K. He
said that as Libya is coming under pressure from the Arab
world, there is appreciation for the Libyan requests. Hawtin
said he understood the reasons that Libya is publicity-shy,
adding that the TS experience is that it cannot rush the
Libyans, even though the presence of the Libyan Ambassador at
the March 23-26 Executive Council session would be a good
opportunity for the OPCW to highlight the Libyan decision.
Grossi added that the Libyans have said they will not object
to what the OPCW may want to do on publicity, but have made
clear they simply will not be a part of it.


17. (C) Mahley recommended that DG Pfirter should have a
dialogue with senior Libyan officials. Libya has been far
more open to IAEA publicity than U.S./U.K. publicity, which
is understandable due to the views expressed by Arab states.
But the OPCW, like the IAEA, may have more latitude for
publicizing what Libya has done. Grossi replied that Libyan
officials had told Pfirter that Libya wants the OPCW to have
"a front seat," particularly on public relations. Reeps
provided the caveat that the OPCW requirement is for approval
from the host country with regard to any film footage of
destruction activity or any other type of publicity on
OPCW-related activities.


18. (U) AC DAS Mahley has cleared this message.


19. (U) Javits sends.
SOBEL