CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): OPCW REQUESTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000039

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2014
TAGS: PARM PREL LY CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): OPCW REQUESTS
CLOSE CONSULTATIONS ON LIBYA

REF: THE HAGUE 32

Classified By: Pete Ito, U.S. Delegation to the OPCW. Reasons: 1.5 (B,
D)

This is CWC-4-04.


1. (C) Summary: Brian Hawtin, acting Director General of
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,
made a strong pitch for close cooperation with the U.S. and
UK in ongoing discussions to address Libya's CW program. He
concurred on the need to keep the focus on the larger goal of
ensuring Libya's program is eliminated, and avoiding a
bureaucratic exercise which impeded progress toward that
goal. While the total impact on OPCW resources is not yet
clear, Hawtin commented that verification and inspection
requirements concerning Libya may force a reassessment of
other current obligations. End Summary.


2. (C) In a Jan. 6 conversation which occurred at about the
time Libya formally requested OPCW technical assistance in
order to accede to the CW Convention (reftel),Hawtin
emphasized the importance of staying in close contact with
the U.S. and U.K. with regard to Libya. He added that this
was clearly the view of DG Pfirter, who would return to the
office on January 19. Hawtin requested a meeting soon with
Ambassador Javits and U.K. Ambassador Budd to ensure that all
parties are working in unison.


3. (C) We told Hawtin that we agreed on the importance of
close and continuing dialogue. We also stressed the point
that the OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS) must not lose sight
of the bigger picture regarding Libyan activities as it
pursues the requirements under the Convention and established
by the TS. We need to avoid a situation where the focus on
technical requirements impedes, rather than promotes,
transparency and full disclosure, as had sometimes occurred
in our dealings with the Russians on their CW programs.
Hawtin fully agreed and said this reinforced the need for
early and complete discussions between the U.S., U.K. and TS
to ensure we gave a consistent message to the Libyans. He
stressed that it would be important to ensure that
appropriate briefings from Washington and London be provided
to those members of the TS who would travel to Libya so they
could do their job properly.


4. (C) There was agreement on the assumption the DG would
want to make a trip to Libya as soon as appropriate, and
Pfirter would take his cue from how U.S./UK discussions with
the Libyans would develop. Hawtin then requested that he be
kept apprised on the developments concerning the formal
Libyan steps to inform the UN of its intention to accede to
the Convention.


5. (C) We asked Hawtin whether the responsibilities
involving Libya would generate a budgetary problem in the
coming year. Hawtin began by noting that Horst Reeps, the
Director of the Verification Division, had already made the
point that it would be necessary to put the tenure decision
on hold (at least with regard to the his division) due to
Libya. Hawtin's only comment was that while he did not think
that a freeze on tenure was possible, there may be a reason
to take a hard look at how many inspectors should be
separated from service in 2004. Hawtin shared Reeps' view
that, depending on what has to be done in Libya, there will
be a requirement to assess whether other verification and
inspection activities should be cut so that Libya can be
squeezed in. In that regard, Hawtin made a strong pitch for
immediate implementation of the arrangement for "on-call
inspectors," as well as further work on more effective
verification procedures that would reduce costs.


6. (C) At this point, Hawtin commented, there is no way to
know whether any kind of supplemental budget or request for
voluntary contributions would be required. Emphasizing that
the actual destruction of Libyan stocks would not be an OPCW
responsibility (the arrangement under the CWC is that the
possessor states pay for destruction),the open questions
involve verification and inspection requirements for
production, storage and destruction facilities. In that
regard, Hawtin said there was particular interest on where
the U.S. and UK might want the Libyans to come out on the
issue of storage facilities.


7. (C) Regarding destruction costs, Hawtin provided a
suggestion, stating that a member of EU HIREP Solana's staff
had contacted the TS to emphasize the EU's interest in
contributing to elimination of Libya's WMD programs. While
not making any promises, it was clear that there was a
particular interest conveyed by Solana's staffer in having
the EU become involved in these important developments, and
Hawtin suggested the U.S. and/or UK may want to see whether
the EU would be willing to make a contribution.


8. (C) Hawtin noted that while the Verification Branch
obviously has the lead in working the immediate steps to be
taken, he had asked External Relations chief Huang Yu to
focus on what efforts his division would need to make to
address the impact the Libyan decision would have on other
countries in the region, as well as on the larger efforts to
promote states that are not party to the CWC to accede to the
Convention. Hawtin added that he has also tasked the Public
Relations office to see how the OPCW's work on Libya would
complement the effort to highlight overall OPCW activities
covering a wide variety of fields. Hawtin stressed that he
would obviously appreciate as much assistance and advice as
possible from the U.S. in these areas.


9. (U) Ito sends.
RUSSEL