NETHERLANDS/EU/CUBA: DUTCH PREVENT INVITATIONS TO CUBAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 003285

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR AND WHA/CCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2014
TAGS: PREL PHUM NL CU EUN
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU/CUBA: DUTCH PREVENT INVITATIONS TO CUBAN
OFFICIALS SUPERSEDING DISSIDENTS


Classified By: POL Counselor Andrew Schofer for Reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)


1. (C) Summary: The Dutch confirmed on December 15 that the EU
COLAT Working Group agreed on December 14 to recommend a
temporary suspension of the June 2003 measures for increased
engagement with the Cuban opposition. A Dutch MFA contact
described the COLAT's recommendation as intended to increase
opportunities for the EU to engage the Government of Cuba with
regard to Human Rights. According to the COLAT agreement, EU
Embassies in Havana will in the future issue National Day
invitations only to the diplomatic corps and local nationals,
not to Cuban dissidents or government officials (although
neither group would be excluded from attending if they
desired.) The EU hopes this arrangement will allow the Cuban
regime to unfreeze diplomatic relations with the EU; the EU will
then re-engage "on condition" that meetings specifically include
discussion of human rights concerns. The suspension of the June
2003 measures would continue until June 2005 "at the latest,"
at which point a subsequent COLAT will review the suspension
and its results. Prior to taking effect, this recommendation
must still be approved at the Minister-level, most likely at
the at the GAERC meeting scheduled for late January 2005. End
summary.

COLAT Working Group Recommends EU Temporarily Suspend June 2003
Measures
-------------- --------------

2. (C) Dutch MFA advisor for Cuba policy Jan Jaap Groenemeijer told
poloff December 15 that the December 14 EU working party
meeting on Latin America (COLAT) had agreed to recommend a
"temporary suspension" of June 2003 measures. The suspension
would allow high-level official meetings "on condition" that
each meeting include discussion of human rights concerns. The
suspension includes a "special formula" for national day
receptions whereby invitations would be issued only to the local
national community and to the diplomatic corps. Groenemeijer
noted that while dissidents and the Cuban officials would not be
specifically invited, they "would not be forbidden" either. The
measures would be suspended until June 2005 "at the latest," at
which point a subsequent COLAT meeting will evaluate the
effectiveness of the suspension.


3. (C) The COLAT also agreed that EU Heads of Mission in Havana would
recommend concrete ways in which to "intensify engagement with the
opposition." Groenemeijer said this would include "more intensive and
visible" engagement. Some measures mentioned included more
meetings with dissidents, providing support to families of
dissidents, and visitation of prisoners.


4. (C) Groenemeijer noted that the objective of the suspension is to
provoke a "positive reaction" from Cuba, to include a reinitiation of
dialogue and ultimately the release of the 75 political
prisoners taken in March 2003. Groenemeijer emphasized that
the temporary nature of the suspension means that the
suspension could be reversed and measures could be reinstated,
or even more restrictive measures could be imposed if the
desired results are not achieved.

EU Seeks Greater Engagement with Both Dissidents and Officials
-------------- --------------

5. (C) Groenemeijer stressed that the recommendation to suspend the
June 2003 measures was made in the context of seeking to
increase engagement with Cuban authorities, dissidents, and
civil society representatives in order to help prepare for a a
post-Castro democratic Cuba. He argued that the EU intended to
keep the pressure on the Cuban government to improve its human
rights record but found the current lack of meaningful
engagement counterproductive to this effort.


6. (C) Groenemeijer was particularly exercised about what he saw
as misrepresentation in the press and abroad that the EU had
frozen relations with Cuba following the introduction of the
June 2003 measures, when it was actually the other way around.
The EU had been dismayed at the time by the Cuban government's
decision to freeze relations, which had prevented the EU from
promoting positive changes within the Cuban government. Noting
that "the EU does not have sanctions on Cuba like the U.S.,"
Groenemeijer said the EU feels engagement with the Government of
Cuba is necessary to promote human rights and to encourage
reform.


7. (C) According to Groenemeijer, a majority of EU members at the
COLAT agreed with Spain that the policy of inviting dissidents
to national days, while appreciated by the dissidents, was
ineffective in producing change or cultivating civil society in
advance of a post-Castro Cuba. "Only two or three" members,
according to Groenemeijer, were unwilling to go along with the
Spanish proposal to cease inviting dissidents to national day
receptions. In their national capacity, the Dutch argued at the
COLAT that inviting Cuban officials without inviting dissidents
was "unacceptable;" as EU president, the Dutch then proposed
the compromise position to invite neither group, which was
ultimately accepted. Since Cuban officials had previously
indicated to the EU that the GOC would lift its diplomatic
freeze when the EU stops inviting dissidents to national days,
he argued that "it is logical to expect that Cuba will respond"
to this development by unfreezing relations.

Next Steps
--------------

8. (C) The proposed suspension must be approved at the Minister-
level before taking effect. Groenemeijer suggested that the
next meeting at which Foreign Ministers could approve the
recommendation would be the late January GAERC. In the
intervening time, Groenemeijer said the Dutch will be drafting
in discussion with other EU members the language for the
Council Conclusions which will explain details of the suspension
and also discuss benchmark-style demands to be met by the
Government of Cuba (which Groenemeijer did not believe would be
included in Council conclusions). Groenemeijer said the EU has
not yet created language clarifying whether another GAERC
decision would be necessary to continue the suspension after
June 2005, and whether the earlier measures would automatically
return to force if there is no progress on the Cuban side. He
believed that the EU would set certain "benchmarks" or "demands"
that Cuba would have to meet in order for the suspension to
stay in place. According to Groenemeijer, these might include:
not hindering contact between EU and opposition members;
releasing the 75 prisoners; and stopping harassment of
dissidents.

Comment: Dutch and EU Wary of US Reaction
--------------

9. (C) Groenemeijer reported that COLAT participants were
concerned about the potential U.S. reaction to a suspension of
the June 2003 measures, and had agreed that the U.S. should be
"very correctly informed about the decision" to avoid
"puzzlement." Groenemeijer took great pains to articulate the
COLAT recommendation and the background to the recommendation,
and indicated that U.S. comment and reaction would be
appreciated to avoid miscommunication. Groenemeijer appeared
convinced that the COLAT recommendations, if enacted, would
ultimately help the EU engage with the Cuban opposition in
preparing for a post-Castro Cuba, but he acknowledged that
other member states have a larger basket of motivations, and
that the Cuban government's reaction to the EU's initiative
will also be a major factor in determining whether it succeeds
in this stated objective.
RUSSEL