NETHERLANDS/EU/CUBA: DUTCH GRAPPLE WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 003243

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR, WHA/CCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2014
TAGS: PREL PHUM NL CU EUN
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU/CUBA: DUTCH GRAPPLE WITH
PROSPECTIVE POLICY CHANGE

REF: STATE 262206

Classified By: DCM Daniel Russel for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: The Dutch will chair the December 14 EU
working party meeting on Latin America (COLAT),at which they
expect to discuss four or five Member State proposals for
amending current EU policy toward Cuba. There is consensus
that the present policy is unsustainable. The Dutch
emphasized they do not wish the EU to appear to be softening
toward the Cuban government as "they have not earned it."
The EU, however, is frustrated that the diplomatic freeze
resulting from the current policy of inviting dissidents to
national days has prevented the EU from positively
influencing Cuba. The Dutch sought U.S. advice on how best
to package any change in policy so that the U.S. could find
it acceptable. End Summary.


2. (C) Poloff delivered reftel points to MFA Cuba policy
advisor Jan Jaap Groenemeijer December 9, and DCM followed up
with Western Hemisphere Director Marianne Kappeyne van de
Coppello on the margins of the US-EU Ministerial on December

10. EU frustration over Havana's freeze-out of EU missions
in Havana and concerns that there can be no progress without
dialogue is prompting the EU to seek alternatives to the
current policy of inviting dissidents to national day events,
Kappeyne van de Coppello said. She added that the EU,
looking toward a post-Castro Cuba, feels a strong need to
"develop lines of communication and political relationships"
that could help the EU to "soften Cuba's landing" during a
transition. Kappeyne van de Coppello, who will chair the
December 14 COLAT, told the DCM that the EU has four or five
proposals on the table and asked how the EU might "package"
an eventual change in policy in a way that the U.S. would
find acceptable. One proposal she mentioned was for EU
Embassies in Havana to discontinue observing national days,
thereby "removing the irritant" of inviting dissidents;
another idea was to "open a time-limited window of
opportunity" for the EU to engage with Cuba and call on Cuba
to respond in kind with positive political movement.


3. (C) DCM reminded Kappeyne van de Coppello that the goal of
engaging Cuba is not "dialogue" alone but "real change in
Cuba." She readily acknowledged the point, recalling that
with one dissident being released each day, the number could
eventually become significant. Characterizing the releases
as a cynical ploy, the DCM emphasized U.S. concern about the
EU policy being influenced by Cuba, rather than the reverse.
Kappeyne van de Coppello agreed with the DCM's emphatic point
that it was not effective to respond to bad behavior with
concessions in order to entice good behavior, and she
emphasized that the Dutch and EU do not want to be seen as
softening their position but rather as remaining tough but
effective in fostering positive change. The DCM recalled the
recent aborted visit by Dutch Parliamentarians to Havana,
which Kappeyne van de Coppello dismissed as a publicity
stunt; the DCM retorted that Cuba's reaction was nevertheless
telling, and not encouraging. Kappeyne van de Coppello was
concerned how Washington might react to change in EU policy;
the DCM reminded her that "this is not a non-trivial issue
for us."


4. (C) On the side, Kappeyne van de Coppello noted that the
Dutch bilateral position was to keep the current policy in
place. She observed further that some countries bear
national economic concerns in mind during COLAT, but she did
not elaborate. Although other Dutch interlocutors have
suggested in the past that they would prefer to let the issue
slide out of their presidency, Kappeyne van de Coppello and
Groenemeijer expressed hope that an agreement be reached as
soon as possible.


5. (C) Kappeyne van de Coppello did not expect the COLAT to
reach a final agreement on December 14. Even if the COLAT
does reach agreement, she noted, the EU's Political and
Security Committee (PSC) would still need to approve a
decision before sending it to the GAERC or European Council
for endorsement. Kappeyne van de Coppello was clearly aware
of the possible negative impact of a change on EU-US
relations, and asked for advice on how the Dutch/EU might
best package any change in EU policy toward Cuba to make it
more palatable.
SOBEL