Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04THEHAGUE3228
2004-12-09 16:51:00
SECRET
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

THE NETHERLANDS: RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR SPECIAL

Tags:  MARR MOPS PREL AF NL 
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S E C R E T THE HAGUE 003228 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2014
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL AF NL
SUBJECT: THE NETHERLANDS: RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR SPECIAL
OPERATIONS FORCES FOR OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

REF: A. STATE 251327 (NOTAL)


B. STATE 251753 (NOTAL)

C. THE HAGUE 3162 (NOTAL)

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD M. SOBEL FOR REASONS 1
.4 (B AND D)

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 003228

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2014
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL AF NL
SUBJECT: THE NETHERLANDS: RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR SPECIAL
OPERATIONS FORCES FOR OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

REF: A. STATE 251327 (NOTAL)


B. STATE 251753 (NOTAL)

C. THE HAGUE 3162 (NOTAL)

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD M. SOBEL FOR REASONS 1
.4 (B AND D)


1. (S) PolMilOff made ref A demarche to MFA Security Policy
Bureau Operations Office Director Rob Gabrielse on November
26 and DATT also raised the issue with MOD ACOS Operations
Air Commodore Pieter Cobelens. Ambassador Sobel discussed
this request with Defense Minister Kamp on December 8. Kamp
said he expected the Netherlands would offer special
operations forces (SOF) for this mission. He thought the
Cabinet would take a decision to do this within the next
30-60 days, with a view towards deploying Dutch SOF to south
Afghanistan in April 2005. We understand the deployment will
probably consist of 80-100 SOF personnel from the Dutch
Army's Korps Commandotroepen (KCT) and 100-150 support
personnel along with three Chinook helicopters. The Dutch
plan to make these forces available for the full range of SOF
missions. Kamp said that parliament, whose concurrence is
usually sought for military deployments, did not need to be
advised of an SOF deployment, though they would be discretely
informed of the mission outside of normal channels (which are
usually a public Cabinet letter). Kamp also noted there was
agreement between MOD and MFA to go ahead with the
deployment. He said the Dutch might follow their SOF
deployment by establishing a second Dutch ISAF PRT in the
same region in 2006, in addition to their current PRT in
Pol-e-Khomri, Baghlan province. Kamp advised that he had
raised the possibility of PRT cooperation with the Japanese
during his recent visit there and had invited the Head of the
Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces to visit the Dutch PRT in
Pol-e-Khomri. He described the Japanese as "cautiously
interested."


2. (S) Comment: Kamp's comments are the most positive signal
that we have heard from the GONL on a possible Dutch SOF
deployment for OEF for some time. Such a deployment has been
under discussion for more than two years. During that period
it has been the subject of disagreement between MOD and MFA,
with each department alternatively expressing concern about
the political risks of such a mission, including possible
Guantanamo implications for any AlQaeda/Taliban members that
Dutch SOF might detain. We understand these concerns have
since been resolved. By linking this mission to a possible
follow-on PRT, Kamp may be planning to package the deployment
by presenting offensive operations (SOF) in combination with
reconstruction efforts (PRTs) in a way that may be more
palatable to the Dutch parliament. End comment.
RUSSEL