Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04THEHAGUE3140
2004-12-01 15:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

EU/TURKEY: DUTCH COMMENT ON DECISION DRAFT

Tags:  AORC PREL TU HR RO CY BU EUN 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 003140 

SIPDIS

EUR/NCE FOR SILKWORTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2014
TAGS: AORC PREL TU HR RO CY BU EUN
SUBJECT: EU/TURKEY: DUTCH COMMENT ON DECISION DRAFT


Classified By: DCM Daniel Russel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 003140

SIPDIS

EUR/NCE FOR SILKWORTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2014
TAGS: AORC PREL TU HR RO CY BU EUN
SUBJECT: EU/TURKEY: DUTCH COMMENT ON DECISION DRAFT


Classified By: DCM Daniel Russel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 29 the Dutch circulated draft
conclusions on Turkey to EU partners (subsequently leaked to
the press) in advance of the December 17 Council meeting that
includes strong, but predictable, language on accession
(e-mailed to EUR/ERA and USEU). Turkish officials in The
Hague have indicated, both to the Dutch and to us, that they
will likely accept the Council language as long as it
contains a clear "yes" and a date for starting negotiations.
The Dutch are watchful for any indication that negotiations
on the date for Turkey could be used by Member States to get
what they want on the other candidate countries, Romania,
Croatia, and Bulgaria. End Summary.

DUTCH STRATEGY FOR GETTING TO "YES" ON TURKEY IS ON TRACK


2. (C) Engineering a "yes" on December 17 was the essential
act of the Dutch Presidency, Pieter de Gooijer (MFA,
Director European Integration) told DCM on the evening of
November 30. It was too early to relax, but that thus far
the Turkish accession process was going exactly as he had
hoped. The Dutch circulated draft Council conclusions on
November 29, after resolving an GONL internal dispute over
whether to keep the draft secret. They concluded that a last
minute attempt by Heads of State to deal with previously
unseen texts could precipitate a disaster worse than the
negative reactions an early release might provoke. De
Gooijer said that he had just spent four hours November 29
with EU DirGen Marnix Krop, PM Balkenende Advisor Rob
Swartbol, and visiting Volkan Boskir (Turkish Deputy U/S for
European Affairs) reviewing in detail the Presidency's draft
Council conclusions on Turkey. The Turks pushed back on
multiple points but de Gooijer was finally left with the
impression that they seemed prepared to live with all the
conditions and caveats as long as they got a clean "yes" with
a date. Ambassador Ildem separately told the DCM the same
evening that there was a lot that Turkey had not liked in the
draft - particularly on Cyprus. After a lengthy discussion

of the Ankara Protocol, Ildem finally clarified that he felt
Turkey would move on Cyprus (presumably by agreeing to the
protocol) "at 1:00 a.m. on the morning of December 18th after
we are sure of what we are getting." He admitted that their
other complaints about the text as it now stands "were not
deal breakers."


3. (C) De Gooijer categorically rejected the Turkish public
claim that the circulated draft conclusions were just a
"first stab" that bore little or no resemblance to what would
ultimately come out of the Council meeting. The Dutch hope
no one will reopen the unbracketed parts of the draft, since
they felt it could come entirely unraveled. De Gooijer noted
that the Heads of State and Government alone can resolve the
bracketed portions on December 17, which contain four open
decisions: the "yes," the date to start negotiation, the
"process" (he did not elaborate),and the clarification that
the goal of negotiations was full membership. He said he had
"a paragraph on each in his back pocket," but it remained for
the Heads to work on them.


4. (C) Finally, de Gooijer reported that a lower-level
meeting among EU mission reps in Brussels on November 30 had
gone quite smoothly and augured well for the COREPER meeting
December 1. (There was only one more COREPER and the
December 13 GAERC before the Council, he noted.) The main
issues raised had to do with (a) whether to pair or delink
the Bulgarian and Romanian candidacies (the French wanted to
pair, he revealed),and (b) whether to give Croatia a date
(as the Germans want) or make negotiations conditional on
surrendering General Gotovina to the ICTY (as the UK wants)
(reported septel).

EFFECT ON THE TURKEY ISSUE OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR OTHER
CANDIDATE COUNTRIES HARD TO PREDICT


5. (C) Jochem Wiers (MFA European Integration Department
and principal drafter on Turkey) told Poloff November 30 that
the Dutch are beginning to "discern the outlines" of a
negotiation strategy in which dates for Romania, Bulgaria,
and Croatia are packaged in complex quid pro quo deal making
in the late hours of December 17 (septel). While he did not
include Turkey in the calculation, he pointed out that in the
end, the importance of the Turkey consensus would necessarily
affect and be affected by discussions of the other three.
Wiers revealed no knowledge of any deal brewing in Brussels
involving Turkey and Cyprus, but he said it would help the
Dutch now if Turkey could find a way to positively
acknowledge Cyprus before December 17. He pointed to
Turkey's handling of Cyprus recognition issues at the signing
of the Rome Treaty of Constitution as a model for December

17. Confirming what Ildem and de Gooijer had told the DCM,
Wiers said the Dutch sense a readiness to be flexible at
"high levels" in the Turkish government, but only "in
extremis."


6. (C) Looking ahead to the Dutch delegation to the closed
Council negotiations, Wiers expects it will include PM
Balkenende, joined by advisors Webke Kingma or Rob Swartbol,
plus a note taker (three is the maximum for any Member
State). Pieter de Gooijer and a small number of other senior
staff will be in a side room nearby.
RUSSEL