NETHERLANDS/IRAQ: RECONFIGURING THE DUTCH PRESENCE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 003015

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS IZ NL NATO EUN
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/IRAQ: RECONFIGURING THE DUTCH PRESENCE

REF: A. THE HAGUE 2766 AND PREVIOUS

B. HOOIJKAAS E-MAIL 11/15/04 ("POLITICS IN THE
NETHERLANDS") AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: A clear consensus in the Cabinet and
parliament exists for concluding the Dutch deployment in Al
Muthanna as scheduled. The government's November 12 letter
to parliament states Dutch troops will end their current
mission in mid-March, although some personnel will stay
longer (we understand six to eight weeks) to draw down the
deployment, and the Netherlands will remain militarily
engaged in Iraq through the NATO training mission. The
parliament chose not to debate the letter, reflecting the
strongly held view that the government's decision is final.
Extensive Embassy contacts with parliamentarians over the
last few weeks confirms the view that, with the exception of
Kamp's own Liberals, there is virtually no support for a
fourth extension of the mission. FM Bot told Ambassador
Sobel on November 15 that a solid majority in the Cabinet,
including PM Balkenende, supports ending the mission as
scheduled. Kamp told Amb. Sobel on November 18 that he was
sensitive to SecDef's suggestion the Dutch not characterize
the end of their mission in Al Muthanna as the end of their
military presence in Iraq. He also reiterated that he was
clear in his conversation with SecDef as to intention to end
the mission as scheduled. The uniformed military leadership,
including CHOD Berlijn, stand firmly behind the Kamp's
decision. Although the British Ambassador has instructions
to pursue the possibility of extending the Dutch presence, he
advises that Balkenende has told Blair directly that this
will not happen. We will continue to pursue the Dutch
interest in the NATO training mission and other options for
retaining a Dutch military presence in Iraq before revisiting
the question of extending the Al Muthanna deployment (in
tandem with the UK and IIG) closer to the January 2005
elections. END SUMMARY.

DUTCH GOVERNMENT RESTATES INTENTION TO WITHDRAW
-------------- --


2. (C) The Dutch government sent a letter to the Second
Chamber of Parliament on November 12 describing its plans for
Iraq over the next several months (ref B). As expected, the
letter, signed by FM Bot, Defense Minister Kamp, and
Development Minister Van Ardenne, reiterated the previously
stated position that the Dutch mission in Al Muthanna will
conclude in mid-March of 2005, with the expectation that
local Iraqi forces will, as scheduled, assume responsibility
for security in the region. In contrast to previous
government statements (most notably by Bot),the letter made
no reference to "extraordinary" or "unforeseen circumstances"
having a bearing on a Dutch decision; the letter allows,
however, that the "clearing out" of the mission "will take
some time thereafter." The letter also states that the Dutch
government intends to make a "proportional contribution" to
NATO and EU training missions in Iraq, noting in that context
that "the departure of the Dutch contingent from Al Muthanna
does not mean the end of the Dutch military involvement in
Iraq."

NO DEBATE IN PARLIAMENT
--------------


3. (C) In an unusual move, the foreign affairs and defense
committees of the Second Chamber took note of the letter on
November 16 but announced that there was "no need" for
further public debate. Had a debate taken place, it was
expected that an overwhelming majority would have expressed
support for the government's stated position, with only the
conservative Liberal Party (VVD) pushing for an additional
extension. Liberal party foreign affairs spokesman Hans van
Baalen later declared that he had chosen not to force the
issue at this time, but might revisit it later depending on
the situation in Iraq closer to the elections.


4. (C) Embassy contacts with parliamentary leaders --
including floor leaders and defense spokesman for all three
coalition parties as well as members of the main opposition
party -- confirm that there is no stomach in parliament for a
divisive debate on this issue a this time. At least two
major parties -- the Liberal Democrats (D-66) and the main
opposition Labor Party (PvdA) -- are firmly opposed to a
fourth extension, and only supported a third extension (last
June) on the basis of assurances from Kamp that it would be
the last. (Comment: This is the crux of the matter for
Kamp. He feels he has given his word and believes altering
course may damage his credibility and undermine his
relationship with parliament. End Comment). The Christian
Democrats (CDA) -- Bot and Balkenende's party -- are also
opposed to an extension of the current mission, although
individual members have told us they do not rule out a
reintroduction of Dutch troops at some point in the future.

STRONG CONSENSUS IN CABINET
--------------


5. (C) In a November 15 meeting with Amb. Sobel, FM Bot
stressed that the cabinet was firmly behind the decision to
draw down the Al Muthanna deployment on schedule. Bot said
that he had been alone in advocating a more flexible
position, but his effort to retain a reference to "unforeseen
circumstances" had run up against stiff opposition from Kamp,
with most other cabinet ministers following his lead "in lock
step." Bot described PM Balkenende as "adamant" that the
Dutch government end the deployment after eight months in
accordance with the agreement it made with parliament last
June. In a separate meeting, Rob Swartbol, Balkenende's
senior foreign policy advisor, confirmed that there had been
"broad consensus" within the cabinet during its discussion of
the draft letter on November 12.


6. (C) According to Bot, Kamp was personally (and, he
suggested, emotionally) committed to concluding the Dutch
mission in Al Muthanna no later than mid-March. In addition
to the cabinet, Bot argued that Kamp had now also convinced
the senior military service chiefs to support a draw down
which they had earlier opposed. (Note: This has been
confirmed through our own contacts with the uniformed
military, including by CHOD Berlijn.) Bot said that he found
Kamp's arguments -- that the Netherlands has already done
more than its fair share, and that the Dutch troops might be
needed for missions in Africa later -- unconvincing, but they
had resonance with the public.

KAMP CLARIFIES DUTCH PLANS
--------------


7. (S) On November 18, Kamp told Ambassador Sobel that he
made clear in his telephone conversation with SecDef that the
Dutch would not abandon Iraq. The current Dutch deployment
will be maintained at full strength until March 15; at that
point, a "new group" of soldiers will be sent in for a short
period (six-eight weeks) to facilitate the draw down and
handover of regional control to the Iraqis. Kamp anticipated
that the British might send "a few troops" to the region at
this time. In response to a question from the Ambassador,
Kamp said that he expected the Dutch contingent of a future
NATO training mission to be about 100 troops (Note: We have
heard from other sources that the Dutch plan to provide
approximately 30 trainers, possibly in addition to the 100
troops.) He did not know the details of how those troops
would be deployed exactly, but took note of NATO's pressing
requirement for force protection. Looking ahead, Kamp said
the Dutch may contribute to the NATO strategic reserve for
the Balkans, in addition to fulfilling their NRF rotation
commitment in 2005, and are also looking at sending special
forces possibly to SE Afghanistan in support of OEF as well
as F-16's to Afghanistan. He noted that the Dutch were
finalizing their plans for next year and would be able to
announce them shortly. Kamp reaffirmed that Dutch Apaches
and Chinooks currently overseas needed to be recalled to the
Netherlands for "reconditioning," but did not rule out the
possibility that they might be redeployed in the region again
in the second half of 2005.

CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS
--------------


8. (C) Kamp's strongly held view has cemented consensus in
the cabinet and parliament that the Dutch deployment in Al
Muthanna should conclude on schedule in mid-March with no
additional extensions. In our view, direct requests for the
Dutch to reverse the decision made last June (and reaffirmed
in the November 12 letter) at this time have virtually no
chance of success. The British and Japanese, for example,
are pushing the Dutch hard to extend the Al Muthanna mission,
but have made no headway. (British Ambassador Budd told us
that Balkenende rejected a direct request from PM Blair on
November 12.) Some -- like van Baalen and Bot -- continue to
assert that "unforeseen circumstances" could compel the Dutch
to stay longer in Al Muthanna, but this is impossible to
predict and, in any case, would probably mean only a short
extension of a few weeks.


9. (C) On the other hand, nearly all our Dutch interlocutors
have stressed that a continuing Dutch presence in Iraq via
the NATO mission demonstrates that the Netherlands' ongoing
commitment to Iraq. We will push hard to lock in a
substantial Dutch component for the NATO mission -- perhaps
including force protection -- and look for other ways to
involve the Dutch in Iraq and Afghanistan, using Kamp's own
arguments to support our case. Although we will have to
overcome the perception, shared by Kamp and many others, that
the Dutch are already doing more than their "fair share" in
Iraq and Afghanistan, we believe the Dutch government will be
more receptive to approaches along these lines. We do not
rule out the possibility of extending the Dutch mission in Al
Muthanna, and will continue to push for it, but every signal
we have received here suggests this is not the right time to
force the issue; instead, we believe we should pocket what we
can now and then seek to revisit the issue in January or
February (closer to the elections.) We also will look for
opportunities to modify the public debate from emphasizing
the Al Muthanna draw down to focus more explicitly on the
continued Dutch engagement in Iraq.
SOBEL