Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04THEHAGUE3006
2004-11-19 08:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

CUBA/NETHERLANDS/EU: NO CONSENSUS (YET) TO CHANGE EU POSITION

Tags:  CU EUN NL PGOV PHUM PREL 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 003006 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR AND WHA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2014
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PGOV, CU, NL, EUN
SUBJECT: CUBA/NETHERLANDS/EU: NO CONSENSUS (YET) TO CHANGE
EU POSITION

REF: A. (A) BRUSSELS 4662

B. (B) STATE 228300

Classified By: POL Counselor Andrew Schofer for reasons 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 003006

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR AND WHA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2014
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PGOV, CU, NL, EUN
SUBJECT: CUBA/NETHERLANDS/EU: NO CONSENSUS (YET) TO CHANGE
EU POSITION

REF: A. (A) BRUSSELS 4662

B. (B) STATE 228300

Classified By: POL Counselor Andrew Schofer for reasons 1.4 (b/d)

1. (C) Summary: According to Dutch presidency contacts, there
is no immediate prospect of changing the EU's policy toward
Cuba. Discussion of the issue at the November 16 EU COLAT
meeting was inconclusive, preserving the status quo. A
discussion of proposals by EU Heads of Mission on ways to
intensify cooperation with Cuban dissidents, while at the
same time reopening contact with the Government of Cuba, is
on the agenda for the December 14 COLAT. The Dutch are
hoping to avoid making a decision during their presidency.
End Summary.

2. (C) Dutch Cuba policy advisor Jan Jaap Groenemeijer told
POLOFF November 17 that no decision had been reached at the
November 16 COLAT meeting to change the EU position.
Therefore, he confirmed, EU policy - including the June 2003
measures - will remain unchanged for the immediate term. The
next opportunity for further discussion will be the December
14 COLAT. Groenemeijer emphasized that participants at the
COLAT "agreed that the EU should intensify its contact with
Cuban dissidents and civil society" and said EU Heads of
Mission in Havana would submit concrete proposals at the
December 14 meeting. Groenemeijer stressed that this
decision was the result of members states' feelings that
"more could be done" in engaging dissidents and civil
society, and contacts could be "more intensive" and/or "more
effective."

3. (C) Groenemeijer noted that the other objective of a
revised EU policy would be a "reopening of contacts with the
Government of Cuba." Groenemeijer said this was the result
of member states' feelings that "the current situation is not
beneficial to the EU, Cuba, or a transition." Groenemeijer
argued that such a reopening would allow the EU to "bring
human rights to the fore" and "steer the GOC toward better
human rights policies" which he felt it had done "pre-2003."
Noting that the GOC had refused contact with EU member states
following the EU's initiation of its policy to invite
dissidents to national day receptions, however, Groenemeijer
stated that more discussion would be necessary regarding
"conditions under which such a reopening could take place."

4. (C) At a reception on the evening of November 17, Marianne
Kappeyne van de Capello, Head of MFA's Western Hemisphere
Affairs Department (who chaired the November 16 COLAT),
confirmed to POLOFF that the EU was looking at ways to revise
its relations with the Cuba in a positive direction. She
noted, however, that Castro's approach to the opposition and
to dialogue on human rights was so negative that it had
poisoned EU efforts in this regard, making it "nearly
impossible" for the EU to reach out.

5. (C) In a separate meeting with POLCOUNS on November 17,
Jaap Werner (Head of the MFA's Political Affairs Department)
said that the Dutch hoped to avoid having the EU take a
decision on this issue during the Dutch presidency. Since
the next national day event would not take place until March,
Werner felt that it would not be too difficult to avoid
making a decision at the December 14 COLAT, thus effectively
pushing the issue into 2005 (and the Luxembourg presidency.)
Werner emphasized that the Dutch national position -- which
they would feel more comfortable expressing once they no
longer held the presidency -- was strongly opposed to
changing the policy on inviting dissidents to national days.
Werner disparaged Spanish efforts to convince the EU to make
a "unilateral gesture" with no hope of a reciprocal gesture
by the GOC, but noted that within the EU only the Germans
continued to make a strong case for maintaining the current
policy; surprisingly, he said, the Nordics and other
traditional human rights proponents were largely silent or,
as in the case of the UK, supported reevaluating the policy.
Werner noted, however, that the Cuban dissidents themselves
had been "quite helpful" in making clear their own feelings
about the proposed changes..

6. (C) Comment: The Dutch clearly feel pressure within the
EU, driven primarily by Spain, to change the EU's policy
toward Cuba. While the EU may try to couch such a change in
terms of "intensifying" contacts with dissidents, clearly the
intent is to strengthen relations with Havana. The current
Dutch strategy of postponing discussion for as long as
possible may get them through the end of their presidency,
but the issue is likely to come to a head as soon as the next
EU national day appears on the calendar in the spring. End
Comment.
SOBEL