DUTCH ASK USG HELP WITH TURKEY ON CYPRUS, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 003001

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2014
TAGS: PREL TU CY GR PGOV EUN
SUBJECT: DUTCH ASK USG HELP WITH TURKEY ON CYPRUS, AND
GREECE


Classified By: DCM Daniel Russel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Still expecting a positive outcome on
December 17 for Turkey, the Dutch DG for the EU, Marnix Krop,
sees trouble brewing on Greece and Cyprus and has asked the
U.S. to help in two specific ways. First, urged us to
impress upon Turkey the problems that Turkey's Aegean flights
have for Greece at this time. Second, U.S. assistance would
be helpful in encouraging the Turks to deal directly with the
Greek Cypriots. Krop reported Austria is getting traction
with some new EU 10 members (including Slovakia, Slovenia and
Hungary) by suggesting that Turkish accession would force
them to make undesirable financial sacrifices. End Summary.


2. (C) Marnix Krop, MFA DG for Enlargement, told the DCM on
November 18 that the EU is on track to set a date for
accession talks with Turkey at the December 17 Council, but
some serious obstacles remain. He said the Netherlands is
working for a Council decision on December 17 that sets the
opening of accession talks with Turkey in the second half of
2005 with no need for another decision. The Dutch are
working to dissuade those who seek open-endedness in the
negotiations or any additional decision points along the way.
Krop expects the Council results to be more stringent on
Turkey than the Commission report. Krop added that he would
not expect full Turkish membership before 2017, and at that
time there might be put in place controls (or at least
transition periods) on labor migration.


3. (C) Krop said Turkey could help its case now, by taking
"symbolically important" unilateral steps to improve the
atmospherics, both for the December 17 negotiations and for
the lukewarm-at-best European public opinion. These could
include setting up an extra, independent monitoring mechanism
for torture or reopening the Halki Greek Orthodox seminary.
Turning to Greece, Krop said it seems clear Greece "really
wants Turkey in the EU." He specifically asked for U.S. help
now to make Turkey aware of the problems Turkish flights over
the Aegean near Greece are causing, in order to head off "a
new Greek tragedy." The Greek Foreign Minister, in The Hague
on November 17, proffered "new, troubling language for the
Council decision that would be a brake to the accession
talks," Krop said. The DCM noted the Political Director
Siblesz-U/S Grossman call (of the same day) and said that the
USG has heard the Netherlands request "loud and clear."


4. (C) Turning to Cyprus, Krop said in no uncertain terms
that "Cyprus will veto Turkey" if Turkey does not find a way
to send a "credible signal" to Cyprus on recognition on or
before December 17 (even if action comes further down the
road). There are different legal and strategic opinions on
how far Turkey's signal of recognition really has to go, Krop
admitted. He "did not think it necessary for Turkey to give
Cyprus full recognition at this time," but "a solution would
have to be found somewhere." The minimum would be that
Turkey act on the Council's invitation to sign the protocol
to the Ankara Agreement. Krop added, "If Turkey does just
this one step, we are not sure if it would be enough for
Cyprus. It might be, if Turkey is forthcoming on confidence
building measures and atmospherics." Such a measure from
Turkey might include a "unilateral declaration" on how Turkey
would foresee dealing with the GOC in the period of the
negotiations, such as "recognition without prejudice to the
outcome of the unification issue," Krop surmised.


5. (C) Krop said he saw a need but did not quite know how to
bring Turkey and Cyprus together to speak directly about all
these variables and possible outcomes. The key is to remove
unpredictability between two sides that practice brinkmanship
negotiations. It was critical to choreograph the talks from
now until December 17 and perhaps some third party might have
to play a convening role. Krop was not sure this job could
fall to the Dutch, who want to avoid being at cross-purposes
with their Presidency. He asked that the U.S. help persuade
the Turks to have some contact with the GOC.


6. (C) The Austrian led, German CDU inspired, effort to seek
a "third way" solution causes problems for the Dutch.
Austria's real goal is to have the Council set a second date,
around 2014, for taking a second look at Turkish membership,
in conjunction with the negotiations over institutions and
financing. They argue that Turkish membership would
over-stress the Union's absorption capacity, Krop said. This
lobbying is "falling on fertile ground in Slovakia, Slovenia
and perhaps Hungary," Krop reported, explaining that Austria
is scaring them about the effect of Turkish membership on
their new agricultural, structural and solidarity payments
from the EU, which presumably would dwindle when resources
shift to the much poorer (by comparison) Turkey after her
accession.
SOBEL