CRITICAL REPORT ON DUTCH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002995

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/UBI, S/CT, INR, INL
JUSTICE FOR OIA JFRIEDMAN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER PINR PINS NL KPRP
SUBJECT: CRITICAL REPORT ON DUTCH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
(AIVD)

REF: (A) THE HAGUE 2929 (B) THE HAGUE 2308

Summary
--------------

1. On November 16, a special blue-ribbon panel published
its long-awaited evaluation of the Dutch AIVD (civilian
intelligence service). The "Havermans Committee," which
included a former Interior Minister and several senior
officials, was formed in February 2004 at the request of
Interior Minister Remkes. The move came in response to
parliamentary criticism about a series of AIVD missteps
including confusion over the number of suspected terrorists
in Holland, failure to prosecute suspects identified by
AIVD, and clumsy handling of the investigation of the
fianci of a Royal family member. The release of the
panel's report in the aftermath of the Van Gogh killing
(reftel A) was timely but coincidental.


2. The report endorsed C/T organizational reform measures
already underway (reftel B) as well as the British "JTAC"
style of integrated C/T coordination. Key findings of the
Havermans Report include:

?Cumbersome bureaucratic structure that hinders C/T
operation, particularly overlap and ambiguity between
the Justice and Interior Ministries.
?A lack of coherent policy guidance and prioritization.
?Poor oversight of AIVD and insufficient supervisory
mechanisms and authorities.
?Insufficient information sharing with law enforcement
agencies (particularly at the local level) and a
culture of withholding information.
?Inadequate staff and funding.

Tasks
--------------

3. According to the assessment, the AIVD has a coherent set
of duties crucial to the protection of national security
rity
(counterterrorism, violent political activism, non-
proliferation and counter espionage). As a result of the
current focus on combating radical Islamic terrorism, AIVD,
however, lacks sufficient means and manpower to address all
potential threats. Despite this, the committee did not
recommend AIVD should cut back on any of its tasks, nor did
the committee consider it necessary to give the AIVD any
additional powers (other than those included in recently
proposed bills).

Responsibility
--------------

4. The Havermans Committee concluded AIVD's management was
fragmented and unclear, because four ministers and three
national coordinators were involved in its activities.
Although AIVD falls within the Interior Ministry, there is
no clear structure to select and prioritize relevant
expectations and to task the AIVD with assignments.
Therefore, AIVD itself mostly determines its own priorities
and activities. Considering this undesirable, the
committee recommended the Interior Minister be made
responsible for setting AIVD priorities in an annual AIVD
plan that would be discussed in the National Security
Council and submitted to the Cabinet for approval.

Cooperation
--------------

5. The committee was concerned about the lack of
cooperation between AIVD and other organizations, in
particular the police. It welcomed measures to streamline
information sharing and endorsed initiatives by the
National CT Coordinator to form an analytical unit (similar
to the UK),in which all relevant organizations within the
government cooperate in high-quality analyses of terror
threats and counterterrorism in the Netherlands (reftel B).
The committee also recommended expanding the so-called CT
Infobox, a handful of senior officials who direct
information gathering on a fluctuating group of about 150
suspect persons. The report called for closer
international cooperation with foreign intelligence
agencies and increased stationing of AIVD liaisons abroad.

Reaction
--------------

6. Interior Minister Remkes endorsed the recommendations
about drawing up an annual AIVD plan. He agreed with the
committee's conclusion cooperation between AIVD and police,
prosecutors and mayors should be intensified, and
recommended AIVD improve the sharing of information with
other parties. Together with the Defense Minister, Remkes
will take the initiative to intensify cooperation between
AIVD and the MIVD military intelligence service.
Nevertheless, he cautioned there would always be
information that could not be shared widely. Remkes also
referred approvingly to the agreement reached during the
November 11 parliamentary debate about the Van Gogh murder
to increase AIVD's budget by 100 million euros. Despite
increased resources, he warned against excessive
expectations.


7. Remkes submitted the report to the Second Chamber
(Lower House of Parliament) for review. Initial MP
reactions have been positive.

Comment
--------------

8. AIVD has come under increased scrutiny and criticism
recently, particularly after the van Gogh murder (reftel
A). AIVD will likely use this report to justify more
resources. We welcome the independent assessment of AIVD's
problems (particularly highlighting its reluctance to share
information either with domestic or international
partners/colleagues),but it is unclear whether AIVD will
change the way it does business even with more staff and
funds.

Sobel