Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04THEHAGUE2836
2004-11-03 17:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

NETHERLANDS/EU: SWARTBOL ON TURKEY, RUSSIA,

Tags:  PREL PGOV NL EUN 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002836 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV NL EUN
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU: SWARTBOL ON TURKEY, RUSSIA,
CHINA, IRAQ, RUSSIA, AND KROES

REF: A. THE HAGUE 2723

B. THE HAGUE 2789

C. THE HAGUE 2766

D. 10/28 HAGUE-UBI E-MAIL

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL, FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002836

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV NL EUN
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU: SWARTBOL ON TURKEY, RUSSIA,
CHINA, IRAQ, RUSSIA, AND KROES

REF: A. THE HAGUE 2723

B. THE HAGUE 2789

C. THE HAGUE 2766

D. 10/28 HAGUE-UBI E-MAIL

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL, FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Rob Swartbol, PM Balkenende's senior
foreign policy advisor, predicted to Ambassador Sobel on
November 1 that the EU will make a positive decision on
Turkish accession negotiations in December, but warned that
the Turks will find some elements of the decision more
objectionable than the Commission's report. On Russia,
Swartbol dismissed a Russian threat to lower the level of
representation at the November 11 summit, noting that this
would have little impact on EU negotiating positions;
Russia's continuing unwillingness to engage the EU in
Russia's "near abroad," however, is a more serious long-term
problem. The EU will probably not lift the China Arms
Embargo during the Dutch presidency, according to Swartbol,
but the lack of a new commission complicates the EU's ability
to offer other deliverables (such as market economy status)
at the December 8 EU-China summit. The Dutch are officially
committed to pulling out of Al-Muthanna in mid-March, barring
unforeseen circumstances, but will participate in NATO and EU
missions there and are pushing the EU to play a more active
role. The EU will continue to follow the EU-3's lead with
regard to Iran, but could support a referral to the UNSC if
the Iranians refuse to cooperate. Finally, Swartbol said
that the Dutch are fighting hard to retain the European
Commission's Competition portfolio for Neelie Kroes but may
ultimately relent to maintain EU unity. END SUMMARY.

TURKEY: THE WORST IS YET TO COME


2. (C) Rob Swartbol, Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to Dutch
PM Balkenende, told Ambassador Sobel on November 1 that
current Turkish unhappiness with the European Commission's
October 6 report is only a precursor of worse to come.
Echoing comments made earlier by Dutch POLDIR Hugo Siblesz
(ref A),Swartbol asserted that the Commission's report
represented the "maximum" the EU could accept with regard to
Turkey; the December 17 Council decision would be "narrower"
in scope and even more likely to upset the Turks. Ambassador

Sobel pressed Swartbol to clarify what elements of the
Council decision would be problematic and why. Swartbol
responded that the Austrians were insisting that language
describing accession negotiations as open-ended actually
spell out the possible outcomes, giving accession and
non-accession equal weight. (The French, he added, wanted
similar assurances, but were being more creative on crafting
open-ended language.) Swartbol asserted that setting a date
remained a highly contentious issue, but suggested that the
EU might be able to finesse the issue by starting the acquis
review on one earlier date (such as March, 2005) and
beginning "actual negotiations" later. He predicted that the
date set to begin negotiations would most likely be in the
latter part of 2005, although he did not rule out slipping to
early 2006. At the end of the day, he said, the Turks should
focus on the positive elements of the decision and not make a
fuss over the details needed to generate consensus.

RUSSIA: YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD IS MY BACKYARD


3. (C) Turning to Russia, Swartbol confirmed that the
Russians had threatened to send PM Fradkov to the November 11
summit in The Hague if there was no agreement reached on the
"four common spaces." Swartbol dismissed the threat as
inconsequential, however, noting that this only highlighted
the pointlessness of holding semi-annual EU-Russia summits.
The EU intended to stand firm, he said, on refusing to delink
the four common spaces (ref D). The biggest problem, he
argued, is that the Russians refuse to acknowledge that the
EU has a legitimate interest in developments within Russia's
"near abroad"; what the EU thinks of as a "common
neighborhood" is viewed by Moscow has its exclusive
"backyard." (Note: Dutch POLDIR Hugo Siblesz also recently
told the Ambassdor that the Dutch are increasingly concerned
about the negative direction in EU-Russian relations; post
will continue to follow closely and will report after the
summit.)

CHINA: LIFT, BUT WHEN?


4. (C) Noting that the French were using "every opportunity"
to press for a lift of the Arms Embargo, Swartbol said he
would not be surprised to see the issue reappear on the
agendas for the upcoming GAERC and Council meetings. The EU,
he said, is in principle agreed on a lift; the only question
is "when." Swartbol doubted that a lift would occur during
the Dutch presidency, putting the odds at "80-20" against.
Echoing recent public statements by FM Bot, however, Swartbol
suggested that the EU could make a positive signal regarding
a future lift at the December 8 EU-China summit. (Note:
Swartbol remarked in confidence that Bot has "flip-flopped"
on the China arms embargo and expressed frustration with
ministers who hold a strong position "until they go to
America and change their minds.") Ambassador Sobel warned
that in American eyes, lifting the Embargo during the Dutch
EU presidency could create a "defining memory" of the Dutch
presidency, and asked whether progress had been made on
identifying other deliverables for the summit. Swartbol
responded that the EU had prepared a "great package" (which
he offered to share with us) but noted that the absence of a
new commission complicated the EU's ability to take steps
toward granting China market economy status, which he
characterized as the "jewel in the crown."

IRAQ: "NO" MEANS "NO" -- UNLESS....


5. (C) Ambassador Sobel noted that the Dutch government
would soon send a letter to the parliament (refs C and D)
laying out its position on Iraq and asked whether this would
prompt debate on a possible Dutch extension in Al-Muthanna.
Swartbol responded that the Dutch government's official
position on an extension was "no." He did not rule out the
possibility of a debate in parliament, but stressed that at
the moment only one faction -- the conservative Liberal Party
(VVD) supported an extension. All other parties, he said,
were opposed, and he did not expect this to change absent a
"drastic deterioration" in the situation in Iraq. If the
elections were to be delayed, for example, then the Dutch
might be prepared to remain a few extra weeks, although he
cautioned that "we won't say this openly." The British and
Japanese are lobbying hard to keep the Dutch mission in
Al-Muthanna, he added, and their concerns (and those of the
U.S.) are well understood. In response to Ambassador Sobel's
question, Swartbol confirmed that the Dutch planned to
maintain a much smaller presence in Iraq through proportional
contributions to NATO and EU missions, and stressed that
there was no intention to leave Iraq completely. He refused,
however, to describe a remaining Dutch presence as
"significant." (Note: On November 1, FM Bot reiterated in
parliament that the government intended to end the
Al-Muthanna deployment in March but did not rule out
reconsidering "in the event of unforeseen circumstances" or
"if the entire world appeals to us.")


6. (C) Turning to the EU support package for Iraq, Swartbol
confirmed that the Council hoped to present a completed
package to Allawi on November 5. Without providing details,
Swartbol said that the French continued to obstruct agreement
on the package, although the Germans, on the other hand, had
been "surprisingly helpful." Noting that it was always
difficult to get the French to join consensus, Swartbol
commented that Allawi had complicated matters further by
making himself personally unpopular with the French through
his "unhelpful" comments. He complained that the

IRAN: MORE TIME NEEDED


7. (C) Swartbol said the Dutch Presidency would continue to
follow the lead of the "big three" and to seek coordination
between the EU and the U.S. He expressed appreciation for
the "extra time" the U.S. appeared to be giving the EU-3 to
work on Tehran. (Ambassador Sobel stressed that this time
was quickly running out.) Swartbol anticipated that if the
Iranian response to the EU-3 proposals is negative, then the
EU might eventually support a referral to the Security
Council.

COMMISSION POLITICS: WHITHER NEELIE KROES?


8. (C) Swartbol confirmed that Prime Minister Balkenende has
recovered from his recent illness and is fully focused on
finishing out a successful EU presidency. Although Swartbol
did not accompany Balkenende to Rome personally, he made
clear that Balkenende had held substantial discussions with
incoming European Commission President Barroso regarding the
crisis over the new commission, and that they had been in
"daily" contact since. Swartbol made clear that Balkenende
was fighting to retain the competition portfolio for Neelie
Kroes, but suggested that it would be hard to resist if
Barroso appealed to the Dutch as EU President to support a
compromise slate acceptable to the European Parliament.
Balkenende and Barroso reportedly are having dinner together
this week and will discuss the matter further. (Note: In a
separate meeting with POLCOUNS, PM advisor Wepke Kingma also
did not rule out the possibility that the Dutch might
ultimately have no choice but to accept a modified portfolio
for Kroes, especially if that would allow Barroso to present
a new Commission to the European Council meeting on November
5.)

SOBEL