CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR 30

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 000283

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR CHUPA
WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2014
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR 30
JAN


Classified By: ERIC M. JAVITS, AMBASSADOR TO THE OPCW. REASONS: 1.5 (B
, D).

This is CWC-14-04.

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OLYMPIC CHEMICAL PROTECTION MEASURES
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1. (C) Greek OPCW Attache Vassilios Kraniotis provided us
with an update on planning for a potential terrorist attack
using chemical agents at the Olympic games. Most of these
plans, he said, had been downgraded from "Confidential" to
"Official Use Only" by his government, but he asked us to
protect the information he provided. According to Kraniotis,
chemical antidotes and detection equipment ordered from
domestic and international suppliers are starting to come
on-line. This includes chemical sensors to be placed at some
Olympic venues. The military hospital in Athens has the lead
in responding to any suspected attack, while twelve hospitals
have been tasked with preparing to treat victims and provide
other assistance.


2. (C) Kraniotis said that Greek officials are consulting
with the OPCW, as well as with the U.S and a number of other
countries, about contingency planning. Domestically,
consultations have expanded beyond a core Counter-Terrorism
group to include Olympic officials and numerous government
departments involved with preparations for the games. To
avoid heightening public fears, Kraniotis said, there is no
plan to highlight these preparations in advance of the games.
However, he anticipated that Greek and Olympic officials
will publicly recognize the OPCW contribution to security
when the games have ended.

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UNIVERSALITY
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3. (U) Huang Yu, Keith Wilson and Ioan Tudor of the TS
External Relations Division hosted a January 13 meeting to
discuss and possibly refine the concept of Points of Contact
(POC) in the Action Plan. Four States Parties (SP) had
nominated POCs: Chile nominated two individuals in its
National Authority; Mexico nominated the office responsible
for international organizations in its MFA; Poland nominated
Krzysztof Paturej, MFA, with no specific regional focus
noted; and the U.S. Huang reported that no SP had yet
volunteered as a POC for African or Asian countries who had
yet to join the CWC. The TS officials questioned the need
for continued facilitations by Consuelo Femenia (Spain).
They also reported receipt of recent voluntary contributions
from Norway, China and South Korea and advised delegations
that Huang had met with the Libyan Ambassador that morning
and discussed possible TS assistance with its national
implementation efforts. Huang noted that the workshop for
National Authorities in Senegal would include universality
elements, and that non-SPs and Libya had been invited to
attend.


4. (U) Several other countries raised consideration of
nominating a POC: France (in conjunction with its EU
partners),Russia, India, Iran, Australia, and South Korea.
Among the topics discussed were the lack of detail regarding
how the POC efforts would work, what types of individuals or
organizations other countries had nominated, and how the TS
plans to structure and coordinate the POC effort.
Netherlands, France, and Spain called for more structure,
while the UK and Russia asked for continued flexibility,
noting that one size does not fit all.


5. (U) China, France and the UK protested the focus on the
POC issue, noting that the Action Plan had a variety of
elements and requesting updates on those issues as well.
China stated it was hosting the second regional meeting of
Asian National Authorities and that universality issues would
be included. Finally the Netherlands reported the EU had
sent demarches to all non-SPs, and that Belize acceded as a
result.

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MEETING OF EXPERTS TO REVIEW SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD
RECOMMENDATIONS
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6. (U) The OPCW hosted a January 28-30 meeting to review the
Note by the Director General's note on the Report of the
Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) on Developments in Science
and Technology and the recommendations of the SAB for the
first Review Conference. Of particular importance was
India's obstruction of the entire process as well as the
subject matter, in addition to its refusal to support the
draft Chairman's Report of facilitator Steve Wade (UK).
India indicated that it would reopen various issues during
the paper's presentation at the 36th Executive Council
meeting, March 23-26.


7. (U) Delegations concurred with the SAB recommendation
that relevant new chemicals be monitored but that the
schedules of chemicals should not be amended at this time.
They agreed that the SAB should continue to monitor trends in
new chemical production technologies. Delegations were
divided regarding the advisability of increasing the number
of compounds referenced in the OPCW Central Analytical
Database (OCAD),with India in particular opposed to any
expansion. Delegations recommended that the SAB look for
alternatives to GC-MS, particularly for portable on-site use
during OCPF inspections. Delegations agreed that the SAB
should consider how S&T developments might affect TS training
programs and welcomed suggestions on how these developments
might be incorporated into future training programs.


8. (U) Delegations also generally supported the SAB
recommendation that the number of OCPF inspections be
increased, as long as this effort does not interfere with the
overall effectiveness of the verification regime (note: this
also was supported by India). Delegations also welcomed
continued SAB review of possible ways to improve activities
associated with Article VI-related verification activities as
well as those associated with verification of CW destruction
programs. Delegations concurred that gaps in protective
capabilities need to be identified, and welcomed SAB
consideration of ways to improve OPCW outreach to the S&T
community. Finally, delegations advised the SAB to consider
OPCW International Cooperation and Assistance efforts,
specifically how S&T developments might impact ICA programs.


9. (U) India, Iran, and South Africa challenged the SAB's
work in general, stating that the SAB needed to consider
initiatives in the political context in which they would be
reviewed by States Parties. Canada intervened, stating that
the SAB exceeded its authority by broaching political
subjects and that in the future it should focus only on S&T
work, and EC priorities would be set accordingly. OPCW
representative Ralf Trapp responded that the SAB was an
independent advisory body that is responsible for advising
the DG on science and technology developments that could
impact the CWC. Iran raised its concerns about
implementation of Article XI, in particular requesting the
SAB consider the issue of chemical transfers for peaceful
purposes.

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NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (NIST)
CHEMICAL DATABASE
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10. (U) At the request of the Technical Secretariat, Gary
Mallard, DOC/NIST, presented NIST-developed chemical database
software (InCHI) for Carlos Trentadue (TS/DEB) on January 12
as a potential way to augment TS outreach efforts to
resource-challenged States Parties. The software allows for
an end-user to input any number of synonyms (chemical names,
structural formulas, or other common references) to generate
a yes/no result for declaration purposes. The TS was very
interested in the product and noted that such a database
could assist States Parties lacking chemical/technical
expertise in identifying Article VI-monitored chemicals for
declaration purposes.

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SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS PROCEDURES
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11. (U) Discussions on procedures for Sampling and Analysis,
held on January 12, went nowhere. States Parties remain
divided over the presence of an observer (UK and
Austria/Swiss on one side -- all the rest on the other side).
The facilitator (Wills, Netherlands) was ill so Mallard
facilitated and Brandon Williams sat in the chair. Del
worked with the UK before the meeting to request them to
reconsider, but with no agreement. The UK rationale is that
they do not want an SP to influence the selection of a
laboratory, hold up analysis or tinker with the process. On
the other side, SPs advocating the presence of an observer
(France, in particular) argue that VA Part II, paras 49 and
50, provide the right for inspected SP access to information
collected to support compliance judgments. Discussion
concluded with no progress achieved.


12. (U) COMMENT: Del notes that the two sides focused on
the presence of an observer and not the underlying reason why
the observer is necessary, namely, the inspected SPs right
to: 1) be ensured of seal/sample integrity and 2) timely
access to raw data to allow for sufficient response (in
alternative documentation, comments to a preliminary
findings, or other means). In all other cases, to include
challenge inspections, inspected SPs are guaranteed the right
to inspector notebooks, offered opportunities to reconcile
anomalies or questions on-site through additional/alternative
records or physical access, and being briefed by inspection
teams of preliminary findings on-site. Basically, inspected
SPs are offered the opportunity to address concerns as they
arise and be provided evidence against them to allow for
sufficient response. Del suggests Washington evaluate
whether options exist that address the two main points that
do not involve a "look over the shoulder", but which
accommodate the inspected SPs need for sufficient information
and security.

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CONSULTANTS
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13. (U) In a January 22 lunch hosted by the French
delegation, Sophie Moal-Makambe raised the future of General
Gregoire Diamantidis, a consultant in the TS Verification
Division, and asked the U.S. representatives their opinion of
him. In response, the French noted that their support for
moving the general from his current consultancy on
optimization of verification activities to a Director
position at the OPCW was tepid at best. They noted that
Paris might take a different view, but at this point they had
no instructions on this matter.


14. (U) Javits sends.
SOBEL