CUBA/NETHERLANDS/EU: DUTCH HOPE EU WILL PRESERVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002758

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR, DRL, AND WHA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2014
TAGS: PREL PHUM CU NL EUN
SUBJECT: CUBA/NETHERLANDS/EU: DUTCH HOPE EU WILL PRESERVE
RESTRICTIONS

REF: A. (A) STATE 228300


B. (B) THE HAGUE 2728

Classified By: POL Counselor Andrew Schofer for Reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: The Dutch support retaining the EU's June
2003 measures to pressure Cuba on human rights, but as EU
president they feel bound to seek a "consensus" position. As
the EU is currently split on the issue, according to Dutch
contacts, a consensus to change the current measures may not
be obtainable -- in which case they would remain in place.
Dutch interlocutors asked to remain in close contact on Cuba
and would appreciate information on U.S. approaches to other
EU members if possible. End Summary.


2. (C) Poloff delivered ref A message to MFA's Cuba policy
advisor Jan Jaap Groenemeijer October 26. Groenemeijer said
the Dutch agree with the line of reasoning presented, i.e.
that Cuba should be kept under pressure to reform its human
rights. Groenemeijer said he believed that the fact that a
majority of Cuban dissidents supported the June measures
"weighs heavily" in favor of retaining them, and stated that
the Netherlands would not suggest lifting the dissident
invitation policy. Nevertheless, Groenemeijer assessed that
while several EU members are holding strong on maintaining
the June measures, a group of others have questioned the
measures' utility in bringing about changes in the human
rights situation in Cuba. Still others, he said, want to
find a compromise position. Groenemeijer said he believes
that "all EU members want to maintain pressure on human
rights in Cuba," but they disagree on which measures would be
most effective in bringing about change. Groenemeijer said
that the Dutch would believe that a loss of EU consensus is
tantamount to a loss of pressure on Cuba but also recognize
that the EU "cannot make too many concessions."


3. (C) As EU members will not formally present their
positions on Cuba until mid-November, according to
Groenemeijer, the Dutch are not fully aware of some states'
positions and/or the factors behind them. While human rights
remains an "important" consideration, not all EU members
believe that the June measures provide the best mechanism for
maintaining pressure on Cuba in this area, he said -- and
some members probably have "other interests" in mind.
Groenemeijer asked if the Spanish position on Cuba was having
a derogatory effect on U.S.-Spanish relations and suggested
that that the U.S. might want to consider sharing with the
Dutch Presidency its analysis regarding other EU members'
positions, if possible. He stressed that the Dutch want to
find a way to navigate this issue in a way that satisfies
U.S. and Dutch concerns.


4. (C) Poloff met separately on October 26 with Aleid Bos of
the MFA's human rights office. (Note: Although the Cuba
desk has the lead on this issue, Bos maintains a "watching
brief" with regard to human rights situation in Cuba.)
Poloff shared reftel points and emphasized that the USG is
deeply concerned by Spanish efforts to reverse the 2003
guidelines. Poloff stressed that human rights issues should
continue to take precedence over other interests when dealing
with Cuba. Bos agreed that human rights issues should lead
in the discourse over Cuba, however, she noted that other
factors, such as economic opportunities and development, must
also be considered. She was aware of the efforts but not the
details of the proposals now under discussion in Havana under
the leadership of the Dutch Ambassador there. Bos said she
would coordinate with the Cuba desk to make sure that our
common human rights concerns are taken into account.


5. (C) POLCOUNS also raised the issue on October 26 with
Director of Political Affairs Jaap Werner. Werner echoed
Groenemeijer's statement that the EU is divided on the Cuba
issue, with some members pushing for a "harder" line and
others demanding a "softer" position. Werner stressed that,
as EU president, the Dutch had an obligation to seek a common
position. If no consensus developed to change the current
strategy, he noted, then one likely outcome would be to leave
the previously agreed measures in place. While such an
outcome would not bother the Dutch, Werner stressed that
others would find this an unsatisfactory result and would
therefore push hard for a new "compromise" position. Werner
did not expect a decision to be made before mid-November, and
thought the discussion would probably drag on for some time.
He urged us to remain in close contact on this issue.
SOBEL