Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04THEHAGUE2462
2004-09-27 15:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

EU CHINA ARMS EMBARGO: VADM METZGER/DAS SUCHAN

Tags:  PREL PARM MARR CH NL EUN 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002462 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2014
TAGS: PREL PARM MARR CH NL EUN
SUBJECT: EU CHINA ARMS EMBARGO: VADM METZGER/DAS SUCHAN
MEETING WITH GONL

REF: A. THE HAGUE 1846 (NOTAL)

B. THE HAGUE 2074 (NOTAL)

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION DANIEL RUSSEL FOR
REASONS 1.4 (B AND D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002462

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2014
TAGS: PREL PARM MARR CH NL EUN
SUBJECT: EU CHINA ARMS EMBARGO: VADM METZGER/DAS SUCHAN
MEETING WITH GONL

REF: A. THE HAGUE 1846 (NOTAL)

B. THE HAGUE 2074 (NOTAL)

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION DANIEL RUSSEL FOR
REASONS 1.4 (B AND D)


1. (C) Summary: On September 15, VADM James Metzger and
PM/DAS Greg Suchan briefed a Dutch interagency team chaired
by MFA Security Policy Director Maurits Jochems on U.S.
concerns regarding the possible lifting of the EU's arms
embargo on China. VADM Metzger outlined the enhanced threat
posed by possible increased EU technology transfers to China,
while DAS Suchan explained why proposed changes to the EU's
Code of Conduct on arms transfers were unsatisfactory, noting
that U.S. concerns in this area were broad and bipartisan.
In a shift from earlier stated positions, MFA Political
Affairs Chief Jaap Werner said that relations with the U.S.
and Japan would be a key consideration in reaching an EU
decision; the Dutch side argued forcefully, however, that an
enhanced Code of Conduct and a "Toolbox" for post-embargo
countries should address U.S. concerns. The Dutch side
repeatedly noted that while the Dutch were not pushing to
lift the embargo themselves, as EU president they would be
compelled to deal with the issue in accordance with the
wishes of the EU membership. End Summary.


2. (C) ACJCS VADM James Metzger and PM/DAS Greg Suchan
briefed a Dutch interagency team on September 15 in The Hague
on U.S. concerns related to a possible lifting of the EU
China arms embargo. Dutch MFA Security Policy Chief Maurits
Jochems hosted the meeting, accompanied by other policy level
colleagues from the MFA Political Affairs and East Asian
Affairs Departments and Ministry of Economic Affairs, as well
as representatives from MOD arms transfer office and Dutch
Military Intelligence Department. VADM Metzger opened the
meeting by stating that the symbolism of a decision to lift
the embargo at a time when China was behaving in a
threatening manner vis-a-vis Taiwan would clearly send the
wrong signal to China and would be counter-productive to
resolving cross strait differences. He noted that U.S.

concerns go beyond countering immediate military threats to
include long-term worries about Chinese proliferation to
third countries. He also said that the U.S. is concerned
about transfers of seemingly non-lethal systems such as night
vision devices which could significantly enhance Chinese
capabilities.


3. (C) Jochems observed that the Dutch were not responsible
for raising the issue of a possible embargo lift within the
EU, but had inherited it from previous presidencies.
Repeating his comments from a previous meeting with U.S.
interlocutors (ref A),Jochems said that he was struck by the
progress the Chinese had already made despite the embargo,
which raised the question of how effective the embargo really
was. MFA Political Affairs Office Director Jaap Werner
(MFA's agenda manager for the Dutch EU Presidency) said the
EU was looking to play a part in China's impressive economic
growth. He saw four elements as being key in determining how
the EU should proceed: the effectiveness of the embargo as
such, human rights concerns, regional stability
considerations and the impact of an embargo lift on relations
with allies such as the U.S. and Japan. He stressed that
VADM Metzger and DAS Suchan's visit was a good opportunity to
explore U.S. feelings on this issue. MFA East Asian Affairs
Deputy Director Margriet Bot said the EU felt compelled to
respond positively to a request from the Chinese, who
objected (fairly, she thought) to being lumped in the same
category as Zimbabwe and Sudan.


4. (C) VADM Metzger presented a U.S. Pacific Command Briefing
on the possible impact of specific EU technologies on
regional stability. Jochems noted that European and U.S.
industrial high-tech cooperation with China was a legitimate
cause for concern, and acknowledged that the Dutch parliament
opposed lifting the embargo on both human rights and regional
stability grounds. He suggested, however, that an enhanced
EU Code of Conduct on arms transfers in place of the embargo
would restrain EU states from increasing sales to China. DAS
Suchan countered that it was intuitively obvious that lifting
the embargo implied an increase in transfers would follow.
MFA arms transfers Office Director Paul van den IJssel argued
forcefully that an enhanced Code of Conduct and a "Toolbox"
for post-embargo countries such as China would result in
increased scrutiny of transfers to China. DAS Suchan noted
U.S. support for the Code of Conduct in general, stating it
was a useful instrument in judging arms transfers to nations
such as Brazil, but stressed that China was a special case.
Suchan added that those EU Members that apply the Code (but
not the Embargo) to their defense exports to the PRC approve
seventeen licenses for every one that they deny. In the U.S.
view, "the universe of acceptable arms transfers to China is
a null set." Bot said the EU hoped to gain some concessions
from the Chinese on human rights grounds in exchange for an
embargo lift. Werner asked how an EU lifting of the embargo
would be received in Washington. DAS Suchan said that on
political level it would be greeted with "immense
disappointment," noting that the issue was a bipartisan
matter of concern in both the executive and legislative
branches of the U.S. government. Suchan also noted that if
the EU lifts the Embargo, it will raise significant obstacles
to U.S. defense cooperation with Europe, and the U.S.
congress would likely legislate additional impediments to
defense trade.


5. (C) Comment: MFA Political Affairs Office Director
Werner's inclusion of U.S. and Japanese interests in his
criteria for Dutch consideration of this issue is significant
and positive shift away from earlier suggestions (from Werner
and others) that the EU had already decided to lift the
embargo and was concerned only with how to manage the U.S.
reaction. With the possible exception of MFA's East Asia
Department, it appeared that most Dutch interlocutors would
be happy to have the issue off their plate for the rest of
their EU Presidency (see also ref B). Nevertheless, the
Dutch continue to argue that an enhanced Code of Conduct and
a "Toolbox" for post-embargo countries will address U.S.
concerns, and it is clear that the Netherlands is not
prepared to "go it alone" if other states make a forceful
move -- without significant opposition -- to lift the
embargo. End Comment.


6. (U) DAS Suchan has cleared this message.

SOBEL