NETHERLANDS/EU/TURKEY: PM ADVISOR ON ACCESSION

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002448

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2024
TAGS: PREL TK NL EUN
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU/TURKEY: PM ADVISOR ON ACCESSION
STRATEGY


Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D).


1. (S) SUMMARY: The Dutch PM's chief foreign policy advisor
(and point man for Turkey during the Dutch presidency)
believes that Verheugen's report will set the stage for a
positive EU decision on setting a date for Turkish accession.
He anticipates, however, that the decision will contain
additional elements -- a "to do" list, a "handbrake"
mechanism, and a front-loaded negotiation schedule -- to
satisfy European skeptics. Picking an actual date that
avoids linkage to national referenda on the EU constitution
will also be tricky, but July 2005 and January 2006 are
possibilities. The U.S. can play a helpful role by
encouraging the Turks to "play by European rules." END
SUMMARY.


2. (S) Rob Swartbol (protect),Dutch Prime Minister
Balkenende's senior foreign policy advisor, told Ambassador
Sobel on September 24 that the apparent resolution of the
Turkish penal code question opened the way for the European
Commission to recommend in its October 6 report that Turkey
be given a date for starting accession negotiations.
Swartbol cautioned, however, that the report was not the last
word -- getting from the report to a positive European
Council decision in December would still require a lot of
hard work from the Dutch presidency. Swartbol also noted
that while Verheugen tends to view the Turkey question as a
"black and white" issue, others involved in the drafting of
the report are likely to take a more nuanced view.


3. (C) Speaking candidly and "off the record," Swartbol
predicted that while the Turks would probably get a date in
December, the Council's decision would also contain three
unusual elements: 1) a "to do list" of areas where the Turks
needed to do more work to ensure that legislative decisions
are properly implemented (he noted torture, religious
freedom, and minority rights as examples; 2) a "handbrake"
mechanism that would allow negotiations to be suspended in
response to Turkish backsliding (he suggested that the
Commission would have responsibility for monitoring Turkish
progress in this regard); and 3) a "front loaded" schedule of
negotiations in which tough issues -- like immigration and
agriculture policies -- were dealt with early on.


4. (C) Swartbol also noted that countries like France and
Austria would not accept a Council decision on starting
negotiations that appeared to prejudge the outcome.
Therefore, he said, the decision would probably have to
include language stating that negotiations were beginning
"with the ultimate goal of Turkish EU membership" or a
similar formulation. He acknowledged that the Turks might
find such language difficult to swallow -- particularly if it
appeared noticeably different from previous Council
formulations -- but argued that Ankara should "accept the
yes." The Turks, he added, understand perfectly well that
they are a unique case (in fact, he said, they are proud of
it),so expectations of exactly equal treatment are
unrealistic. At the same time, he stressed that he is
personally studying the Rome Treaty carefully to find
precedent language to use when referring to sensitive issues
such as the "handbrake" mechanism. Swartbol said that he had
found language normally used with regard to the question of
starting negotiations that might also be applicable for
monitoring ongoing talks.


5. (C) In addition to the issues mentioned above, Swartbol
suggested that setting the date to begin negotiations would
be a difficult topic for the EU. For domestic political
reasons, he said, none of the states having referenda on the
EU Constitution want them to occur close to the start of
Turkish accession negotiations. Two window he suggested
might be possible were July, 2005 -- since it fell between
the spring and fall referenda, and January 2006.


6. (C) According to Swartbol, the EU would try not to tip
its hand until very close to the December 17 Council meeting.
Negotiations within the EU could well last until the day of
the Council itself, he added, but the GAERC prior to the
Council meeting would probably be the key decision point in
the next few months. (He noted, however, that the October 1
meeting between Schroeder and Chirac also bore close watching
on this issue.) In response to a question from the
Ambassador, Swartbol suggested that the U.S. could best help
the Turks during this period by encouraging Ankara to "play
by European rules." He stressed that after the Commission
report was released in October, the anti-accession movements
in Europe would become even more energized, and would seek to
exploit any Turkish missteps. Swartbol also noted that it
was important for the U.S. to recognize the delicacy of this
issue within the EU. When the October 6 report comes out,
for example, it would not be helpful for the U.S. to suggest
that the report forced a decision on the EU; on the other
hand, statements recognizing that the report provided a good
basis for the EU to consider the issue would not be unwelcome.

SOBEL