Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04THEHAGUE2388
2004-09-20 10:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

NETHERLANDS/EU: PETER CHASE VISIT HIGHLIGHTS US-EU

Tags:  NL 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002388 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2014
TAGS: NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU: PETER CHASE VISIT HIGHLIGHTS US-EU
ISSUES

Classified By: DCM Daniel Russel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002388

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2014
TAGS: NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU: PETER CHASE VISIT HIGHLIGHTS US-EU
ISSUES

Classified By: DCM Daniel Russel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: At meetings with the MFA on September 10,
Peter Chase
(EUR/ERA Director) heard that EU Member States see new
informal interest groups
forming around particular issues. This variable geometry
extends to EU
representation at the UN, where the EU's formal division of
competencies
continues to confuse outsiders. The Dutch believe Turkey is
on course to get a
"yes" to opening negotiations in December. Coordinating the
information flow
on counter-terrorism discussions at the Senior Level Group
remains a
challenge. The Dutch are committed to the Stakeholders
Dialogue process and
Innovation Conference but cannot speak for future EU
presidencies. We
reiterated our request that the Dutch encourage Member States
to conclude the
bilateral protocols for the US-EU Mutual Legal Assistance
Extradition
Agreements by the end of the year. End Summary.


2. (U) Jaap Werner, Director of Political Affairs at the
Dutch MFA, Marion
Kappeijne, Director of the North American Affairs, and Jos
Schellaars,
Kappeyne's deputy, met visiting EUR/ERA Director Peter Chase,
DCM, and Poloff
over lunch on September 10 to review a range of issues,
including EU dynamics,
the EU at the UN, Turkey (reported septel),the workings of
the Senior Level
Group, and the Stakeholders Dialogue. Chase separately met
with Marjorie Bonn
of the Department of Justice at a reception hosted by the
DCM.

EU Dynamics at 25
--------------


3. (C) Werner said the EU at 25 is finding that a more
assertive Solana,
anticipating his EU Foreign Minister role, is already
starting to provide more
centralized guidance in the common security and foreign
policy arena. Solana
sees his office as taking the lead on the Middle East,
Balkans, and ESDP
dossiers, and he apparently also wants to stretch out into
Africa, as evidenced
by the recent mission he sent to Sudan and his growing
general interest in
African issues.


4. (C) Werner noted the effect of the new EU 10 in CSFP and
how new ad hoc
groups are forming around certain dossiers, even if they do
not make up
majorities or blocking minorities. The EU 10 have little or
no relationship or
interest in Africa, which they leave to the "natural
coalition" of Belgium,
France, the UK, Germany and the Netherlands. On the other

hand, the EU 10
often coalesce around issues related to Russia, Belarus,
Ukraine, Moldova and
the Caucasus. For example, Latvia put Belarus on the GAERC
agenda, he noted.
On human rights, the Nordics remain like-minded, while the
southern EU members
tend to place human rights a little lower on the agenda. The
Benelux per se
will not be strong, Werner predicted. Finally, the "big
three " (UK, France,
Germany) still work closely together, sometimes to the point
of pushing
"pragmatic" Netherlands into the camp of Italy and Spain,
Werner concluded.

Turkey and the SLG
--------------


5. (C) On Turkey, Werner told Chase and the DCM that the
"trend is positive
toward a yes." The EU will still temporize, he added, noting
that the start of
negotiations will wait until the EU and Turkey work out in
what kind of format
they will address the raft of issues before them, a process
that could take
months in itself.


6. (C) Regarding the Senior Level Group (SLG),Marion
Kappeyne, director of
the MFA office of North American Affairs, suggested to the
DCM and Chase that
we could best use the SLG for keeping in touch on leading
issues, such as
BMENA. Werner suggested that action on BMENA would have to
await results from
the US-EU troika meeting in New York. Generally, the DCM
suggested that the
SLG should formulate follow-through plans for the most recent
Summit
Declaration. Chase suggested that smaller meetings of
principals, such as the
upcoming lunch between Undersecretary Larson and his Dutch
counterpart Frank
Majoor, should have limited, focused agendas, in this case,
the Middle East,
counter terrorism, and economic issues.

Counter-Terrorism
--------------


7. (C) On counter-terrorism, the DCM recalled USG interest
in
cross-pillarization and noted that the SLG has spun off a
sub-group on Border
Security (the "Political Dialogue on Border and
Transportation Security").
Both Chase and the DCM pointed to the need to look at the
architecture for
these discussions, particularly at the sub-cabinet level.
The DCM noted that
we need to "make sense of the feeder process for information
to the SLG,
Summits, and other meetings on CT." Werner said that the EU,
in COTER, has put
together a list of priority countries to whom they have
offered technical
assistance in combating terrorism. A team already visited
Morocco and Saudi
Arabia, and Algeria is next, he said.

EU in the UN
--------------


8. (C) The DCM asked how the US and EU can be effective and
not appear at
cross purposes in the UN. Specifically, we have trouble with
UNGA resolutions
on the Middle East whose sole purpose seems to be to generate
another USG
veto. This creates an atmosphere where it is impossible to
handle some UN
issues. He reminded the Dutch that every EU vote "has a long
tail" in the
UNGA. Werner recalled the recent UNGA resolution on the
Israeli security fence
and said that part of the deal was supposed to be
consolidation of UNGA Middle
East resolutions.


9. (C) With regard to dealing the EU at the UN, Werner
pointed out that
shifting competencies on particular subjects made it seem
necessary for EU
outsiders to deal with both the Commission and the Presidency
separately. Mr.
Chase countered that the issue of who speaks, Commission or
Presidency, is
frequently mixed up in New York, even in the EU, and needs
clarity for the EU's
partners such as the USG. Werner dryly observed that in a
matter of years, he
expects the issue will be resolved as the EU works toward a
unified external
representation.

Stakeholder Dialogue
--------------


10. (C) Chase recalled to Kappeyne that the USG sees the
Stakeholder Dialogue
and the Innovation Conference as positive developments
enhancing the U.S.-EU
relationship. How to maintain this momentum after the Dutch
Presidency,
however, remains a concern. Kappeyne assured Chase and the
DCM that "the
Netherlands is on board for the program," but could not make
promises for
future EU presidencies.

MLATS
--------------


11. (C) Chase spoke to Ministry of Justice's Marjorie Bonn
at a reception
hosted by the DCM the evening of September 10. Chase
stressed Washington's
desire for the Dutch to take an active role as EU president
to urge Member
States to conclude the bilateral protocols for the US-EU
Mutual Legal
Assistance Extradition Agreements by the end of the year.
(Note: Amb. Sobel
had made the same point to Justice Minister Donner in a
separate September 10
meeting. Donner and DG Visser said they plan to include a
call for the Member
States to work quickly to conclude the bilateral protocols in
the Minister's
opening remarks at the Informal JHA Council. End Note.)


12. (U) Mr. Chase cleared this message.
SOBEL