SEPT 13-14 GAERC: DISCUSSION WITH DUTCH OFFICIALS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002289

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2014
TAGS: PREL NL EUN
SUBJECT: SEPT 13-14 GAERC: DISCUSSION WITH DUTCH OFFICIALS

REF: A. STATE 193154


B. BISHARAT/SCHOFER E-MAIL

C. 9/8/04

Classified By: Polcouns A. Schofer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. Emboffs discussed Sept 13-14 GAERC agenda
and reftel subjects with MFA Political Affairs Department
Director Jaap Werner on September 8 and with MFA European
Correspondent Joep Wijnands on September 9. The Dutch
clearly signaled that EU member states on the IAEA board will
not support referral of the Iran issue to the UNSC. The
Dutch are committed to finding EU funds for the UN Protection
Force in Iraq despite technical and legal obstacles involving
the Commission. Other EU support activities for Iraq (police
training etc) are still in the process of being defined. The
Dutch anticipated no serious EU disagreements on Sudan/Darfur
or Bosnia. The upcoming GAERC will also discuss Belarus
(elections),African Great Lakes (probable support for
proposed reinforced UN role),and ASEM (formal endorsement of
Gymnich decision on Burmese participation). End summary.

Sudan/Darfur
--------------


2. (C) The EU agrees with the US about the need to maintain
international pressure on the Sudanese government to fulfill
its commitments. The GAERC will have sanctions "explicitly
on the table," which in practical terms means that the
ministers want to look at the options and have the ground
prepared to implement sanctions "immediately" if appropriate.
The EU wants to "reinforce" the African Union observer
mission in Darfur and support financially or logistically.
But the EU wants to respect AU and UN "ownership" of action
in Darfur and will await AU requests and/or UN decision
before acting. Werner added, however, that the EU will not
be passive in awaiting an invitation but will be in contact
with AU on needs.

Iran
--------------


3. (C) The GAERC will want to express concern about
developments in Iran not only with regard to the nuclear
issue but also human rights. However, the EU position will
not support a referral by the September IAEA Board of
Governors to the Security Council. Werner said that member
states -- including the UK, Germany, and France -- believed
it was too early and too risky to refer the issue to the
Security Council, particularly since the expected IAEA
report, taken alone, did not appear to justify such a step.
Werner suggested that the time until the November BOG meeting
should be used to intensify pressure on Iran to cooperate,
and to convince Russia and China not to block possible action
at the Security Council. Moving the issue to the Security
Council too soon, he said, would allow Iran to "get off the
hook" by ending its cooperation with the IAEA. Without a
"plan B," the international community would "lose its grip"
on the process and end up exerting even less pressure on
Iran. Wijnands separately expressed it as a member state
belief that referral in September "could make things worse"
but if by November there has been no movement from Iran, then
referral "would become a concrete option." Emboffs stressed
that the costs of failing to hold Iran to account were
mounting and argued that the international community sent the
wrong signal to Iran by not referring the issue to the
Security Council.

Iraq
--------------


4. (C) The Dutch officials said that the EU is leaning toward
providing significant financial support to the UN Protection
Force in Iraq, although they cautioned that the details
(including total figures) remained to be worked out. The
hitch that developed at the Gymnich over whether the funds
could come from the Commission or not was primarily a
technical issue, they said. Werner noted that the Dutch have
asked their own legal people to counter the Commission
argument that Commission funds cannot be used for "military
operations" -- so far, however, the Dutch legal advisors were
leaning toward accepting the Commission argument. Speaking a
day later, Wijnands seemed more definite, saying it appeared
that member states would have to come up with the money,
though some may still want to argue at the GAERC that the
protection force would not be a military operation. Werner
said the twenty million for election support is "locked in"
for that and could not be shifted to protection force
support. Both stressed that the Dutch, as EU president,
would continue to push member states to come up with the
necessary funds individually if Commission funds were not
available.


5. (C) Werner and Wijnands both said that they had "heard"
that states earlier identified as providing the 1,800
soldiers for the protection force might now be reluctant to
do so. The level of EU support for the force, they
suggested, might depend to some degree on whether the force
was viewed as a truly international, independent force or a
subset of the MNF. Drawing from refs, poloffs stressed that
a number of states have offered to provide troops if the
costs were met by a third party, such as the EU.


6. (C) The GAERC will move ahead with endorsing the
conclusions of the EU's exploratory mission (already
informally endorsed at the Gymnich) calling for EU support
for police training, civil administration, rule of law, and
elections. The Commission is to come up with specific
proposals in these areas, but these will probably not be
ready for Council review until the October GAERC. Werner and
Wijnand predicted that any election observers would most
likely be made available by member states rather than the
Commission given the Commission's concerns regarding
security, although Werner noted that this could change if the
security situation improved. Werner reiterated that FM Bot
had invited Iraqi PM Allawi to address the November 5
European Council meeting, and said that the Dutch also hoped
to receive Iraqi President Ghazi al-Yawer in The Hague during
his current European tour. (Note: If al-Yawer does not come
to The Hague, then FM Bot would try to meet him in Brussels
when both are there next week. End Note.)

Other GAERC issues: Belarus, African Great Lakes, and ASEM
-------------- --------------


7. (C) According to Wijnands, ministers will use the occasion
of the GAERC to remind Belarus that the October 17
parliamentary elections should be "free and fair", as should
the planned referendum on a constitution amendment that would
permit Lukachenko to continue as president. On the Great
Lakes, the ministers will discuss the situation and the UN
Secretary General's proposals for reinforcing the MONUC in

SIPDIS
the Congo. At the Gymnich the ministers basically concluded
that the EU should be ready to contribute more, either money
or manpower, because the situation threatens stability not
only in the Congo, but in the region. On ASEM, the GAERC is
expected to endorse formally the "package" that was approved
at the Gymnich that will permit the ASEM to proceed with
Burmese participation at the minister level. (Note: On
ASEM, Werner noted that the French -- who had not been
present at the Gymnich discussion -- had posed some
"technical" concerns regarding the package, but he did not
expect these to prevent the GAERC from endorsing the
compromise. End Note.)

SOBEL