NETHERLANDS/IRAQ: EU EXPLORATORY MISSION REPORT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002205

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2014
TAGS: PREL IZ NL EUN
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/IRAQ: EU EXPLORATORY MISSION REPORT TO
FOREIGN MINISTERS AT GYMNICH

REF: A. THE HAGUE 1935

B. THE HAGUE 2172

C. BAGHDAD 756

Classified By: POLCOUNS ANDREW J. SCHOFER FOR REASONS 1.4(B) and (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The EU exploratory mission to Iraq will
report its findings and present a long list of "options" for
supporting Iraqi reconstruction to the September 3-4 Gymnich,
according to its Dutch chair. The Dutch hope that the
mission's report will spur the EU to take a more active role
in supporting Iraqi reconstruction, especially in the areas
of "civilian crisis management," which include election
support, police training, civil administration, rule of law,
and human rights. EU involvement on the ground will start
relatively small and build up gradually, with an emphasis on
"quality" (i.e., niche value-added) over "quantity." END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) On September 2, DCM received a comprehensive readout
of the EU's three-day "exploratory mission" to Iraq from
Herman Schaper, Dutch MFA Deputy Political Director.
Schaper, who chaired the mission in his EU presidency
capacity, stressed that the mission had been "exploratory"
and therefore set out "options" rather than recommendations.
The mission's report, which would be circulated at the
September 3-4 Gymnich informal meeting of EU foreign
ministers, contained a long list of options which could serve
as the basis for concrete proposals. Schaper anticipated
that the September 13 GAERC formal meeting of foreign
ministers would endorse the findings of the exploratory
mission and hopefully authorize a second fact-finding
experts' mission to Iraq to develop a plan of action. The
November 5 EU Council meeting -- to which Iraqi Prime
Minister Allawi has been invited -- could then serve as an
action-forcer leading the EU to put the plan of action
quickly into effect.


3. (C) Schaper noted (as have other Dutch interlocutors, per
ref b) that the EU Commission and Council Secretariat had
earlier been seen as reluctant to engage aggressively on
Iraq, despite clear guidance that the EU intended to take a
more active role in reconstruction. He left no doubt that
the Dutch presidency had been the driving force behind the
exploratory mission. The decision to have FM Bot accompany
the mission into Iraq, and to staff it at a relatively high
level, had been deliberately intended to shame the Commission
and Secretariat into more active participation. Schaper
expressed satisfaction that the positive experience of the
mission would encourage the EU to play a more constructive
role in Iraq both politically and practically. In his view,
the mission succeeded both in bringing all relevant EU
elements "on board" and in pushing the process of Iraqi
reconstruction forward significantly. He added that the
Dutch were actively pursuing several tracks with regard to
Iraq, which included strengthening political contacts through
high-level visits and exchanges and providing
financial/economic support (including possible debt relief)
in addition to supporting civilian reconstruction.


4. (C) The options contained in the exploratory missions
report generally fell into the area of "civilian crisis
management," according to Schaper, which he further divided
into five sub-categories:

- Police Support (including training)
- Rule of Law
- Human Rights
- Civilian Administration
- Election Support.

In all these areas, Schaper said, the commission recommended
that any EU involvement take into account the following
criteria:

- Does it respond to an actual Iraqi need?
- Does it provide concrete added value (i.e., no duplication
of effort)?
- Is it complementary to what others are already doing and
part of a coherent program?
- Does it reflect real EU capacities (esp. since member
states' participation will be voluntary)?
- Will the security situation allow it?
- Is it politically relevant/visible as an EU project?
- Is it practical in budget terms?


5. (C) Schaper stressed that several of the options listed in
the mission report went beyond the strict mandate of the
mission but reflected suggestions made by Iraqi and
international contacts during the visits. He noted the EU
was especially interested in finding "niches" where its
unique capabilities could be most effectively utilized:
"quality not quantity." In that context, Schaper cautioned
that the EU's involvement in Iraq on the ground would
probably start small and increase gradually; it would not be
realistic to expect "50 to 100" EU trainers to begin work in
the next few months, for example, but a few "tens" might be
possible. The exploratory mission, he added, had not taken
up the issue of "reflagging" existing programs (such as the
training program in Jordan) so the options in the report were
all new.


6. (C) According to Schaper, some of the specific options
outlined in the mission report include:

- Specialized police training (forensics/crime scene
investigation, border police, customs, senior-level officer
capacity building);
- Human rights/rule of law training support for the Ministry
of Justice (training of judges, prosecutors, lawyers):
- Assistance to the Iraqi special tribune (including in the
area of exhumation of mass graves);
- Establishment of a center for the promotion of Human Rights
and Democratization;
- Election support, including the funding and training of
observers (NOTE: Schaper stressed that on this issue, in
particular, the European Commission would take the lead on
developing proposals. End Note)


7. (C) Schaper noted that although security/military issues
were not part of the exploratory mission's mandate, the
mission had also discussed with U.S. interlocutors in Baghdad
the possibility of helping Iraq develop effective
import/export controls and assistance in demobilizing and
disarming militias. He stressed that the mission had gone to
Baghdad without a particular agenda, but had solicited input
from all sources. In that context, Schaper said he was
particularly appreciative of the thoughtful proposals the
mission had received from U.S. mission personnel in Baghdad.
Schaper also had an opportunity to discuss the EU mission's
approach with Dutch Air Force Major General Carel Hilderink,
who chaired the recent NATO Training Implementation Mission
in Iraq (ref c) and stressed that every effort would be made
to ensure that the two missions reports were complementary
rather than duplicative.



RUSSEL