Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04THEHAGUE2188
2004-09-01 15:37:00
SECRET
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

NETHERLANDS/IRAQ: MAINTAINING MULTINATIONAL

Tags:  PREL OPDC MOPS MARR IZ NL 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002188 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2014
TAGS: PREL OPDC MOPS MARR IZ NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/IRAQ: MAINTAINING MULTINATIONAL
FORCES IN IRAQ

REF: A. STATE 185525

B. THE HAGUE 2154

C. THE HAGUE 2055

D. THE HAGUE 1566

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE DANIEL R. RUSSEL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B
AND D)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002188

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2014
TAGS: PREL OPDC MOPS MARR IZ NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/IRAQ: MAINTAINING MULTINATIONAL
FORCES IN IRAQ

REF: A. STATE 185525

B. THE HAGUE 2154

C. THE HAGUE 2055

D. THE HAGUE 1566

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE DANIEL R. RUSSEL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B
AND D)


1. (S) Summary: PolCouns and PolMilOff delivered ref A
points to Dutch MFA Security Policy Director Maurits Jochems
and MOD General Policy Director Lo Casteleijn in separate
meetings on August 31. While the current Dutch deployment in
Iraq is scheduled to run through March 15, 2005, the GONL is
not currently planning to extend it. According to both
Jochems and Casteleijn, the August 14 killing of a Dutch MP
in an ambush in Rumaythah seriously disturbed Defense
Minister Kamp. They claimed the local population, with whom
the Dutch have taken pains to develop good relations, had
advance knowledge of the attack yet did not warn them. Both
local British and Japanese colleagues have received similar
messages from these interlocutors. While Kamp has publicly
stated that the current Dutch deployment would not be renewed
after March (ref B),Jochems felt that the door was not
completely closed on a possible Dutch presence after that
date. Casteleijn also allowed that Kamp had not "absolutely"
ruled out a further extension, but cautioned that a U.S. push
at this point would not be productive. PolCouns urged both
not to lock the GONL into an exact date of departure as it
would only play into hands of those seeking to take advantage
of the situation. End Summary.


2. (S) PolCouns and PolMilOff discussed ref A points with MFA
Security Policy Director Maurits Jochems and MOD General
Policy Director Lo Casteleijn in separate meetings on August

31. Jochems said Defense Minister Kamp had reacted strongly
to the killing of a Dutch military police sergeant on August
14 in an ambush in Rumaythah (ref C). Apparently Kamp
believed that the local population had had advance knowledge
of the attack but did not warn the Dutch. According to
Jochems, Kamp had taken this as a personal affront, given
Dutch efforts to build good relations with the locals, and
this had been reflected in his public comments. Jochems

stressed that Kamp's statement that the Dutch deployment
would not be extended past next March did not reflect a
considered government position and, in his estimation, had
not received significant press coverage. He expressed hope
that Ministers would not make any further such statements.
Concerning the current security situation, the Dutch Polad in
Al Muthanna had told him that the recent agreement in Najaf
had helped "enormously" with local tensions, given the mainly
Shi'a population of the province. Jochems felt it was "too
early to tell" whether it would be possible to renew the
Dutch deployment beyond March. He said MFA PolDir Siblesz
had reminded Kamp in a recent meeting that Dutch personnel
were present at the request of the Iraqi Interim Government
and the UN; the attitude of the local population toward Dutch
troops was not the only (or even most important) factor in
determining Dutch actions. Jochems said that even if the
main Dutch deployment were to end as scheduled, there might
still be continued Dutch involvement depending on the shape
of NATO and EU operations at the time.


3. (S) MOD General Policy Director Lo Casteleijn stressed
that Kamp had been "really offended" by the August 14
incident, as he had believed the Dutch had been successful in
establishing an atmosphere of "mutual trust" with the locals.
While the recent agreement in Najaf would hopefully lower
tensions, he noted, armed Al Sadr followers might yet
disperse and cause further trouble, including for the Dutch.
Casteleijn said MOD viewed March 15 as the end date for the
Dutch deployment and were planning accordingly. (He warned,
however, that a dramatic deterioration of the situation would
create pressure for an even earlier departure.) Casteleijn
stressed that the original Dutch plan (prior to the August 14
attack) had been to transfer primary responsibility for
security in the area to Iraqi authorities in January; the
Dutch "exit strategy" now assumed that a follow-on, non-Dutch
MNF presence would need to be in Al Muthanna after March. He
thought it might be possible the UK or another nation would
be prepared to replace the Dutch in this role, and said the
Dutch would coordinate with the UK on a force generation
event this fall. Casteleijn allowed that a continued Dutch
presence in Iraq might be possible through an expanded NATO
mission or other "new" configuration of forces. He stressed,
however, that any effort to put pressure on Kamp at this time
to continue the Dutch deployment in Iraq would be
counter-productive. PolCouns urged Casteleijn against
locking the GONL into a specific date for departure as that
would only play into the hands of those who are seeking to
exploit the situation. Casteleijn agreed to take the message
to Kamp and observed that Kamp had not used words like
"absolute" in ruling out a possible further Dutch extension
in his public statements.


4. (S) Comment: The Dutch are currently committed to remain
in Iraq through the upcoming elections, a position FM Bot
publicly reiterated during his August 29 visit to Baghdad.
While a premature Dutch pullout is possible, it is highly
unlikely absent a dramatic deterioration in the security
situation (the legacy of the 1995 debacle in Srebrenica is
always in the back of Dutch minds). It is clear, that the
August 14 ambush has clearly rattled Kamp. Local British and
Japanese colleagues received similar impressions from these
same interlocutors in recent days. In view of Casteleijn's
explicit caution, it would be unproductive to push Kamp too
hard right now on an extension past March until tempers cool.
When the current deployment was renewed for eight months
last June, GONL Ministers did not explicitly rule out an
extension past March 2005 under "exceptional circumstances"
(ref D). The recent ambush has made such a renewal
considerably more difficult but not impossible, especially if
tensions in southern Iraq lessen. A "new" Dutch deployment
as part of an expanded NATO or other international presence
is also a distinct possibility we should explore at the
proper time. In renewing their current deployment back in
June, the Dutch were keenly sensitive to requests from the
Iraqi Interim Government and the UN. Such requests would be
critical to any further extensions. End Comment.
RUSSEL