Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04THEHAGUE1967
2004-08-05 13:28:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WEEKLY WRAP-UP

Tags:  PARM PREL CWC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 THE HAGUE 001967 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR JOECK
WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WEEKLY WRAP-UP
FOR 6 AUGUST 2004

This is CWC-91-04.

-------
Summary
-------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 THE HAGUE 001967

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR JOECK
WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WEEKLY WRAP-UP
FOR 6 AUGUST 2004

This is CWC-91-04.

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (U) A recent trip by the Director General proved
uneventful and produced little or nothing in terms of
substantive results - an outcome considered very successful
by the DG. The OPCW Chief of Cabinet Raphael Grossi
expounded on a number of personnel issues, most notably
appealing for a solid US candidate for the position of Head
of Industrial Verification, to replace the outgoing Don
Clagett - an appeal seconded a few days later by Deputy
Director General Brian Hawtin.


2. (U) While the Libyan initiative for a technical change to
permit the conversion of Rabta has largely fallen prey to the
summer doldrums in The Hague, planning and lobbying by the
delegation continues and the prospects for approval appear as
sound as at any point so far. France's position may/may be
softening, and the delegation is making an active effort to
identify potential problem delegations in advance of EC-38
with an eye to initiating a dialogue with those who may not
be fully supportive. Thus far only Pakistan has indicated
they have a significant problem, though India will require
further attention in the coming weeks, as the signals from
them to date leave it unclear whether they have or will cause
significant problems.


3. (U) The effort by the delegation to begin establishing a
relationship with personnel at the Iraqi Embassy has been
placed on temporary hold, at the request of the Iraqis
pending the arrival of their new Ambassador in September.

--------------
Grossi on DG's Trip to Tehran
--------------


4. (U) On Tuesday, 27 June Deloff met with OPCW Chief of
Cabinet Raphael Grossi to discuss a range of issues,
including his understanding of the state of play with Libya's
request for a technical amendment.


5. (U) The conversation began with a debrief by Grossi of
the Director General's (DG)recent trip to Iran. During an
earlier conversation, Grossi indicated that the Iranians had
pressed the DG quite insistently to come to Tehran for a
visit. Reluctant but unable to decline without giving
offense, the DG agreed to a whirlwind trip in which he

arrived late on a Friday night, engaged in two meetings on
Saturday, and departed on Sunday. The overriding concern by
the DG was the prospect of a media circus, which, in the
event, did not materialize.


6. (U) Grossi's description of both meetings was that they
were pro forma and largely non-substantive. Iranian hosts
said nothing provocative except the obligatory comments, in
response to the DG's admonitions about promoting universality
in the region, that Israel continues to be the obstruction.

--------------
Grossi on Personnel Issues
--------------


7. (U) On the subject of OPCW consultants, it was clear
Grossi had arrived at the meeting with the objective of
defending the DG's apparent decision to extend the contract
of South Korean consultant Chong. Chong has been working on
the issue of promoting universality on the Korean peninsula
for approximately one and one half years, and it appears he
will continue for the foreseeable future. The DG recently
returned from a trip to Seoul where it became clear to him,
according to Grossi, that Chong was wired in at very senior
levels of the Korean government. This placement, along with
the important objective of eventually gaining North Korea's
accession to the Convention, warranted Chong's further
retention. It is the DG's view that Chong is definitely
adding value (Note: Deloff viewed this as an effort to
justify a political decision taken by the DG. Chong's
contributions to the organization have been questionable
since he began his work. He appears to be extremely
conscientious and industrious, but the
portfolio he has been assigned makes it far from clear, and
indeed Grossi offered no substantive evidence, that anything
substantive is being done and that Chong therefore
"continues" to add value.) The consultants retained to work
on universality in Latin America and on optimization of
verification at demilitarization facilities, will not have
their contracts renewed. To emphasize, French consultant
Gregoire Diamantides will return to the OPCW for a few weeks
to finalize his report on optimization in Russia, and will
then end his tenure at the OPCW. Grossi accented these
non-renewals apparently to bolster the case for the decision
to retain Chong.


8. (U) Grossi availed himself of the opportunity to do some
repair work after the discord created when delegates were
informed during the course of budget discussions that Chong's
work was classified and very sensitive and that they could
therefore not be briefed about it, as they had requested.
Grossi allowed that this had clearly been the wrong answer,
and that it would be rectified. Chong would, in fact,
provide the requisite briefing when the issue came up again,
presumably during the next round of budget discussions.


9. (U) Continuing with personnel issues, Grossi lamented the
loss of the American head of industry inspections, Don
Clagett to the tenure policy. He appealed once again for a
strong US candidate and noted that UK had proposed Steve Wade
as a national candidate and is apparently pressing the DG
quite hard for Wade's acceptance. Deloff assured him the US
was searching diligently for a solid candidate and that in
fact a few extremely good ones had been identified. The
remaining question was whether the individuals in question
were interested. In any case, we would continue to work to
get an applicant(s) in front of them to consider. A few days
later, delegation received the same appeal from Deputy
Director General Brian Hawtin, who noted the closeout of the
extended date for candidates was October 25th and, therefore,
time was of the essence.


10. (U) In a somewhat strange turn of the conversation,
Grossi expounded at length the virtues of acting Head of the
Inspection Directorate Jose Carvalho. He particularly
highlighted the sense of allegiance and cooperation Carvalho
had shown during implementation of the tenure policy, in
sharp contrast to some other senior staff members, notably
Horst Reeps. Carvalho had shown no resistance to carrying
out the staff turnovers demanded by the tenure decision and
had carried out the process in a very professional and
reasoned manner. Further singing his praises, Grossi noted
that when he had been informed of the recent decision to hire
Japanese incumbent Akiyama to head the Inspection
Directorate, and the attendant removal of Carvalho as acting
head, Carvalho's response had been to express gratitude for
the opportunity to fill the position for the time he had been
given.

--------------
Rabta
--------------


11. (SBU) In a brief exchange regarding the Libyans' request
for a technical change, Grossi confided (please closely
protect) that in a conversation with French delegate Sophie
Moal-Makame, she informed him that he "should be optimistic"
about the fate of the request. There would be problems along
the way, but eventually a "good outcome". Grossi had taken
this to mean the France would, in the event, come around.
Grossi also said that in conversations with the Chinese
delegation, it seemed clear that China would not cause any
trouble on this issue. He did not expect the Indians to be a
problem either, but said they might look for some kind of
language to the effect that the decision "does not set a
precedent", though it was not clear what precedent it
wouldn't set.


12. (U) Delegation also attempted contact with the Indians
to discuss their views on Rabta, but was unable due to the
Summer holiday season. Delegation will attempt to schedule
the meeting later in August when the Indian delegate
responsible for the issue will have returned.

13. (U) At delegation's request, Ambassador Javits contacted
Pakistani Ambassador Kazi to gauge Pakistan's likely response
to the Libyan proposed technical change. In an unexpected
turn, Kazi expressed extreme dislike for Libyans and
agitation that Libya had not bothered to approach Pakistan to
discuss the initiative. Kazi referred to unspecified "raw
wounds" between Libya and Pakistan as the basis for his
dislike and indicated that an effort would have to be made to
overcome that baggage. More substantively, Pakistan had no
problem with the principle of converting Rabta but they may
have problems with the mechanism of a technical change. The
change being sought may require an Amendment Conference.
Delegation intends to follow up with the Pakistan delegation
to gain a clearer view of their position and to suggest to
Libya that they make a clear political effort to engage
Pakistan.


14. (U) During a discussion in the delegate's lounge at the
OPCW, deloff overheard half of a phone conversation between
the Director of Chemical Demilitarization Jerzy Mazur, and
German Ambassador Alexander Olbrich. The thrust of the
conversation was that Olbrich was attempting to gain some
background and understanding about the status of equipment at
Rabta, specifically whether it had been "secured" by the TS.
In addition, Olbrich was trying to determine whether the TS
considered it appropriate for Germany to send a team to Libya
to examine the CW facilities there. Mazur assured him the
equipment was under OPCW tags and seals and that the question
of a trip to Libya was between Libya and Germany. There was
nothing Mazur knew of from a Convention standpoint that
prevented it. Delegation believes it is likely that Germany
is or will be in the near future, planning such a trip.

--------------
Iraq
--------------


15. (U) At Washington's prompting, delegation began pursuing
a dialogue with the Iraqi Embassy here in The Hague to
establish lines of communication, establish relationships,
and to identify who locally would be working OPCW issues. In
preparation, delegation discussed the issue with the UK
delegation which, in turn, contacted the Iraqis. While very
engaging, the Iraqi Embassy personnel UK spoke with indicated
they are in the midst of rotating in a new Ambassador and
until he or she arrived they did not want to engage on such
issues, even superficially. They anticipated having their
new Ambassador in place in September, and delegation will
renew the initiative with them shortly thereafter.

--------------
Pine Bluff DG Verification Plan
--------------


16. (U) In a series of discussions, delegation sought to
clarify with TS personnel the nature of the concern that
drove the TS to include certain items of equipment in Table 2
of its draft Verification Plan for the Pine Bluff Arsenal DF
Production Facility. TS concerns were related to its
practical ability to confirm the destruction of these items
of equipment, specifically to have adequate "before" and
"after" photographs of the equipment upon which to make a
sound determination of their destruction. In the course of
the discussions, delegation and TS were able to agree that
photographs taken of this equipment under the regimen for
"standard, various" equipment would in fact provide the
necessary tools to confirm destruction, and the TS removed
the contentious items of equipment from Table 2.

--------------
Article VII Meetings
--------------


17. (U) Del met with Art. VII facilitator (Matthews, UK),
Trapp and Bauta (TS) on 28 July to exchange information
regarding bilateral assistance activities pursuant to the
Art. VII Action Plan. As directed, del provided copies of
the US Demarche Status 2004 noting that the copies are not
intended for public dissemination. Other than reviewing
outstanding requests for assistance listed on the status
report, very little new information was exchanged. The TS
continues to push States Parties to provide specific requests
for assistance and indicated they would circulate an updated
table with more detailed information regarding requests
received. The TS (Bauta) again, asked the del whether the US
could provide a web-developer on a cost-free basis to assist
the TS to get the Art. VII/National Authorities collaboration
website online. The TS also inquired whether the US was
willing to provide cash, in terms of voluntary contributions,
to States Parties to assist in national implementation. Del
informed the TS that, while no options are off the table, US
offers of assistance would need to be tied to specific
requests and specific, monitorable, results. Del continued
that, at this point in time, the US continues to focus its
assistance efforts towards information assistance via
bilateral visits, exchanges and training with national
authority personnel or with the TS rather than through
voluntary monetary contributions.


18. (U) On 29 July, the facilitator held consultations on
the implementation status of the Article VII Action Plan.
Discussions were sparsely attended, netting primarily the
WEOG and Asian States Parties extending offers of assistance.
Discussions were also largely one-way. The bulk of
discussions were the TS informed dels of increased
transparency measures planned relative to their efforts to
match donors and recipients. In particular, the facilitator
indicated he would be conducting bilateral exchanges, like
those conducted on 28 July, with donor countries four times
before CSP 10. The facilitator will set dates for the next
round of bilats tentatively in September. As a follow-on to
the successful Universality Action Plan discussions held
recently in Brussels, the TS (Trapp) also reviewed the
planned London Art. VII consultations set for 1 Sept. to
discuss Art. VII implementation with delegations not resident
in The Hague but present in Brussels. The TS also reviewed,
in general terms, the types of potential assistance donor
countries offered during bilateral discussions with the
facilitator and the TS on 28 July (TS talking points faxed
back to AC/CB). Del requested the TS to consider circulating
a more detailed, comprehensive, list of requests received to
facilitate offers of assistance. Del noted that offers of
specific assistance are difficult to obtain in capitols
without specific justification. The TS noted they would
compile and circulate a more informative list of requests
received. In closing, the facilitator reviewed that the next
round of Art. VII consultations would be scheduled the week
of 12 Sept to coincide with the Industry Intersessionals.


--------------
ICA Bilat
--------------


19. (U) TS reps Davahle and Kisslev (ICA) requested to meet
with del on 4 Aug to discuss Art. VII ICA assistance
activities. Specifically, ICA requested U.S. assistance in
encouraging African countries to submit applications to
attend the Second Regional Meeting of National Authorities
scheduled for 19 and 20 Oct 2004 in Harare, Zimbabwe.
Davahle indicated that no countries have signed up to attend
this meeting and the closing date, 17 Aug, is rapidly
approaching. Davahle indicated the TS can support 20-25
participants to this event. Second, ICA requests that the
U.S. apply "political" pressure to four countries the TS
considers close to adopting national legislation in the
Pacific Rim: Cook Islands, Fiji, Palau and Kiribati. The TS
is approaching the U.S., Australia and New Zealand in
requesting to approach these countries to help push along
legislation adoption efforts. In each case, the TS
understands that the draft legislation is complete, has been
reviewed by the TS, but that the domestic drafters have
informed the TS that there is a lack of legislative interest
in movement on the text. The TS provided specific points of
contact in each of the countries for reference (faxed back to
AC/CB 5 Aug 2004). Third, the TS requested U.S. assistance
in generating a 2-3 page outreach paper designed to inform
States Parties on how to assemble a National Authority, using
lessons learned from the U.S. experience. ICA views this
document as helpful in identifying for States Parties lacking
National Authorities the necessary skill sets, personnel and
interagency coordination procedures necessary to establish a
functional National Authority. Fourth, ICA, again, requested
U.S. assistance, via a cost-free expert, to establish an
online Art. VII and National Authority coordination website.

--------------
Schedule of Upcoming Meetings
--------------


20. (U) There are currently no official meetings schedule
for the duration of the month of August.


21. (U) To facilitate advance notification of scheduled
meetings and consultations, del is working to establish an
AC/CB link to the del's internal electronic calendar on the
OpenNet. This electronic calendar contains the time/date for
upcoming del events, attendee(s),and del notes regarding the
event and includes links to electronic documents, if
available.


22. (U) Kellogg sends.
RUSSEL