EMBASSY THE HAGUE SECURITY MEASURES: PROMISE OF

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 001954

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT. FOR DS/ER/CC, DS/ITA, DS/IP/EUR, EUR/UBI
BRUSSELS FOR LEGATT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2014
TAGS: ASEC PTER NL
SUBJECT: EMBASSY THE HAGUE SECURITY MEASURES: PROMISE OF
GOOD NEWS ON AUGUST 5

REF: A. (A) STATE 166129

B. (B) THE HAGUE 1294

C. (C) THE HAGUE 1293

D. (D) THE HAGUE 1915

E. (E) THE HAGUE 1913

F. (F) THE HAGUE 1904

G. (G) THE HAGUE 1847

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DANIEL R. RUSSEL FOR REASON 1.5 (B) an
d (D).


1. (C) The Dutch security "triangle" chaired by National
Coordinator for Security Jonge Vos and including
representatives from the Ministries of Interior, Justice,
Foreign Affairs, Defence, and AVID (security service)),met
late August 4 to review Embassy The Hague security. The
results of the meeting are strictly embargoed until Thursday,
August 5, when the written report will be prepared and
presented first to the local authorities in The Hague and
then to the U.S. Embassy. However, Charge learned
unofficially from participants in the meeting -- in strict
confidence -- that the triangle endorsed the request in
Embassy's July 30 dip note (Ref B) -- reinforced by DAS
Davies meeting with Dutch DCM the same day (Ref A). Embassy
source shared in confidence that the Triangle agreed to
invoke Article 16 of the Dutch Police law, which permits the
central authorities to issue a written "advisory notice' to
the local government (which under Dutch law has nearly
absolute discretion on matters of public safety). The
advisory will call on the City of The Hague to take increased
measures specifically to strengthen the anti-ram traffic
barriers next to the embassy -- "in the shortest possible
timeframe." CDA was told that "this time we really mean
business" and the city authorities are expected to comply
"promptly." Jonge Vos' office separately said he would be in
touch with Charge directly before the end of the day August 5
to convey the official decision, and underscored that no
information could be provided to the USG until the city had
first been informed. We expect to get a better sense on
Thursday what the likely timeframe would be for constructing
a concrete or metal barrier and any other improvements.


2. (S/NF) Embassy has used recent surveillance incidents
(refs C,D,E,F) to push hard for a reversal of the Triangle
position that a decision on security upgrades should be left
to the City of the Hague. In the preceding 72 hours, Charge,
RSO and Ambassador Sobel (from overseas) had frequently met
or phoned all senior decision-makers in the Dutch government
to press for action on an anti-ram barrier as a top priority,
as well as additional security measures previously requested
by the embassy. Our contacts emphasized they were building a
rationale for taking new measures as required by the arcane
and complex Dutch system. ORCA reinforced with AIVD the
serious nature of surveillance incidents and provided
information regarding upgrade in threat levels in the U.S. as
well. In the Dutch security system (hopefully to be revised
by early 2005 per ref G),triangle security decisions rest
heavily on AIVD judgment of the explicit threat against a
particular facility. In the event, it appears that the
triangle concluded that the direct threats against the
embassy were insufficient to elevate its status from the
current "high" to "critical." However, they did agree that
there was justification for issuing the advisory to provide
elevated protection within the "high" category.
RUSSEL