Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04THEHAGUE1935
2004-08-03 11:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

DUTCH A/POL DIRECTOR ON IRAQ: TERRORISM STATEMENT,

Tags:  PREL OPDC MOPS MARR IZ NL EUN NATO 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001935 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2014
TAGS: PREL OPDC MOPS MARR IZ NL EUN NATO
SUBJECT: DUTCH A/POL DIRECTOR ON IRAQ: TERRORISM STATEMENT,
EU AND NATO MISSIONS, RECONSTRUCTION IN AL MUTHANNA
PROVINCE

REF: A. (A) STATE 167045 (NOTAL)

B. (B) AUGUST 2 DAVIES-RUSSEL TELCON AND EMAILS

C. (C) STATE 165043 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel R. Russel for reason 1.5 (b).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001935

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2014
TAGS: PREL OPDC MOPS MARR IZ NL EUN NATO
SUBJECT: DUTCH A/POL DIRECTOR ON IRAQ: TERRORISM STATEMENT,
EU AND NATO MISSIONS, RECONSTRUCTION IN AL MUTHANNA
PROVINCE

REF: A. (A) STATE 167045 (NOTAL)

B. (B) AUGUST 2 DAVIES-RUSSEL TELCON AND EMAILS

C. (C) STATE 165043 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel R. Russel for reason 1.5 (b).


1. (SBU) Terrorism Declaration: CDA contacted Dutch MFA
A/Political Director Herman Schaper late August 2 and got
confirmation that the Netherlands would support and release
the Coalition Terrorism Declaration. Early August 3, A/Pol
Couns provided ref A points to MFA Security Policy Director
Maurits Jochems. Jochems confirmed FM Bot had no problems
with the substance of the statement and that the MFA planned
to publish the statement on its website concurrent with other
partners on August 4. Jochems noted the slight textual
changes between the versions of the statement as conveyed
refs A and C. He termed these changes "improvements8 and
said he would convey the revised ref A version to FM Bot.


2. (C) EU Mission to Iraq: Schaper said that the Dutch are
pushing hard to organize the exploratory mission agreed to at
the July 12-13 GAERC with Iraqi FM Zebari, despite foot
dragging by the Commission and resistance by "certain
members" (i.e. France, Germany, Belgium). The Dutch have
penciled in August 28-29 as a window for FM Bot to visit
Baghdad. This would allow him to report back firsthand to
the Gymnich meeting of Foreign Ministers on September 3 and
put some force behind his recommendations for accelerating
and expanding the EU's role in Iraq. Seeing value in giving
the mission a high profile, the Dutch are hoping to persuade
Solana to accompany the FM. Schaper said he would accompany
the Minister (who will be on his way back from Indonesia) and
planned to stay on in Iraq for a few days to flesh out
details of the proposal to EU FM's. He was sharply critical
of the Commission's timidity about the mission, saying that
in a conversation Friday he had "shamed" Patten's chief of
staff who had assumed that due to security concerns, Schaper

would delegate the visit to a junior member of his staff.
While Iraq is Bot's "first priority," Schaper said that
events in Darfur might require that the FM go to Sudan in
late August vice Iraq. In that case, they had a second
window for travel -- September 8-9, which was still in
advance of the GAERC on the 13th, although it missed the
Gymnich.


3. (C) NATO training mission in Iraq: Schaper said that the
appointment of Dutch Air Force Maj. Gen. Hilderink, RNLAF
(currently Commandant of the Military Academy at Breda) as
chief of the NATO training mission was well received in the
GoNL and would be quite helpful politically and in terms of
good EU-NATO coordination. He said he knew Hilderink well
and would meet with him before the General departed to
coordinate. The Dutch are keen to ensure that there is a
complementary and cooperative division of labor between NATO
military training and EU police training in Iraq. Schaper
said that (unfortunately) it appeared unlikely the MFA would
be able to assign a Dutch POLAD to Hilderink because they
were "running short" of suitable candidates who know the
Middle East well and speak Arabic. Separately, MOD sources
spoke highly of Hilderink to Acting PolCouns, describing him
as an activist, and noting that in addition to his training
background, he also has international and operational
experience having been heavily involved in Bosnia policy as
Dutch MOD operations chief from 1995-1997.


4. (C) Reconstruction in Al-Muthanna Province: Schaper said
that the Dutch MOD reported a serious and growing problem
among the Iraqis in the Al-Muthanna Province where the Dutch
battalion is deployed. With the dissolution of the CPA and
the phasing out of the "commanders' program" (that provided
quick funding for small local projects at the discretion of
local commanders),money for reconstruction in the province
is drying up. The Dutch military sees growing concern and
resentment from the populace and reports an uptick in
complaints that the MNF is doing nothing to promote
prosperity and civil reconstruction. Local concern about
economic stagnation is beginning to poison the previous good
relations between the Dutch military and the population. The
Dutch mission is strictly security and the GONL has no
reconstruction programs or funds for Iraq. Nevertheless, as
the face of the international community in the province, the
peacekeepers are being held to account. Schaper said he
regretted that the question had been posed in Washington by
the Dutch embassy in terms of "where is the money that Amb.
Bremer promised us?" The real question, he clarified, is:
Who in the USG should we be talking to -- either in
Washington or Baghdad -- in order to get a better
understanding of what to expect in the future in terms of
civil reconstruction funding in the province? CDA promised
to seek guidance from Washington.


5. Baghdad minimize considered.




RUSSEL