Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04THEHAGUE1916
2004-07-30 12:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

DUTCH PRESIDENCY REPLY ON BURMA/ASEM MESSAGE

Tags:  PREL PHUM NL BM 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001916 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2014
TAGS: PREL PHUM NL BM
SUBJECT: DUTCH PRESIDENCY REPLY ON BURMA/ASEM MESSAGE

REF: A. STATE 157147


B. THE HAGUE 1836

Classified By: POL Counselor Andrew Schofer for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001916

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2014
TAGS: PREL PHUM NL BM
SUBJECT: DUTCH PRESIDENCY REPLY ON BURMA/ASEM MESSAGE

REF: A. STATE 157147


B. THE HAGUE 1836

Classified By: POL Counselor Andrew Schofer for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Dutch Presidency Special Envoy Hans van den
Broek was reportedly pleased with the results his recent trip
to Hanoi, Bangkok, Beijing and Tokyo to resolve the current
impasse regarding Burmese participation in the upcoming
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). The Dutch are reluctant to
provide a formal readout of the trip at this time, and are
prickly about describing internal EU deliberations on this
issue. Informally, however, a Dutch contact told us
informally that a compromise solution is in sight, in which
Burma would participate at ASEM and ASEM would issue a
statement of dissatisfaction with Burma's human rights
record. The Dutch are clearly wary about appearing to exert
pressure on either ASEAN or Burma. END SUMMARY.


2. Poloff met July 29 with Eric Verwaal, Head of Asia and
Oceania Department and Special Assistant to EU Presidency
Special Envoy Hans van den Broek, who accompanied van den
Broek on his recent trip to Asia. Noting that ref A points
had been successfully conveyed to van den Broek en route,
Verwaal provided the following point-by-point response:

-- The Dutch take note of the U.S. interest in the situation,
but cannot comment on expectations or developments at this
point.

-- The Dutch are aware of the upcoming Burmese chairmanship
of ASEAN, but think there is "some question about the extent
to which pressure will be effective." Verwaal noted that
while ASEAN is "painfully aware" of the situation, having
lost face when Burma did not follow through on expected steps
this spring, he believed there was also substantial
sensitivity among ASEAN members that external parties
recognize that Burma is a full member of ASEAN.

-- The Dutch believe the EU does not consider itself in a
position to exert pressure on ASEAN regarding the situation
(while noting there are always a variety of views among
members). The EU will keep up dialogue with Asian partners
who were already aware of the situation, and have contacts
with all parties involved.

-- The Dutch take note of the U.S. plans not to send senior

representatives to attend ASEAN meetings hosted by Burma in
2006, but Verwaal noted what he saw as a possible discrepancy
that Secretary Powell had attended the recent ASEAN Regional
Forum in Jakarta which was also attended by the Burmese FM
and defense officials.

-- Finally, Verwaal said that the EU has certainly shared its
view with its Asian partners that Burma must abide by
international standards if it is to join the international
community. He commented, however, that such a status is "not
a top priority" for the Burmese junta.


2. (SBU) In response to Poloff's request for a readout of
the trip, Verwaal said he was reluctant to discuss ongoing
"delicate negotiations." Restating the delegation's initial
response to a July 21 invitation to brief the Embassy upon
van den Broek's return, Verwaal reminded that van den Broek
would report directly and exclusively to FM Bot, who would
report his conclusions at the informal "Gymnich" meeting.
(Note: We were informed separately that Van Den Broek
provided a readout to FM Bot on July 26.) Verwaal said that
since no other partners, including within the EU, were being
briefed during this initial phase, the Dutch were unable to
brief the USG. Overall, however, Verwaal commented that the
talks held during the trip were constructive, "discussions
were very good, and the level of reception showed an
appreciation for the issues involved." Verwaal added that
the Dutch would be open and willing to exchange views with
the U.S. and others regarding handling the approaching
Burmese chairmanship of ASEAN once the EU had made a decision
on the upcoming summit.


3. (SBU) Verwaal was apologetic about not sharing more with
us at this point, but insisted that it was in the best
interest of "almost all parties involved." Verwaal seemed
especially sensitive about the possibility of imposing
additional sanctions against Burma, stating (without being
asked) that "the EU has no intention of undertaking economic
sanctions." Verwaal also argued that "external pressure" on
ASEAN in general would have an adverse effect since ASEAN is
still struggling to develop its own balanced approach to
Burma.


4. (C/NF) In a separate meeting June 27, Jaap Werner,
Director for Political Affairs, told DCM and POLCOUNS that a
compromise solution for the summit was in sight. Werner
suggested that the EU would eventually agree to allow Burma
to participate in the ASEM summit (albeit at a lower level)
provided that ASEM clearly expressed dissatisfaction with the
human rights situation in Burma. Werner indicated that Van
Den Broek's brief had been along these lines. He cautioned
that the EU had not yet reached consensus on the issue, but
suggested that the Dutch would work toward developing one
along the lines he described at the September Gymnich and
GAERC meetings.


5. (C) COMMENT: It is unusual for the Dutch to be so
cautious about sharing information. The fact that we were
told both before and after Van den Broek's trip that the MFA
would not be able to brief us highlights the sensitivity of
this issue and the delicacy of current negotiations. As
noted in previous reporting, Dutch officials -- including FM
Bot and PM Balkenende -- believe the Dutch presidency will be
judged in large part by the success or failure of its
summits. Their top priority, therefore, is clearly is to
find a "compromise solution" to ensure that the meeting takes
place. END COMMENT.

SOBEL