Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04THEHAGUE1902
2004-07-28 15:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

NETHERLANDS/NEPAL: DEMARCHE ON MAOIST VIOLENCE

Tags:  PTER ETTC EFIN NP NL EUN 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

281554Z Jul 04
C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001902 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2014
TAGS: PTER ETTC EFIN NP NL EUN
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/NEPAL: DEMARCHE ON MAOIST VIOLENCE

REF: STATE 159970

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Schofer for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001902

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2014
TAGS: PTER ETTC EFIN NP NL EUN
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/NEPAL: DEMARCHE ON MAOIST VIOLENCE

REF: STATE 159970

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Schofer for reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: The Dutch are in discussion with EU
colleagues regarding designation of the Maoists, but expect
to release a "balanced" statement condemning violence on both
sides as an interim measure. They expect the Maoists will be
designated this Fall. End Summary.

Dutch Presidency Statement Expected This Week
--------------


2. (C) Poloff met with Wilfred Mohr, Head of South Asia
Division, July 27 to discuss reftel message. Econoff also
delivered the points separately on July 23 to Wouter Jurgens,
Senior Policy Adviser responsible for terrorist financing
issues in the MFA's Political Affairs Department, and on July
27 to Margreet Wenting, Senior Policy Advisor in the
Department of Financial Integrity at the Finance Ministry.


3. (C) Mohr confirmed that the EU had followed up its June
discussion of the situation at last week's COREPER, and said
the Dutch Presidency is preparing to issue a statement on the
matter this week. Mohr expected the statement to take a
"compromise position" calling on all parties to refrain from
excessive violence, and to conduct themselves in a manner
consistent with respect for human rights. Mohr said the UK
was most active toward getting the Maoists designated, and
the Germans and Swedes most hesitant (although he thought the
UK had already alleviated the German areas of "criteria"
reluctance).

"Balanced Approach"
--------------


4. (C) Mohr said that the problem encountered in EU
discussion was that there was pressure for a "balanced
approach" since both sides were guilty of violent acts (he
said "the army goes a bit too far") and some EU member states
doubt the sincerity of the GON's attempts to move forward
with respect to human rights. Mohr singled out the GON's
creation of the Human Rights Office, which he said "has no
teeth" and said that the already-existing Human Rights
Commission "does excellent work." He wondered why the GON
would then create a separate, less active Human Rights
Office, implying that this demonstrated that they do not
intend to improve the situation as much as they could.

Strategy Toward Designation
--------------


5. (C) Mohr seemed fairly certain that the Maoists would be
designated by the EU this Fall. The Dutch will issue a
Presidency statement, putting pressure on both sides, which
should lead the GON to move forward with a cease-fire and
initiate peace negotiations. At that point, an EU review
would be held, as the result of which Mohr expected the
Maoists would be designated. Mohr commented, however, that
if the Maoists would be prepared by that time to commence
peace negotiations with the GON, the EU would have trouble
designating them -- but he did not believe this was likely to
occur by the fall. Mohr asked whether the U.S. had a
strategy in place for de-listing the Maoists if they began to
engage with the GON in peace negotiations.

Not Condemning Maoists
--------------


6. (C) When poloff asked whether the Dutch or EU had
condemned Maoist terrorism, Mohr provided a July 6 statement
released in Kathmandu by the Danish Embassy (EU Presidency
representation in Nepal) in which the EU heads of mission
welcomed the formation of a new interim government, and
called on the GON to ensure early negotiations with the
Maoists. He conceded that this did not in fact condemn the
Maoists. He also conceded that while the GON could not be
construed as conducting "terrorist" acts, the Maoists were in
fact engaging in random violent acts.

SOBEL