Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04THEHAGUE1844
2004-07-22 14:14:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

THE HAGUE EAC CONVENED JULY 22, 2004

Tags:  ASEC NL PTER 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

221414Z Jul 04
S E C R E T THE HAGUE 001844 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DS/IP/EUR, DS/ITA, DS/ER/CC, EUR/UBI, EUR/EX

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2014
TAGS: ASEC NL PTER
SUBJECT: THE HAGUE EAC CONVENED JULY 22, 2004


Classified By: LISELI MUNDIE, ACTING RSO

SUMMARY
(U)
S E C R E T THE HAGUE 001844

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DS/IP/EUR, DS/ITA, DS/ER/CC, EUR/UBI, EUR/EX

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2014
TAGS: ASEC NL PTER
SUBJECT: THE HAGUE EAC CONVENED JULY 22, 2004


Classified By: LISELI MUNDIE, ACTING RSO

SUMMARY
(U) 1. This is an action request. Please see paragraph 6.

(U) 2. Post convened an EAC July 22 to review security
postures and consider new security measures as a result of
increased threat reporting. The EAC was briefed on new
information made available since the last EAC meeting and
existing and new security procedures were discussed. The EAC
unanimously agreed to make two requests to the Department
regarding security augmentation (see paragraph).

DETAILS:
(S ) 3. The Deputy Chief of Mission briefed the EAC on his
meetings with the Director of Crisis Management and Security
Matters and the Director of Coordination on Counterterrorism.
The DCM voiced the Missions, displeasure with the time that
it took the GONL to notify the AmEmbassy The Hague of
relevant threat information. The Crisis Management and
Security Matters Director stated that the U.S. Embassy,s
present security posture had been reviewed and was deemed
acceptable by the GONL. Nevertheless, he agreed to do better
in sharing information quickly in the future.

(S N/F) 4. ORCA briefed the EAC regarding the Dutch
Security and Intelligence Service (AIVD) report that on June
2, 2004, a member of a suspected terrorist cell cased the
U.S. Embassy while paying particular attention to the main
vehicle and visitor entrance. OGA relayed their displeasure
at the six week time lag between the occurrence and the
notification from the GONL to the U.S. Embassy.

(S N/F) 5. The Acting RSO briefed the EAC on existing
security measures and the importance of procedure
enforcement. The Acting RSO reviewed current security
procedures to include vehicle and pedestrian entrance/exits
on new security measures that would be implemented. The
Acting RSO stated that effective June 26, 2004, a Local Guard
will be moved from his current post in the lobby into the CAC
to conduct the screening process for all visitors and Embassy
personnel to augment the presence of the CAC security
greeter. The Acting RSO also stated that commencing Monday
July 2004, bikes entering the compound via the bicycle
entrance will be itemized by the Local Guard Force. The
Acting RSO is scheduled to meet with the local police
supervisor to request that the police that are assigned to
rove around the Embassy compound be positioned mostly on the
street entry leading to the Embassy,s main entry gate as a
deterent. The Acting ARSO has compared the photographs of the
individual who cased the Embassy on June 2, 2004, with the
photographs and incident reports from the SD Team but did not
find any similarities or photographs matching those provided
by AIVD.

(S N/F) 6. ACTION REQUEST: Due to the current elevated
threat reporting, the shortfall in Local Guard coverage and
of inadequate perimeter setback, the EAC requests funding for
an additional Local Guard position to serve as a rover around
the Embassy compound and to assist the Local Guard in the
screening of visitors and Embassy personnel. The EAC also
formally requests expedited funding for the DS/OBO perimeter
security project involving the installation of bollards and
an anti-climb perimeter fence.
RUSSEL