SUBJECT: DUTCH/CUBA: STRONG ON HUMAN RIGHTS;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001639

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY (MARGINS)

DEPT FOR WHA/CCA COLEMAN, EUR/UBI HOLLIDAY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2014
TAGS: CU EAID ETTC NL PHUM PREL EUN
SUBJECT: SUBJECT: DUTCH/CUBA: STRONG ON HUMAN RIGHTS;
WAVERING ON ISOLATION

REF: A. REF: (A) STATE 135512


B. (B) HAVANA 2996

C. (C) BRUSSELS 2733

Classified By: Classified by POL Counselor Andrew Schofer
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY


1. (C) The EU Common Position forms Dutch policy toward Cuba.
While the Dutch prefer a policy of engagement to one of isolation,
they are resolute that Cuba must first improve human rights before
any thaw in EU-Cuban relations -- even to pre-2003 "constructive
engagement" as usual. Besides this tough official policy, the
Dutch are working to cultivate civil society in Cuba, and several
Dutch NGOs support local efforts to strengthen human rights,
democracy and fundamental freedoms, and hasten the arrival
of a post-Castro Cuba. Strong Dutch policies and actions
toward Cuba, together with general cooperation with the U.S., make
a renewed suspension of Title III of the Libertad Act a matter
of U.S. national interest.

European Policy Ties Relations to Human Rights


2. (C) Dutch Cuba policy is primarily dictated by the EU. In
a June 24 meeting with Poloff, Dutch MFA Cuba desk officer
Jan Jaap Groenemeijer reiterated that the Dutch do not intend to
take a different line toward Cuba from the EU, and cautioned that
the EU would take issue with a country-by-country U.S. approach to
member states. He also noted that the EU's July 6 Latin America
Working Group meeting would discuss both Cuba and U.S. concerns.


3. (C) Groenemeijer stressed that the EU gives a high priority to
human rights in its dealings with Cuba, and that no easing in
official relations will take place until the Cuban government
improves the human rights situation of Cubans. Groenemeijer
indicated that the EU Common Position toward Cuba had never been
stronger, limiting official and cultural ties with Cuba and denying
improved relations until the Cuban government makes human rights
improvements. This position will not weaken during the Dutch EU
presidency.

Dutch Interested in Unfreezing Relations When/If Human Rights
Improve


4. (C) Groenemeijer emphasized that the U.S. and EU share the
same human rights objectives with regard to Cuba, but commented
that Europeans generally prefer a strategy of engagement to one of
isolation. Groenemeijer said the effect of the recent crackdown
in Cuba was that Havana has "isolated itself." The resulting
diplomatic freeze was "not benefiting anyone," he said, and would
ultimately be "a price paid by the Cuban people."
While emphasizing the European preference to engage ("helping
rather than isolating") Groenemeijer nevertheless said he did not
foresee any EU move to unfreeze relations until the human rights
situation in Cuba improved.


5. (C) Groenemeijer placed particular emphasis on the 75
political prisoners arrested in March 2003, commenting that no
improvements in relations would take place until the prisoners
were released. The recent release of prisoners, he said, was not
sufficient to change the Dutch or EU positions. Groenemeijer
added that he foresaw no change in EU policy during the Dutch EU
presidency even if the situation improved, primarily because
"reaching agreement with all European governments takes a
long time."

Optimistic About Civil Society; Wary of Appearances


6. (C) Groenemeijer commented that he saw "a lot of potential
for Cuban civil society." He cited the Varela project, which
continues to collect more
signatures in its petition campaign despite the fierce
Cuban crackdown, as evidence that Cuban civil society
remains active and continues to grow even in the face of
hardship.


7. (C) When questioned as to whether Groenemeijer believed
that the Dutch mission in Havana would be interested in working
with the U.S. Interest Section the specific projects cited in
Reftel B (Note: Schoudeboom is now Ambassador in Latvia rather than
Director of the Latin America and Caribbean office),Groenemeijer
expressed concern that the Europeans might be -- and in some cases
already were -- seen as "slaves" to the U.S. in places like Cuba.
"The EU has its own policy," he stated. (Note: This presumably
would not preclude approaching the Dutch in the EU presidency
capacity, however.)

Dutch Activities in Cuba


8. (C) Dutch officials routinely make their concerns regarding
the human rights situation in Cuba known, both in public and
through gestures such as issuing invitations to Cuban dissidents
to attend national day celebrations overseas. Several Dutch NGOs
also help focus public attention on human rights in Cuba.
Dutch NGO Pax Christi, for example, whose work raised awareness
about Cuban human rights prior to the EU's toughening of policies
toward Cuba, supports the Plan Varela Campaign, a dissident-run
petition drive to convince law-makers to put constitutional
rights - which are currently ignored - into law. Pax Christi has
contact with the Cuban dissident movement Movimiento Cristiano
Liberacion (MCL),which seeks to stimulate the democratization
of the Cuban regime, and MCL-run magazine Vitral, which seeks
to empower civil and political awareness in preparation for a
democratic transition. Dutch NGO Hivos (Humanist Institute for
Cooperation with Developing Countries) provides financial and
political support to twelve local partner organizations in Cuba,
including agricultural, developmental, and cultural programs.

Consequences if Title III Not Suspended


9. (C) Groenemeijer reminded that the US-EU Understanding on
Cuba reached in 1996 meant that the U.S. was expected to suspend
Tier III of the Libertad (Helms-Burton) Act and the EU would drop
its WTO case against the U.S. with reference to the legislation.
Groenemeijer believed that the EU would renew its case against the
U.S. legislation before the WTO if Title III were not suspended.

Comment


10. (C) Clearly the Dutch disagree with both the policy of
isolating Cuba and what they view as "extraterritoriality"
in the Libertad Act. These differences, however, should not
obscure the fact that the U.S. and Dutch generally share a
similar view of a free post-Castro Cuba. Failure to re-suspend
Title III for the Netherlands or the EU would cause a
major political fracas that would adversely impact political
relations with the Dutch and the EU. Even though the Netherlands
reportedly has "blocking laws" that would stop enforcement in The
Netherlands of any potential awards granted in U.S. courts
(if indeed there are any actual cases of Dutch companies operating
on confiscated properties ) Groenemeijer was not aware of any),
the real result would be a political wedge between otherwise strong
allies.

SOBEL