Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|
04THEHAGUE1565 | 2004-06-23 13:27:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy The Hague |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 001565 |
1. (C) Summary: The case against Slobodan Milosevic before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) crossed two key mileposts last week. On June 16, the Trial Chamber issued its decision on the amici curiae,s (friends of the court) motion seeking the dismissal of numerous charges against the accused. While the Court found that the prosecution failed to provide sufficient evidence for roughly 130 of over 400 specific allegations against the Accused, it refused to dismiss any of the sixty-six counts against Milosevic. As a result, counts for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes still stand. The decision, moreover, found sufficient evidence of a joint criminal enterprise in which Milosevic participated, an essential finding for the prosecution given the dearth of evidence directly linking Milosevic to specific criminal acts. A defense status conference on June 17 marked the first official appearance of Judge Bonomy (the replacement to Judge May) and a solid first performance by Judge Robinson as presiding judge. The conference showed the Trial Chamber walking a careful line between efficient management of the defense case and ensuring that it does not encroach upon the Accused,s rights at trial. The Chamber rejected Milosevic,s plea for additional time to prepare his case, declined to consider whether to subpoena witnesses and documents from the U.S. and other governments absent additional steps and submissions by Milosevic, and confirmed that the defense phase of the trial would commence on Monday, July 5. End summary. -------------------------- --- Motion to Dismiss: A Victory for OTP -------------------------- --- 2. (SBU) On March 3, the amici curiae filed a motion for acquittal under Rule 98 bis of the Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence with respect to roughly 200 of the more than 400 specific allegations against Milosevic. (NB: A Rule 98 bis motion is similar in most respects to a summary judgment motion in U.S. jurisdictions. According to the rule, the trial chamber in response to such a motion may issue a judgment of acquittal on some or all offenses "if it finds that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction on that or those charges." A dismissal of a challenge does not, however, mean that the trial chamber will convict on a particular count; it merely confirms that the prosecution has presented enough evidence to support conviction on a particular allegation absent contrary evidence introduced during the defense phase. A further act of judging, of weighing whether the evidence meets the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for a criminal conviction, only comes following the defense case.) The amici argued that an armed conflict did not exist in Kosovo prior to March 24, 1999, requiring a dismissal of all allegations related to the period before that date in Kosovo; the charges related to the conflict in Croatia between January 15 and May 22, 1992, should be dismissed because there was no international armed conflict during that period; the genocide charges related to Bosnia should be dismissed for lack of evidence of the accused,s relevant actions or specific intent to commit genocide; and roughly 200 separate allegations related to specific crimes should be dismissed for insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. 3. (SBU) In a 144-page ruling (available at ref A), the Trial Chamber refused to dismiss any of the sixty-six counts (which are made up of roughly 400 underlying allegations) against Milosevic. In particular, the chamber found sufficient evidence of an armed conflict in Kosovo prior to March 24, 1999 and sufficient evidence of Croatian statehood by October 8, 1991, leading it to reject the amici,s arguments related to grave breach charges in Croatia. The Trial Chamber did, however, dismiss roughly 130 of the allegations related to specific crimes that were associated with a number of the indictment counts. 4. (C) Many observers were waiting to see whether the chamber would uphold the genocide counts of the Bosnia indictment, long seen as among the weakest elements of the prosecution,s case. The chamber first found sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction on genocide charges, saying that it "could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there existed a joint criminal enterprise, which included members of the Bosnian Serb leadership, whose aim and intention was to destroy a part of the Bosnian Muslim population, and that genocide was in fact committed" in a number of municipalities. More importantly, it said that it "could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused was a participant in the joint criminal enterprise . . . and that he shared with its participants the aim and intention to destroy a part of the Bosnian Muslims as a group". In reaching this conclusion, the chamber pointed to Milosevic,s leadership role among all Serbs; his advocacy of "greater Serbia"; the support of Serbia to the Bosnian Serbs; the accused,s relationship with Bosnian Serb political and military leaders, and his authority and influence over them; his "intimate knowledge" of events in Bosnia; and the scope and nature of the crimes. 5. (C) Of the three indictments, the Kosovo case best survived the ruling, with the Court dismissing all objections lodged by the amici. By contrast, the court dismissed roughly 125 (of 300) specific allegations covered by the Bosnia indictment related to detention facilities, forcible transfers and most of the Sarajevo sniping and shelling incidents. Similarly, the court dismissed roughly 5 (of 55) specific allegations related to the Croatia indictment. At several points throughout the judgment, especially concerning Bosnia, the trial chamber found that U.S. witnesses (especially General Wesley Clark, but also former Ambassadors Galbraith and Okun) and documents (not all of which have been publicly identified as having been made available by the USG) provided key support for the prosecution case. 6. (C) Despite the loss of roughly 130 of the specific allegations of crimes, the decision on the whole seems to bear out Senior Trial Attorney Dermot Groome,s assessment that it represents a "huge victory" for OTP. Groome said that OTP had conceded the lack of evidence for most of the specific allegations dismissed by the chamber. The retention of the genocide count in particular marks a significant victory for OTP. That said, the judgment does not mean that the prosecution case has been proven; rather, it demonstrates that the prosecution was able to show that, in the absence of contrary evidence presented by the defense, the evidence could sustain a conviction. It remains for the trial chamber, following the defense case, to weigh the evidence and determine whether it actually meets the much higher standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required in such a criminal case. -------------------------- -------------------------- Status Conference: Gearing up for the Defense -------------------------- -------------------------- 7. (C) The pretrial conference on June 17 was an important milestone in the Milosevic case, both substantively and procedurally. (NB: The "Omnibus Order on Matters Dealt with at the Pre-Trial Conference" provides an overview of the decisions reached at the conference and is available at ref website). The conference was attended by Milosevic, two amici, the new liaison between the chamber and the accused, and other court officers, while a full press contingent was in the gallery. Only lead prosecutor Geoffrey Nice and Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte were present at the prosecution,s table. Conspicuously absent were senior trial attorneys Dermot Groome and Hildegard Uertz-Retzlaff who had led the Bosnia and Croatia portions of case respectively. (NB: Embassy legal officers understand that Groome and Uertz-Retzlaff will be called upon to help "if and when SIPDIS necessary." Del Ponte, in turn, has indicated that she will actively participate in the defense phase, saying to her staff, "I want to have fun with this witness list." Comment. Neither development is positive. End comment.) 8. (SBU) The Court maintained July 5 as the firm start date for Milosevic,s defense, with 150 sitting days allotted to his case. Milosevic complained bitterly and unsuccessfully about the lack of time he had to prepare witnesses and present his case. He claimed, with support from the Amici, that he had been unable to work at all for 41 days of the preparation period and that that his work had been limited by physician orders to three days a week. The Court extended his opening statement to four hours, but left other aspects of timing unchanged. The Court,s only acknowledgment of Milosevic,s complaints was a vague reference to reserving the right to be flexible during the course of Milosevic,s presentation if it appears that a lack of preparation is a valid concern. 9. (C) The hearing was the first public appearance of Judge Bonomy (the English judge who replaced the ailing Judge May), and the first time that Judge Robinson (the Jamaican judge who assumed May,s role as presiding judge) ran the courtroom. Bonomy participated in the proceedings and was evidently up-to-date on the material. (Comment: In conversations with our British colleagues we learned that Bonomy has a reputation for speaking his mind and running a very tight courtroom. End Comment). Judge Robinson performed admirably, keeping Milosevic on a short leash, though providing him with greater freedom to speak than Judge May likely would have. 10. (SBU) The primary substantive issue of the conference concerned Milosevic,s confidential and sealed witness list. As described in ref B, Milosevic,s list includes roughly 1600 names (five times more than that called by the prosecution), of which only 300 or so are named in the document. The OTP complained that there was not enough detail describing the witnesses and their relevance to the case to allow for effective preparation of cross-examination. (Comment: Some of the witness descriptions were extremely "exiguous," in Nice,s term ) one witness was labeled simply as an "academician," with no reference as to who he was or the reason he was being called to testify. End Comment). The Court rejected the prosecution,s request for more detail, though it did require Milosevic, "where possible," to provide the birth date of each witness. The Court also ordered Milosevic to produce within seven days a list of his first 50 witnesses and the likely order in which they will be called. The Court further ordered Milosevic to present his evidence "in an orderly manner, bringing witnesses on an indictment by indictment basis, except for overlapping witnesses." 11. (SBU) Milosevic pressed the Court to subpoena various witnesses (including former President Clinton, Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroeder) and documents (in particular those held by "foreign intelligence organizations"). The Court indicated that it was "not in a position to consider the Accused,s oral application for the production of documents or information from States, and that he should make his application in writing and comply with any other procedural requirements." Milosevic has thus far refused to submit any written requests to the Court under his own hand (as a matter "of principle") and thus the exact status of Milosevic,s requests was left unclear. The Court also ordered Milosevic to indicate whether he intends to testify during the defense phase and, if so, when and for how long. -------------------------- Comment -------------------------- 12. (C) The trial chamber,s Rule 98 bis judgment marks the most significant milestone thus far in the trial of Slobodan Milosevic. In effect, it is the trial chamber,s first reaction to the prosecution case. As such, the prosecution has reason to be happy, though not overconfident. The trial chamber rejected dozens of specific incidents supporting counts against the accused, but these were incidents for which the prosecution largely conceded its failure to provide sufficient, if any, evidence. The retention of the genocide counts -- particularly the notion that Milosevic was involved in a joint criminal enterprise to commit genocide -- suggests that the prosecution succeeded in painting a picture of a defendant who was much more involved in the Bosnian war than he has admitted. That said, the 98 bis judgment reflects the trial chamber,s reactions to a somewhat modest challenge to the prosecution case. Typically, one expects a defendant to challenge all charges with real vigor; here the defendant refused to participate, let alone challenge the charges in a legally (as opposed to politically) recognizable way and it was left to the amici to pose a limited challenge to the prosecution,s case. 13. (C) Milosevic,s approach gave no new indication that he would present serious evidence to undermine the specifics of the prosecution case. He continues to obsess over the senior leadership of governments that dealt with him in the 1990s, a tack that may very well further his domestic political ambition to paint himself (and Serbia) as a victim of the West, particularly NATO and its member states. But a political case leaves him without any defense against the specific charges brought against him. The summary judgment motion gives some bait -- a roadmap for his defense, an indication of what he needs to target -- but his performance at the pre-defense conference gave no indication that he,ll rise to take it. 14. (C) Beyond the questions of proof and defense, the status conference demonstrated that Milosevic will play the "fairness" card at every opportunity. To say that the trial is unfair adds an entirely different layer of argument to his ongoing rejection of the Tribunal,s authority to try him. It helps paint himself as the victim against a well-resourced prosecution, and his illnesses serve to buttress the point. Milosevic is likely to play to the trial chamber on this theme repeatedly, testing a presiding judge who has, in the past, seemed most willing to indulge Milosevic,s claims of unfairness. It will put the trial chamber in a difficult position of balancing the tension between countering any perception of unfairness to the defense and trial efficiency. SOBEL |