Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04THEHAGUE1484
2004-06-16 14:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

MOLDOVA/TRANSNISTRIA: DUTCH RESPONSE ON STABILITY

Tags:  PREL PARM PBTS MD NL OSCE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001484 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2014
TAGS: PREL PARM PBTS MD NL OSCE
SUBJECT: MOLDOVA/TRANSNISTRIA: DUTCH RESPONSE ON STABILITY
PACT

REF: STATE 130336

Classified By: Political Counselor M. Daly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001484

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2014
TAGS: PREL PARM PBTS MD NL OSCE
SUBJECT: MOLDOVA/TRANSNISTRIA: DUTCH RESPONSE ON STABILITY
PACT

REF: STATE 130336

Classified By: Political Counselor M. Daly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Emboffs delivered reftel demarche June 15 to Frank
van Beuningen, MFA OSCE policy coordinator, Willemijn
Kallenberg MFA OSCE senior policy advisor, and Bas Wels, MFA
lead on East European issues during the Dutch EU presidency.


2. (C) Before we presented our points, the Dutch noted
similar concerns as in reftel. They called the Moldovan
proposal vague and said they were uncertain as to what the
GoM wanted to achieve with it. They found it "most striking"
that the proposal addresses an internal problem by presenting
a plan to external partners. The Dutch believe that the GoM
should begin by addressing Transnistrian authorities rather
than the international community. Given Russia's close ties
with Transnistria, the Dutch found it odd that while
appearing to circumvent the Transnistrians, the Moldovans
have consulted with Russia.


3. (C) Despite the unorthodox approach, the Dutch think the
basic Moldovan objective might be to "instill energy" to the
five-sided negotiations, which they described as having come
to a "full stop". The Dutch were surprised at the absence of
mention of the OSCE, and wondered if what was envisioned was
a two-track process or something to replace the existing
process. They did not reject the possibility it would help
the five-sided negotiations to move ahead, but added there is
also the danger that Russia could use the proposal as
additional reason for delay.


4. (C) The Dutch also believe it's possible that the
proposal was simply a less than well-thought-out election
ploy by President Voronin. The Dutch have the impression
that Voronin did not even consult his own foreign ministry
about the proposal before going public, let alone coordinate
with other potential signatories. (They noted that a
high-level Moldovan minister met with the Dutch the day the
proposal was announced, and did not mention it to them.)


5. (C) Wels noted that the EU does not yet have a reaction
to the U.S. proposal for a high-level meeting, but may reach
a consensus by mid to late July. There is concern from some
member states that the U.S. proposal could undermine the OSCE
role, while others think it would be a boost for the existing
process. The Dutch asked about the substance of the U.S.
reply to the initial Moldovan draft, and whether the current
draft reflected changes suggested by the U.S. Emboffs
advised that the U.S. had not given an extensive commentary
on the text, but rather that we had urged the GoM to consult
with others.
SOBEL